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Abstract
Whether there exist causal relations between guns firing and people dying, between
pedals pressed and cars accelerating, or between carbon dioxide emissions and global
warming, is typically taken to be a mind-independent, objective, matter of fact. How-
ever, recent contributions to the literature on causation, in particular theories of con-
trastive causation and causal modelling, have undermined this central causal platitude
by relativising causal facts to models or to interests. This thesis flies against the pre-
vailing wind by arguing that we must pay greater attention to which elements of our
causal talk vary with context and which elements track genuine features of the world
around us. I will argue that once these elements are teased apart we will be in a
position to better understand some of the most persistent problems in the philoso-
phy of causation: pre-emption cases, absence causation, failures of transitivity and
overdetermination. The result is a naturalist account of causation, concordant with
the contextual variability we find in our ordinary causal talk, and parsimonious with
respect to the theoretical entities posited.
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Introduction
What is it for one thing to cause another? The answer to this question will have
an impact on questions of responsibility and agency, on questions of the interaction
between the body and the mind and, most obviously, it will impact on causal theories
of knowledge and perception. And yet, whilst an answer would have wide import, there
is currently no philosophical consensus as to what that answer might be.
One might think that we demonstrate a mastery of the causal concept in our ability
to manipulate the world around us. After all, if we didn’t know what caused what,
then we wouldn’t be able to drive a car, operate a television or take a photograph.
Plainly we already understand many cases of cause and effect! However the question
is not ‘what are the causes?’ but rather ‘what is it about the causes that make them
causes?’ and this is a notion we are yet to master.
The recent literature in the philosophy of causation has produced a wide variety of
views which in turn have produced a plethora of problematic cases that appear to refute
them. Reading this literature, one can detect a growing pessimism about the prospects
of our ever being able to give a really informative and satisfying account of causation,
one that conforms to our ordinary understanding and identifies some unifying feature
that all cases of causation have in common. In particular there is great pessimism
about our being able to give an account which captures the idea that causation is a
natural rather than mind-dependent feature of the world around us.
In this thesis I will swim against that pessimistic tide. I will argue that we can
understand causation in terms of counterfactual dependence relations that hold be-
tween events in our world, and that we can explain and defuse the most problematic
counter-examples that have arisen to date.
1
2 Introduction
1.1 Overall Aims
I take it that an adequate account of causation must be able to say what someone
means when they say ‘c caused e’. So, my first aim will be:
(I) To account for our everyday causal assertions.
That first aim concerns our causal talk, not the metaphysics of causation itself. Of
the causal relation Strawson said:
We sometimes presume, or are said to presume, that causality is a natu-
ral relation which holds in the natural world between particular events or
circumstances, just as the relation of temporal succession does, or that of
spatial proximity. [Strawson, 1992, p.109]
Like temporal succession or spatial proximity, the relation of causation, we presume,
holds or does not hold between c and e mind-independently. To which Menzies adds:
If causation is a natural relation between events, then this relation should
hold no matter how the events are described. In other words, causal propo-
sitions should be extensional in the sense that the substitution of one event
nominal for a second co-referential event nominal in a causal proposition
should preserve the truth-value of the proposition. [Menzies, 2009, p.346]
Menzies takes it to be our central causal platitude that causation is a natural, mind-
independent relation. I hasten to add that Menzies identifies this notion in order to
refute it. That refutation hinges, however, on there being no viable theory of causation
which can conform to this platitude and account for our causal talk. So, in addition
to the first aim of this thesis regarding causal talk, I add the following aim regarding
the metaphysics of causation:
(II) To give an account of the mind-independent, objective standard for
causal connectedness between events.
In other words I will hypothesise that there is such a relation and proceed to see if
there is a viable theory that can accommodate that hypothesis.
What connects (I) and (II)? The first concerns what we say and the second what
the world is like, so insofar as they pertain to the same topic we might hope that
that the account of causation that is offered meets both requirements under a single
account. That does not require that our causal talk be analysed in one way and that
our metaphysics be analysed in the very same way, but any strategy that aims to offer
two different analyses owes an explanation as to how they are connected. So my third
aim will be:
(III) To explain the relation of (I) and (II).
1.2 Lewis 3
I will aim to meet these requirements by advocating a two-tier account of causation.
The first tier will concern the truth conditions for our causal talk and the second tier
will concern the conditions under which causation takes place in the world. Both will
be subject to a counterfactual analysis which stems from, but is not identical to, David
Lewis’s 1973 analysis of causation. Regarding such a two-stage strategy within the
counterfactual tradition, Menzies says:
[I]t would surely be a surprising fact, requiring elaborate explanation, if our
framework for conceptualizing causation used in two different but crucial
ways the very same idea of difference-making.
I will attempt to meet this explanatory challenge and to offer a theory of causation
which successfully accounts for apparently problematic cases from the literature: cases
of pre-emption, causation by omission, apparent failures of transitivity and cases of
causal overdetermination. Along the way I will make assumptions and accept conse-
quences that others would not. In the end, however, we will have something which we
do not have now: a naturalist theory of causation which can handle the problem cases.
Once we have such a theory we will be in a position to ‘measure the price’ as Lewis
put it: consider the costs of accepting the theory, the benefits, and to compare it to
rival theories. I will explicitly aim to measure the price in Chapter 9.
1.2 Lewis
I will take as my point of departure the highly influential theory of causation given in
1973 by David Lewis. According to this account:
Actual event c is a cause of a distinct actual event e iff there is a chain of
causal dependence which connects c to e, where e causally depends on c iff
the following conditional is true: ¬Oc ¬Oe.
Here Oc represents the proposition that c occurs and the symbol represents the
counterfactual conditional, so the conditional is to be read as: were it not the case the
c occurred, it would not have been the case that e occurred. So, e causally depends on
c if c occurs, e occurs, and if c had not occurred, e wouldn’t have.
What does it mean to say that if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred? In
other words, what are the semantics for the counterfactual conditional? Working out a
viable semantics for counterfactuals was a significant philosophical breakthrough in the
20th century and it is a breakthrough for which Lewis [2001] shares some credit with
Robert Stalnaker [1968]. Lewis and Stalnaker both offered a semantics based on the
notion of possible worlds. Possible worlds are ways the world could have been—every
way you can imagine—and these worlds are to be thought of as ordered or ranked
in terms of their similarity to the actual world. The worlds that are more like ours
in matters of fact and in their laws are closer than worlds which are less like ours.
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According to Lewis ¬Oc  ¬Oe is nonvacuously1 true iff there is some world in
which ¬Oc and ¬Oe are true, which is closer than any world in which ¬Oc is true and
in which ¬Oe is not. In other words it is true that if c had not occurred, e would not
have occurred if and only if there is some world such that (i) c and e do not occur, and
(ii) there is no closer world where c occurs and e does not.
There is a simplification available if we follow Stalnaker and accept, as Lewis did
not, the Limit Assumption that there is some closest ¬Oc world. If we assume the
Limit Assumption, we can say: ¬Oc ¬Oe is nonvacuously true iff all of the closest
¬Oc-worlds are ¬Oe-worlds. In words: if c had not occurred then e would not have
occurred is true if and only if all of the closest worlds where c does not occur, e does
not occur either.
I do not believe that anything in what I say is affected by accepting the Limit
Assumption and so I will avail myself of this simplification throughout without meaning
to commit myself one way or another regarding the truth of that assumption.
Lewis’s analysis of causation has had enormous impact on the philosophical litera-
ture and its success no doubt stems from its relative simplicity and its ability to match
common sense in a wide range of ordinary cases. The purpose of this analysis was to
give a broad and non-discriminatory account of causation, that is: to give an account
of causation which was not relativised to selection effects or interests. It was also a
reductive account, seeking to analyse causation in terms of a putatively more basic
notion: that of counterfactual dependence.
However problem cases soon emerged, in particular cases where we would ordinarily
assert that there was causation, yet in which there was no counterfactual dependence
between the putative cause and effect. To use a well-worn example:
EP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Suzy reaches for the only rock
and throws it at the window. Had she not thrown it Billy would have, and
he is notoriously accurate. The rock strikes the window and the window
breaks.
In this case it is clear that Suzy caused the window to break and that Billy did
not. So, by the counterfactual analysis it should be the case that had Suzy not thrown
the rock (¬Oc) then the window would not have broken (¬Oe). However, because
Billy would have thrown it instead, this is not true: even if Suzy had not thrown the
rock (¬Oc), the window would have still broken (Oe). So it seems at first glance as
though the counterfactual analysis gets the case wrong. Such cases are said to have an
Early Pre-emption structure, that is a structure whereby the actual cause pre-empts
the back-up by cutting it off at an early point. This is important because it means
that Lewis’s theory can appeal to some mid-point along the path the rock took between
Suzy and the window. An event that takes place at such a mid-point (call it event d)
takes place after the back-up has been frustrated so, by the time d occurs there is no
longer any back-up event to guarantee the window breaking. So, the window breaking
1Following Lewis, this is a useful shorthand for saying that there are at least some antecedent worlds
(¬Oc-worlds). If there were no ¬Oc-worlds then the antecedent would be false and the conditional
would be vacuously true.
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event e counterfactually depends on event d.2 Of course, Billy’s throw could not have
brought about d—it was a different rock thrown at a different time along a presumably
different trajectory—so d counterfactually depended upon Suzy’s throwing of the rock
(c). Thus there is a chain of counterfactual dependence which runs from e to d and
from d to c so, by Lewis’s transitive account of causation, c is a cause of e despite the
lack of direct counterfactual dependence.
Such cases depend upon the transitive nature of Lewis’s analysis and I will discuss
this important issue in Chapter 7, however there are cases with a similar structure
that do not seem open to the same response because they lack a mid-point such as
d, a midpoint which is partisan with respect to being dependent on the cause (Suzy)
and not the back-up (Billy). Such cases are known in the literature as cases of late
pre-emption:
LP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
Since there is no point at which Suzy’s rock is not backed-up by Billy’s, there is
no partisan midpoint via which we can trace a step-wise causal dependence from the
effect to the cause. These cases are taken to be amongst the most difficult for any
causal theory to account for. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I will lay the groundwork
for the solution I offer to these cases in Chapter 3. On the basis of that solution
I will develop the ACCT Analysis of causation through Chapters 4 and 5. I will
then apply that analysis to three other key problem cases for counterfactual analyses
of causation: what should we say about cases where it seems like absences (which
are presumably not events) cause things? (Chapter 6); what should we say about
apparent counterexamples to the transitivity of causation? (Chapter 7); what should
we say about cases where an effect was overdetermined and so the effect depended on
neither apparent cause? (Chapter 8). In Chapter 9 I will consider how this analysis
fares against rival contrastivist and causal modelling accounts—in short, I will compare
the prices.
1.3 Assumptions, Caveats and Terminology
In laying out the case for my analysis I will need to make certain assumptions. Some of
these are innocent and harmless and some require suspending concerns about a contro-
versial matter until some future discussion. Here I make as many of these assumptions
clear as I can.
Firstly, I will be assuming rather than arguing that a Lewisian counterfactual anal-
ysis is prima facie plausible. I do not mean that it is plausible given the problem cases
such as late pre-emption, but rather that it is plausible enough for the problem cases
2This step requires that we read the counterfactual in what is known as a non-backtrackting way.
This means that we hold the past relative to the event in question fixed when we consider what would
have happened if it didn’t occur. For discussion of this controversial reading see Lewis [1979].
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to stand out within an otherwise successful theory. That will be important as I will be
starting from Lewis’s theory and amending it in response to problems as I go through.
I will also be assuming determinism for the purposes of the discussion. This is
certainly controversial within metaphysics in general, but it is fairly standard in the
counterfactual causation literature as it makes the examples easier to sketch and the
semantics easier to state. Should the analysis on offer succeed within a deterministic
framework then that should motivate attempting to extend the theory to the indeter-
ministic cases too so this is an assumption of convenience, not a central commitment
of the theory.
I will not be taking a stand on modal realism. It would not trouble me to be
committed to the reality of the possible worlds that are discussed here—I do not find
the idea as unpalatable as some—but I do not believe that I need to share Lewis’s
(in)famous commitment [1986c] to modal realism.
Regarding the issue of which worlds are close and which are not, I think it important
to note that we may well agree on a particular similarity criterion for possible worlds yet
still disagree on which of those was the closest ¬Oc world, precisely because we disagree
about the status of c and what it would be for c not to occur. I will discuss this sort of
issue at length in Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 4 and apply my findings throughout
the thesis. However, whilst I do not deny that our standards of similarity for worlds
will vary by context, much as Lewis says in his [1979], I will proceed as though we
can take the ordering to be fixed by some objective standard once the context is fixed.
This is important for establishing a mind-independent standard of causal connection
as my aim (II) requires. Lewis’s use of a closest worlds metric is highly controversial,
and adding this objectivity requirement may make it even more so, but if causation
is a mind-independent, objective feature of our world that reduces to counterfactual
dependence between distinct events, then the truth conditions for those counterfactual
dependence relations had better be mind-independent and objective too.
I will be assuming four-dimensionalism, the view that time is simply another dimen-
sion which is perfectly analogous with the traditional three dimensions of space. Just as
physical locations such as the Himalayas are distant to me spatially (i.e. distant in the
three dimensions of space), past and future versions of the Himalayas are distant to me
spatio-temporally (i.e. distant in the three dimensions of space and the fourth dimen-
sion of time). Thus regions of spacetime in a world pick out a four-dimensional region
in that world. For a full exposition and a compelling case for four-dimensionalism see
Sider [2001]. The final view I will advocate does not strictly require this assumption
but my argument to that conclusion is easier to make if objects and events are close
analogues, as I take it they are under four-dimensionalism.
I will assume that events are the causal relata. This is not uncontroversial3 but
it is common in the counterfactual causation literature. Less common is the further
assumption that events are world-bound individuals, identical with the region of space-
time that they occupy. The merits of this approach to events will be laid out in Chapter
2.
3For alternative accounts see, for example, Mellor [1995] and Woodward [2003], and for a general
discussion see Ehring [2009].
1.4 Method 7
I will be assuming that there is a semantic/pragmatic distinction that roughly tracks
the difference between the truth conditions and assertability conditions for a sentence.
This will be important throughout but especially in Chapters 3 and 6 where I make
use of the difference between giving the truth conditions for a causal claim and giving
assertability conditions.
It will be useful for me to refer to causal claims, causal facts and causal expressions
throughout the discussion. I take causal expressions to be ordinary spoken (or written)
assertions of the form ‘c caused e’. I take causal claims to be somewhat distinct: they
are propositions concerning the relations of events in the world. The causal facts are
just those propositions which are true. Those views of causation which take the causal
facts to be determined by mind-independent and objective factors, I will refer to as
realist or naturalist invoking Strawson’s conception of ‘natural’.
1.4 Method
It is worth remarking on the method to be adopted here at the outset. Standardly,
theories of causation are offered and then tested against their ability to conform with
intuition on a range of imagined examples. I will be attempting to offer an account
of causation which at times requires that I reject certain causal intuitions (that others
have claimed) or require that certain claims which some find counter-intuitive ought
to be accepted. So, when is intuition a guide and when is it not? Lewis offered the
following:
If one event is a redundant cause of another, then is it a cause simpliciter?
Sometimes yes, it seems; sometimes no; and sometimes it is not clear one
way or the other. When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial
answer about a not-too- far-fetched case, theory had better agree. If an
analysis of causation does not deliver the common-sense answer, that is
bad trouble. [Lewis, 1986e, p.194]
The problem with this outlook is that it defers all-too-thoroughly to intuition and
leaves no room for a prescriptive theory. Here Lewis sounds like he is endorsing a sort
of Canberra Plan approach to causation where if we simply list the causal platitudes
endorsed by the folk, we will have derived a (likely disjunctive) theory of causation.
This is an approach which Lewis would later explicitly reject [2004a, p.76], but the
earlier statement quoted above indicates that philosophers of causation should defer to
intuition almost without challenge. Hall responds to this idea exceptionally well in my
opinion and I will quote his response at length here as it serves as a powerful statement
of the methodological sensibilities that I will be guided by in this thesis:
Why not accord intuitions about cases such a high degree of respect?
Because a sensible metaphysical position is that facts about what causes
what reduce to facts about the complete history of physical states the world
occupies, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern the
evolution of these states.. . . Accept this reductionist picture—as I do, and
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as most authors in the counterfactual tradition seem to, either implicitly
or explicitly—and it seems that even perfect success at “triangulating” on
intuitions about cases will accomplish nothing more than the production of
a semantics for a fragment of English. Why should scientists, philosophers
of science, or metaphysicians care about that?
They shouldn’t. But it doesn’t follow that they should not care about
intuitions at all. That would be an overreaction. Rather, they should
treat intuitions about cases as defeasible evidence of the existence of a
theoretically useful concept, worth careful articulation and study. This is,
I think, a sensible attitude to take towards many topics in science and
philosophy. Do our firmly held intuitive judgments involving the word
“knowledge” track any concept of genuine interest for epistemology? Do our
firmly held intuitive judgements involving the word “life” track any concept
of genuine interest to biology? And so on. It’s quite difficult to answer these
questions well. But it seems clear that the best way to approach them is
to start out with the assumption that trying to produce an account that
respects the given intuitions will lead to something worthwhile.. . .
The shift from viewing intuitions as non-negotiable data to viewing them
as “guides” makes a difference to the dialectical role of examples. It won’t
do to exhibit some example, point out that [certain theories] get it wrong,
and declare them refuted. Rather, rejecting them on such a basis only
makes sense if one can produce a better account, and say why it is better,
beyond its ability to more closely fit the intuitive data. [Hall, 2007a, p.2-3]4
Following Hall I will be taking intuitions to be evidence, but defeasible evidence, in
favour or against a theory of causation. A theory which deviates from a widely held
intuition bears the explanatory burden to say why, and a theory which conforms with
intuitions on a given case better than another theory does is not automatically a better
theory overall. In such cases we must do as Lewis says and ‘measure the price’. The
cheapest theory wins.
4This quote is from a pre-print of Hall’s eventual [2007b] paper published in Philosophical Studies.
The methodological sermon appears in the pre-print that I cite here but not in the final printed edition
but Hall considers the pre-print the official version (personal correspondence). The print edition was
shortened due to space constraints.
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How much delay or change do we think it takes to replace an event by an
altogether different event, and not just by a different version of the same
event? An urgent question, if we want to analyze causation in terms of the
dependence of whether one event occurs on whether another event occurs.
Yet once we attend to the question, we surely see that it has no determinate
answer. We have not made up our minds; and if we presuppose sometimes
one answer and sometimes another, we are entirely within our linguistic
rights. [Lewis, 2004a, p.186]
In this chapter I argue that the contextual sensitivity attributed to certain causal claims
can be traced to shifts in how we represent the events involved in those claims. I will
adopt a counterpart-theoretic view of events and show that this provides a compelling
bridge across the fine-grain/coarse-grain dichotomy found in the literature on event
ontology. Next, using a recent proposal from Schaffer [2012a] as a counterpoint, I will
argue that combining this counterpart theory and a simple counterfactual analysis of
causation provides a neat fit and a parsimonious semantic treatment of context sensitive
causal claims. This relates to aim (I) of my thesis: to account for our everyday causal
assertions.
2.1 Event Variation Across Contexts
If events are the relata of causation, as is widely assumed, then those offering accounts
of causation had better specify what they take events to be. Counterfactual accounts
of causation in particular owe an account of what it is for an event to occur, and
importantly what it is for a given event not to occur.
In this section I propose that events should be viewed counterpart-theoretically.
I will then argue that our de re modal attributions concerning events can vary with
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context. This idea is familiar from Lewis’s discussion of objects and what he referred
to as our inconstant representation of them. In §2.2 I will show how this idea of
inconstancy can help us understand the context variation we find in our causal talk.
2.1.1 Event Modality
The literature on the ontology of events is split on the topic of grain. On the one hand
you have a fine-grained conception of events offered by, for example, Kim [1973] (and
Lewis [1986d, p241-269]) and on the other you have a coarse-grained conception of
events offered by, for example, Davidson [1963, 1969].
On the Kimian view events are constituted by the triple [object, property, time]:
an object having a property at a time. Thus, an object at a given time can constitute
one event in virtue of one property and constitute a second in the same place, at the
same time, in virtue of some other property. The non-constitutive properties that
are present in the object at that time are said to be ‘exemplified’ by the event but
not constitutive of it. Such events are considered fine-grained because there are as
many of them in a given space-time region as there are properties, leading to a fine
discrimination between events in a world.
On the Davidsonian view events are individuated by their causal role and are ex-
tensional. This means that they can be re-described, via different predicates, salva
veritate. According to this view the event Bill’s birthday party is identical with the
party in the penthouse. Since there was only one party, the idea that there is just one
event, twice represented, has prima facie plausibility. Davidson’s view of events offers
a coarse discrimination between events since it posits far fewer events1 in any given
space-time region than the Kimian alternative.
So, a key difference between the fine-grainer and the coarse-grainer lies in how many
events they posit in the actual world: the fine-grainer posits vastly more than the
coarse-grainer. These differing individuation conditions are clear enough in the actual
world, but our counterfactual considerations add a modal dimension to events—had
Bill’s party been held on the ground floor instead of the penthouse, would it have
been the same party? Nothing in the individuation conditions of events which I have
introduced commits either theory to a particular answer to this counterfactual question.
The counterfactual question requires us to consider two occurrences—one in the
actual world and one in another, possible, world—and ask whether these two occur-
rences constitute the same event. For Kripke [1980], individuals can exist in many
worlds at once and so a Kripkean about event modality might think that it is possible
for these two occurrences in different worlds to constitute the same event. For Lewis,
individuals were world-bound and so could not literally exist in multiple worlds, but
they could have counterparts in those worlds instead (more on this below). Oddly,
Lewis took events to be different from objects or people in this respect and he argued
for a transworld identity of events.2 In this chapter in particular, and in the thesis
1“Perhaps just one: I am uncertain both in the case of substances and in the case of events whether
or not sameness of time and place is enough to ensure identity” [Davidson, 1969, p.306].
2One might reasonably expect that a four-dimensionalist such as Lewis, who thought that objects,
defined by their extension in spacetime, are individuals, would also think that events which are
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more generally, I will, unlike Lewis, take events to be individuals but, like Lewis, I will
take individuals to be world-bound particulars. That means that I take Bill’s party in
this world to be one event and any occurrence in another world, no matter how similar
to Bill’s party, to be a different event.
Given this understanding of events, the question about whether or not the party
would have been the same if it had occurred in the basement cannot be a question
of literal identity on pain of triviality. The question is not trivial, so some weaker
form of sameness must be applicable. The sameness under consideration is the sort
that we find in our standard modal ascriptions: I could have been taller, the pylon
could have toppled or the fire could have been contained. In each such case we are
saying that there is a possible scenario in which I, the pylon or the fire exist, but
exist in some altered state—taller, toppled or contained respectively. Each entity is
considered the same despite the alteration. The counterfactual question about Bill’s
party asks whether it would have been the same party under a specified alteration,
namely having taken place on the ground floor instead of the penthouse. To settle this
question we require not only actual-world individuation conditions but cross-world, or
modal individuation conditions too. Let us follow tradition and call those features
that an object or event must have to be considered the same across worlds as forming
the essence of that object or event. The features that are not essential, we will call
accidental. The crux of our counterfactual question then is this: is the location of Bill’s
party essential or accidental?
I said that neither the fine-grainer nor the coarse-grainer (as characterised) were
committed to a particular view of the modal individuation of events, but one may think
that we can infer an answer on behalf of the fine-grainer who already splits their events
into those features which are constitutive and those which are exemplified. Mapping
this dichotomy onto the modal notions of essence and accident seems natural—if an
event is individuated by the presence of its constitutive properties in the actual world,
it would make sense that these same properties individuate the event modally. Thus
the fine-grainer has a conditionalised answer to the counterfactual question: if the
penthouse location of Bill’s party is constitutive of the event, then it is no longer the
same event on the ground floor, however if the location is merely exemplified, then the
possible event that takes place on the ground floor can be considered the same event.
This conditionalised answer now prompts the question of which features of events are
constitutive and which are merely exemplified?3 This question will get a different
answer for every one of the countless events that occupy a given region and without
knowing which of those events is under consideration, we will be no closer to having
similarly extended in spacetime, are also individuals. In his clearest articulation of his event ontology,
his paper Events [1986d, p.241-269], Lewis argued for transworld, rather than counterpart-theoretic
events Why he thought this is not obvious from what he says in that paper so I think this is an
interesting question for Lewis scholars, though beyond my scope here.
3Kim [1973] argues that the subsumption of events under laws helps establish which features are
constitutive. I will ignore this response here for two reasons: First, I wish to present a more neutral
fine-grained account without this further commitment. Second, it is far from obvious how Kim’s view
could fit with the counterfactual account of causation that I will be considering later.
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an answer to the counterfactual question.4
It is even less obvious what the coarse-grainer should say. The coarse-grainer gives
no priority to one set of features over another in the constitution of the event and so
there is no natural mapping of such features onto the essential/accidental split. Three
options present themselves: (i) treat all of the properties as essential, (ii) treat none of
the properties as essential, (iii) treat some of the properties as essential (and the others
accidental). Option (i) denies our standard modal attributions about the pylon, the
fire and me—all are strictly false. Option (ii) accepts our standard modal attributions
about the pylon, fire and me but problematically accepts any modal attribution what-
soever. On this view ‘that pylon could have been an electron’ is true. This just makes
a nonsense of possibility attributions in general. Option (iii) allows the acceptance
of some modal attributions and the rejection of others—as we might have hoped—but
absent a principled way of telling which features are essential or accidental, we still can-
not tell the true attributions from the false. We are no further forward in answering
the counterfactual question.
So, on the one hand we have a fine-grained account of events which has a natural
modal reading but a bloated ontology and on the other hand we have the coarse-grained
view which has a more parsimonious ontology but no natural way of reading our modal
claims. The problem of answering the counterfactual question about Bill’s party cuts
across both accounts.
2.1.2 Event Counterparts
There is strong precedent in the realm of objects for handling our counterfactual ques-
tion. Where a strict standard of sameness (identity) restricts claims of sameness to only
those objects who share all and only the same features, a weaker standard is employed
when we entertain certain counterfactual claims—we will happily say it could have been
larger or it could have been green. One strategy which allows us to accommodate both
standards is to adopt a counterpart theory for objects.5
The object before me is a keyboard. There is only one keyboard which is exactly the
same as this keyboard: this very one. No other keyboard, no matter how qualitatively
similar to this one, is identical with it. However that does not preclude the keyboard
from having counterparts in other possible worlds where things are different. In worlds
without plastic perhaps there is a functionally similar keyboard made of some natural
resin. In such a world the counterpart keyboard does not strictly speaking sit on this
desk in front of me, but rather, it sits on a counterpart desk in front of a counterpart
of me in that other world. Objects such as the keyboard, desk or me, stand in a
counterpart relation with objects in other worlds such that these counterparts are
sufficiently similar to be counted as representing the object in that world, without
strictly being the object in that world. In counterpart theory we take the truth of de
re modal attributions to depend on both the object and its counterparts. Possibility
attributions are true if they are true of some counterpart and false otherwise.6 For
4I will discuss what clues the expression of the event provides in §2.2.2.
5For a well developed version of counterpart theory see Lewis [1968a, 1986c, 2001].
6Note that the actual object is taken to be one of its own counterparts [Lewis, 1968a, p. 114 P6].
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example, the actual keyboard is made of plastic but this keyboard could have been made
of a natural resin will be true if and only if there is a counterpart of the keyboard in
some world w that is made of natural resin. On the other hand necessity attributions
(‘must’, ‘essentially’, ‘necessarily’) applied to an object are true only if the attributed
feature is to be found in all of its counterparts, and false otherwise. For example, the
keyboard is essentially white will be true if and only if all of the counterparts of the
keyboard are white.
The advance offered by counterpart theory is that it resolves the apparently in-
consistent claims about identity: strict identity is maintained, but less strict modes of
identity are tolerated via the counterpart mechanism.
I propose that events should be understood as individuals within counterpart theory.
Strictly speaking the event is just the concrete, world-bound, particular that occupies a
given space-time region—this is the actual world individuation that the coarse-grainer
is advocating. In our talk of event modality, however, we employ counterpart relations
that satisfy our modal attributions of those events. Thus, had the party occurred on
the ground floor, it would have counted as the same party via being a counterpart to
the actual (penthouse) party. Strictly speaking there was only one party, but there is
a sense in which it would have remained the same had it occurred differently.
Embracing a counterpart theory of events offers an explanatory bridge between
the coarse-grain and the fine-grain views. If events were transworld entities, literally
existing in multiple different worlds, then the distinct modal attributions we could
make of the party—it could have been louder, it could have been dull—would imply
that distinct events (the loud party, the dull party) overlap in the actual world, just as
the fine-grainer maintains. However, on a counterpart-theoretic view of events these
distinct attributions do not imply distinct events that overlap, but rather distinct
representations of the single individual in the actual world. In different contexts,
counterpart theory can support each of the different fine-grained attributions: under
one counterpart relation Bill’s party has a loud counterpart (but no dull ones), under
another it has a dull counterpart. The strength of counterpart theory is that it can
achieve such fine-graining without bloating our ontology because there remains just
one, re-describable, event in the actual world that corresponds to each of these different
attributions. Thus, the proposed counterpart theory of events is a coarse-grained view
which can track our fine-grained event attributions.
2.1.3 The Inconstant Modality of Events
Counterpart-theoretic events allow for the double-standard of sameness which seems
to resolve the underlying conflict in event ontology. In Lewis’s original formulation of
counterpart theory [1968b] there was just one such counterpart relation but in sub-
sequent iterations [1983a, 1983d, 1986c, 2003], Lewis held that there were indefinitely
many counterpart relations that could hold accross different contexts. This means that
adopting a flexible counterpart theory, as I do, doesn’t by itself resolve which of two
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competing non-strict counterpart relations should be taken to apply in a given case.7
Perhaps Bill would not think it would have been the same party without his friends
being present and yet his neighbours care only that it was noisy, not who was the
source of the noise. To them the party with a totally different set of members could
be the same event. These event identity standards are in conflict—the event cannot at
once be the same and not the same under a given alteration—so which is it to be?
I think this question is misleading. Whilst Bill and his neighbours are both talking
about the same party—the one that actually took place—they are talking of it under
different counterpart relations. One relation, the neighbours’, contains a counterpart
with completely different party-goers and the other, Bill’s, does not. The different
counterpart relations make for a difference in the acceptability of certain de re modal
attributions concerning the event. Nonetheless, they are talking of the same actual-
world party.
Similarly for the delayed concert: the tickets remain valid and the band plays the
same songs in the same order, so for many it will be the same event. However the back-
up band may be different, or the lighting engineer or perhaps it is re-scheduled for a
night when a certain fan cannot go. To those who experience it, or fail to experience
it, in a way that is peculiar to the re-scheduled event—that is, they experience it
as essentially having some feature that would have been absent from the originally
scheduled concert—this is not the same event at all. For one group of people it is the
same event, and for another group it is not, so there are different standards of sameness
in different contexts. There are a multitude of counterpart relations that could apply
to any given event and context shifts which applies and when.
A final example: A train can travel down Local, Express or Broken lines to the
station arriving, respectively, on time, early or not at all. When the train travels
down Local, is that event essentially the taking of the Local line? Or is that event
essentially the taking of some functional line, but only accidentally the taking of the
Local line? The signaller may well adopt the former view as it corresponds with the
precision of his intentions and has a knock-on effect concerning traffic on the various
lines. However a nervous passenger may only care that the line is functional, especially
if that passenger is unaware of the Express line, but all too well aware of the Broken
one. This passenger will treat the event as having a different essence. Which essence is
the right one? As Lewis says in the opening quote: once we attend to the question, we
surely see that it has no determinate answer. Both the signaller and the passenger are
within their linguistic rights to assert competing de re modal attributions regarding
the train’s journey.
To recap, my proposal is to apply a counterpart theory, typically applied to objects,
to events. In object-involving events, this a natural move as the de re modality of the
objects within the event would seem to impact the de re modality of the event as a
whole. The examples given above, however, (the party, the concert and the train)
appear to vary with context quite apart from the modality of the objects that they
involve: it is not Bill’s counterpart relation that varies, or the performer’s or the train’s,
7This is the same issue as the fine-grainer faced when asked about which features constituted the
event — they have as many different answers as there are events so how do they choose between them?
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but rather something over and above that object variation. This indicates that event
expressions, and not just the objects they involve, trigger inconstant (to use Lewis’s
phrase) modal attributions and counterpart theory allows us to express this inconstancy
in terms of shifting counterpart relations.8
2.2 Event Modality and Causal Claims
In the previous section I argued that event expressions are sensitive to contextual
variations insofar as the context affects which de re modal attributions we will accept
of that event, which is just to say that context can shift the counterpart relation that we
take the event to fall under. In this section I will demonstrate the impact of shifts in an
event’s modality upon the truth of causal claims involving that event. I will introduce
a simple counterfactual test for causation, then I will show that shifts in the modality
invoked by an event expression shift the truth value of counterfactual conditionals
involving these events. I will then argue that this shift accounts for certain sensitivities
(contextual, sentential) in classic examples of causal contextualism.
2.2.1 Counterparts and Counterfactual Sensitivity
I will adopt the following simple causal test:9
For any distinct actual events c and e, c is a cause of e if and only if c and e
are linked by a chain of counterfactual dependence where e counterfactually
depends upon c iff:
¬Oc ¬Oe
In words: if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred.10
The truth conditions for this counterfactual conditional operator are given in Lewis
[1973, p.560-561]: ¬Oc ¬Oe is nonvacuously true iff some world where c does not
occur and where e does not occur is closer than any world where c does not occur and e
does. We can harmlessly simplify this for the purposes of my discussion: ¬Oc ¬Oe
is nonvacuously true iff all of the closest ¬Oc-worlds are ¬Oe-worlds.11
8The version of counterpart theory that I adopt here is left open to more than one interpretation.
This is so that certain contentious commitments of specific views (Lewis’s modal realism being a prime
example) do not complicate the issue unnecessarily.
9The simple test I offer is sufficient for the cases I will discuss, but it is highly vulnerable to
counterexamples in a way that more sophisticated versions may not be. See Lewis [2004a] for a run-
down of the issues that plague such an account. I offer it here as an indicative test, not as a general
analysis of causation.
10For reasons that will become plain in Chapter 4 I will not follow convention and drop the O.
Lower case italicised letters are to signify events, except w which will signify a world.
11This simplification implies that there is such a thing as the closest possible world. Lewis thought
this ‘Limit Assumption’ was unwarranted and so he gave the wordier locution. I will use the neater
phrasing without meaning to commit either way to whether or not the assumption should adopted.
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Possible worlds are possible ways the world could have been—all the possible ways—
and such worlds are ranked for closeness by a similarity metric. So, the closer possible
worlds are those worlds more like ours (the actual world) in matters of fact and natural
law.12
On this account what makes c a cause of e is that e counterfactually depends upon
c—that is, without the cause the effect would not have occurred—or that there exists
a chain of such dependence between c to e. This is by no means the end of the
story13 but this basic test lies at the heart of a range of contemporary counterfactual-
based accounts of causation. Such simple counterfactual analyses can have few serious
defenders remaining given the apparent failures to analyse problem cases such as pre-
emption and prevention, which may make it seem like an odd choice of test to employ.
However whilst few would defend the idea that such a test is decisive, it remains widely
accepted that it is, at the very least, strongly indicative of causal connectedness in
standard cases. I will consider what impact the context sensitivity of event expressions
has within this causal test before linking these findings to a recent proposal by Jonathan
Schaffer in the next section.
Here is the main claim of this section: varying what counts as a counterpart of an
event can vary which counterfactual conditionals concerning that event are true.
Let us begin with shifts in the counterpart relation. Suppose that McEnroe has just
served but that the serve was awkward. Perhaps the event expression ‘McEnroe’s serve’
invokes two different counterpart relations in two different contexts: in the context of
an inattentive observer who didn’t see the serve, the counterpart relation includes
counterparts of the serve which are awkward and counterparts which are graceful,
but in the context of the attentive coach, the counterpart relation includes only those
counterparts which are awkward. By the first relation the same serve can be taken to
occur in worlds where it is graceful, but by the second it cannot. Thus, shifting the
counterpart relation invoked shifts which worlds that event is taken to occur in.
Recall that the truth conditions for the counterfactual conditional ¬Oc ¬Oe
state that for ¬Oc  ¬Oe to be true, it must be the case that all of the closest
worlds where c does not occur are worlds where e does not occur. So, shifting the
worlds in which the cause event is taken to occur, will affect the truth of counterfactual
conditionals involving that event, when that shift alters whether or not all of the closest
possible ¬Oc-worlds are ¬Oe-worlds. So, if the counterpart relation shift alters the set
of closest ¬Oc-worlds such that either (i) they are no longer all ¬Oe-worlds, or (ii) they
are now, but were not before, all ¬Oe-worlds, then that shift in counterpart relation
changes the truth of the conditional from true to false in (i), and from false to true in
(ii).
Relatedly, shifting the worlds in which the effect event is taken to occur, will affect
the truth of counterfactual condtitionals when that shift alters whether or not all of the
closest possible ¬Oc-worlds are ¬Oe-worlds. Assume that world w is one of the closest
¬Oc-worlds. There are two types of counterpart relation that could apply: (iii) relation
12For more detail on how matters of fact and law are to be weighed, see Lewis [1979].
13For a comprehensive discussion of a range of issues that arise for counterfactual accounts of
causation view see John Collins [2004].
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r1 on which e does not occur in all of the closest ¬Oc-worlds, including world w, and
(iv) relation r2 on which e does not occur in all of the closest ¬Oc-worlds except world
w. In the language of counterfactuals, w is an ¬Oe-world by (iii), but is an Oe-world
by (iv). Shifting the counterpart relation from r1 or r2 has shifted the counterfactual
conditional ¬Oc ¬Oe from true to false on Lewis’s semantics.
If this is correct, then shifting the counterpart relation can shift which condition-
als involving events that fall under that relation are true. The counterfactual test
for causation that I am employing takes c to be a cause of e if and only if a certain
counterfactual conditional (¬Oc ¬Oe) is met. Since shifting the counterpart rela-
tion of an event can shift the truth value of counterfactual conditionals, then shifting
the counterpart relation of an event could shift the causal status of that event on a
counterfactual test of causation.
In the next section I will show that certain features of our causal talk can be
understood as stemming from counterpart shifts in the events involved.
2.2.2 The Sensitivity of Causal Claims
I will consider three classic cases in which shifts in the representation of an event shift
the causal intuitions. In each case I will argue that there is an implicit shift in the
counterpart relation being evoked across the different representations.
The first is from Hitchcock [1996]. Consider the following event:
1. Susan’s stealing the bicycle.
Now consider how the causal implications change as we introduce emphasis on different
parts of the event phrase:
2. Susan’s stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested.
This appears to be true, whereas the following appears to be false:
3. Susan’s stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested.
It seems that emphasising ‘stealing’ in (2) and emphasising ‘bicycle’ in (3) each
shift the acceptability of the causal claim that Susan’s stealing the bicycle caused her
to be arrested. What is the emphasis shifting?14 My proposal is that shifts in the event
expressions indicate shifts in the counterpart relation being invoked.
If we take the emphasis to indicate the essence of the event, then we can see that in
(2), all of the counterparts to the cause, c, will involve stealing—stealing of a bicycle or
skis or whatever else. The closest ¬Oc-worlds will be those where no such c counterpart,
i.e. where no such stealing event, takes place. All else being equal, the closest ¬Oc-
worlds will not feature Susan’s arrest, e, and so those closest ¬Oc-worlds will be ¬Oe-
worlds too. By the counterfactual test, this means that c is a cause of e and that (2)
is true.
14Hitchcock argues that the emphasis implies an alternative, contrast, event. I am proposing a
different solution and I will say more on contrastive approaches when I come to discuss Schaffer’s
proposal in the following sections.
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Turning to (3), it seems that all of the counterparts to the cause, c, will involve a
bicycle: stealing of a bicycle, riding of a bicycle etc. The closest ¬Oc-worlds will be
those where no such c event, i.e. no such bicycle-involving event, takes place. All else
being equal, the closest ¬Oc-worlds will still bring about Susan’s arrest, e, because
the closest such worlds contain counterparts of c which are still stealings, just not of a
bike (perhaps of skis). So some of those closest ¬Oc-worlds will be Oe-worlds. By the
counterfactual test, this means that c is not a cause of e and that (3) is false.
So, counterpart theory, coupled with a counterfactual test for causation (call this
coupling CCT for Counterpart-theoretic Counterfactual Theory of causation), can
match intuition on this emphasis-shift case.
The next case uses the earlier example of McEnroe’s serve and is taken from Mc-
Dermott [1995]. This case concerns the impact of altering the description that is used
to pick out the event and illustrates the impact of re-description of the event: different
counterfactual conditionals hold. This first sentence seems acceptable:
4. McEnroe’s tension caused him to serve awkwardly.
Yet, when we remove the adverb, we change the acceptability of the claim:
5. McEnroe’s tension caused him to serve.
The difference between (4) and (5) is the removal of the adverb ‘awkwardly’. Pre-
suming that there only was one serve being discussed, the change in description may
appear innocuous. Presumably to ‘serve’ could be to do so gracefully, but to ‘serve
awkwardly’ could not, so there are counterparts of the serve in (5) which are awkward,
and ones which are graceful, whereas there are only awkward counterparts to the serve
in (4). The re-description is not so innocuous after all.
If we take the effect-side event to be essentially awkward, as I take it the first descrip-
tion implies, then there will be some ¬Oe-worlds—the closest ones—where McEnroe
still serves, just not awkwardly. The closest worlds in which McEnroe is not tense are
worlds in which he is still primed to serve, just absent the tension. So, we can expect
that all of the closest ¬Oc-worlds (not-tense worlds), will turn out to be ¬Oe-worlds
(not-awkward worlds). That makes the first claim true on a counterfactual test.
If we take the effect-side event to be essentially a serve, as the second description
implies, then all of the ¬Oe-worlds will be worlds without a service. The closest not-
tense (¬Oc) worlds remain exactly like the actual world in other respects—McEnroe
throws the ball and arches his back just as he does in the actual world. At least some
of the closest such ¬Oc-worlds will yield a serve and so will be Oe-worlds too. Thus,
the second claim fails the counterfactual test for causation.
Once again, armed with a sensitivity to the counterpart shifts implied by the dif-
ferent descriptions, the CCT account tracks our intuition. The claims that the coun-
terfactual test says are true, we intuit as acceptable, those which the counterfactual
test considers false, we intuit as unacceptable. I take these examples to illustrate the
impact that implicit counterpart shifts can have on our causal attributions, at least on
a counterfactual view of causation.
I take my third case from Achinstein [1975]:
2.3 Causal Contextualism 19
6. Socrates’s drinking hemlock at dusk caused his death.
7. Socrates’s drinking hemlock at dusk caused his death.
The first is acceptable but the second is not. Once again, there is but one drinking
of hemlock but when the focus shifts to at dusk then that becomes the essential
property of the event. A shift in the essential property of an event just is a shift in the
counterpart relation it invokes and, as we have seen, shifting the counterpart relation
indicates a shift in the set of acceptable de re modal attributions of the event.
If we take the cause-side event to be essentially a drinking of hemlock, as I take
it the first focus implies, then the closest ¬Oc-worlds will be worlds where Socrates
does not drink hemlock. Absent the drinking of hemlock Socrates will not die,15 so all
of these ¬Oc-worlds will be ¬Oe-worlds. This means that the first claim passes the
Lewisian test for causation.
If we take the cause-side event to essentially take place at dusk, as I take it the
second focus implies, then the ¬Oc-worlds are those in which a counterpart poisoning
does not occur at dusk. All else being equal, any world where Socrates drinks hemlock
will be closer to the actual world than a world where he does not. So, the closest ¬Oc-
worlds will include Socrates drinking hemlock—just not at dusk—and subsequently
dying. So, at least some of the closest ¬Oc-worlds will be Oe-worlds and so the second
claim fails the Lewisian test for causation.
This shift in emphasis is just like that of the Hitchcock example above concerning
Susan’s theft: in virtue of shifting the counterpart relation of the event in question, the
emphasis shifts the truth value of the causal claim on the Lewisian account. Thus, the
Lewisian semantics along with counterpart theoretic events—the view I dub CCT—
tracks the intuitive acceptability and non-acceptability of 6 and 7 respectively.
So, for clarity, here is the CCT view: c is a cause of e iff (i) c and e are distinct
actual events; and (ii) c and e are linked by a chain of causal dependence, where causal
dependence is defined as follows: e causally depends on c relative to counterpart relation
x iff the following counterfactual conditional is true:
¬Ocx ¬Oex
In ordinary causal discourse, the value x is set to a specific value, n, which is determined
in part by the context of utterance and the mode of representation of c and e.
2.3 Causal Contextualism
In a recent paper, Jonathan Schaffer [2012a] argues that our causal claims are context
sensitive and that, since no existing pragmatic mechanism exists to account for it, that
15Well, of course he will die eventually. The idea here is that he won’t die in a relevantly similar
way. Establishing what counts as relevantly similar is exactly what I take the counterpart relation to
do. Just as there will be different standards of relevant similarity, there will be different counterpart
relations.
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variation must be semantic in nature. He goes on to propose a contrastive semantic
framework that would account for the contextual variation.
In this section I will introduce Schaffer’s argument for Causal Contextualism and
then briefly summarise his contrastivist position. I will then argue in §2.4 that my
counterpart theoretic approach offers a satisfying alternative to Shaffer’s treatment of
the contextual variation of causal claims.
2.3.1 Schaffer’s Dichotomy
The aim of Schaffer’s argument is to establish a thesis he calls Causal Contextualism.
He defines this as follows:
A single causal claim can bear different truth values relative to different
contexts, where this difference is traceable to the occurrence of ‘causes,’
and concerns a distinctively causal factor. [Schaffer, 2012a, p.37].
The requirement that the contextual variation be traced to the word ‘causes’ means
that Causal Contextualism will be false if the contextual variation can be traced
elsewhere—say, to the events (and their counterparts). The alternative Schaffer of-
fers is Causal Invariantism:
It is not the case that a single causal claim can bear different truth values
relative to different contexts, where this difference is traceable to the occur-
rence of ‘causes,’ and concerns a distinctively causal factor. Causal claims
are context sensitive in their acceptability, but the context sensitivity of
causal claims is a wholly pragmatic phenomenon [Schaffer, 2012a, p.40]
This is the denial of Causal Contextualism plus a positive requirement that the context
variation be a wholly pragmatic phenomenon. There is a genuine dichotomy at play
here: is the sensitivity to context a wholly pragmatic or is it a partly semantic phe-
nomenon? However, the two theses presented do not track this dichotomy because there
remains logical space to deny Causal Contextualism but reject that context variation
is a wholly pragmatic phenomenon either. In particular, Schaffer overlooks seman-
tic accounts which do not treat the context variation of causal claims as distinctively
causal.
The two options presented by Schaffer are clearly not logically exhaustive,16 but he
takes arguments against Causal Invariantism to provide evidence in favour of Causal
Contextualism in his discussion. This is tantamount to a false dichotomy since there is
a third way being overlooked. My view of combining a counterfactual causal test with
counterpart theory represents a version of this third way.17
The CCT view that I have been advocating amounts to a semantic treatment of
the contextual sensitivity of certain causal claims: what shifts from one context to an-
other is the truth of the claim, not just its assertibility. This is not a wholly pragmatic
16Schaffer concedes as much in [fn. 3, p.60].
17It is worth noting that Schaffer also explicitly endorses a counterpart theoretic view of events in
his [2005].
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treatment, and so CCT does not meet Schaffer’s criterion to be Causal Invariantist.
As I have presented it, the CCT view does not trace the contextual variation to the
presence of ‘causes’ and so it should not be considered Causal Contextualist either.18
Of course, if further examples emerge which demonstrate that the word ‘causes’ makes
a distinctively context-sensitive semantic contribution, over and above the contribution
of the events, then this would precipitate a modification of the view. Note, though,
that any contextualist view which denies or overlooks the contextual contribution of
the events owes an explanation as to why events display across-context variation inde-
pendently of causal discourse, but yet do not contribute to the context sensitivity of
the causal claims which they constitute.
So, CCT offers a third way between the contextualist and the invariantist that
Schaffer characterises: it has the contextualist feature of truth value variation across
contexts, but that variation concerns the entire causal claim and is traceable to the
contribution of the event expressions. CCT takes the semantic contribution of ‘causes’
to remain static across contexts. I will now briefly introduce Schaffer’s positive proposal
before going on to argue in §2.4 that the data he considers can indeed be accounted for
within the CCT view without any additional contribution from the word ‘causes’. The
aim is to establish that, despite being overlooked, CCT remains a viable alternative.
2.3.2 Schaffer’s Contrastive Proposal
Having given the prima facie case for contextualism, Schaffer goes on to propose a
semantic treatment of causal claims that traces their context variance to the presence
of ‘causes’.
Schaffer’s proposal is that the verb ‘cause’ projects two contrast places in the causal
claim, and that context dictates which contrasts are salient. These contrasts can be
seen explicitly in the rather-than constructions of certain causal claims, where both the
cause and the effect are contrasted with salient alternatives, but are often suppressed
or implicit. For example: ‘Susan’s stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested’ should
be interpreted as meaning ‘Susan’s stealing the bicycle rather than borrowing it, caused
her to be arrested rather than remain free’. In this case the word ‘causes’ is taken to
project each of the rather-than clauses which were suppressed in the original, more
natural, formulation.
On Schaffer’s view the binary surface grammar of ‘c causes e’ is semantically in-
complete. To complete the causal claim we need to plug in alternatives to the cause
and to the effect such that we get a four-place claim: c rather than c∗ causes e rather
than e∗.19 Every causal claim is taken to have this quaternary structure at the level of
18Perhaps there is a sense in which it is traceable to the presence of the word ‘causes’: the coun-
terfactual construction itself stems from presence of the word ‘causes’ and it is the truth of this
construction which varies across contexts. Of course the word ‘causes’ and the construction that it
gives rise to are present in contextually variant causal claims, but that is just because they are present
in all causal claims. I am proposing that the context variance is contributed by, and hence traceable
to, the events alone—at least in the examples considered. I thank Daniel Nolan for pointing this out.
19To mirror Schaffer I will treat the contrast as being a specific alternative to c (represented by c∗)
rather than a set of alternatives (which are represented by C∗). Schaffer suppresses this distinction
in his [2012a, p.45] for simplicity and so when discussing Schaffer’s contrastivism I will follow suit.
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logical form and by filling each of the places for c, c∗, e and e∗ the contextually variant
elements, i.e. the contrasts, are fixed. Thus, the explicitly contrastive formulation is
context invariant.20
So, Schaffer offers a contrastive rendering of ‘c causes e’ and whilst he stops short
of committing to a full analysis of this rendering he does gloss it as follows: c rather
than c∗ causes e rather than e∗ iff (roughly) if c∗ had occurred, e∗ would have occurred
[p.46]. For the purposes of this discussion, then, we can sketch Schaffer’s position as
follows: ‘c caused e’ is true iff had c∗ occurred, e∗ would have occurred (where c∗ and e∗
are supplied by context).
I will next argue that the CCT view can handle the context variation cases as well as
the contrastive view can, but I will also argue that tracing the contextual variation to
the inconstant modality of the events, not the presence of ‘causes’, is more parsimonious
and has independent motivation.
2.4 Contrasting with Contrastivism
In this section I will argue that the CCT view can account for the contextual variation
found in the classic cases that Schaffer discusses. I will not only argue that CCT can
match the results of contrastivism in these cases, but that it can be expected to match
the contrastivist’s results more generally. The aim of this section is to establish that
the CCT view is, at the very least, a viable alternative to contrastivist treatments of
the context sensitivity of causal claims.
2.4.1 Sentential and Contextual Sensitivities
Within his [2012a] paper, Schaffer groups the bicycle, McEnroe and Socrates cases that
I discussed in §2.2 as part a class of Sentential Sensitivities.
In discussing each of these cases, Schaffer makes the following caveat: “...unless one
has an implausibly fine conception of events...” [Schaffer, 2012a, p.39]. This caveat
seems to imply that the contextual variation in these cases cannot be traced to the
events since the events (the stealing and the serving) are one and the same across
contexts. However, the CCT view I am proposing provides just the sort of framework
that makes sense of there being just one event and for event referring terms to alter the
counterpart relation they pick out relative to context. I have already argued in §2.3.1
that the variation in these cases can be traced to the events in this way.
In addition to these Sentential Sensitivities, Schaffer presents three cases which he
describes as examples of Contextual Sensitivity. I will argue that the CCT view on
its own can offer a semantic solution for two of these cases and I will propose that we
combine CCT with the standard Gricean pragmatic maxim of relation to resolve the
third.
Beginning with Schaffer’s example of Causal Inquiry. The example given is:
However, when I come to talk of contrastivism more generally in Chapter 9, I will switch to the more
common use of contrast sets (C∗).
20This is a crude summary. For a more detailed account see Schaffer [2005, 2012a].
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8. John’s boldness caused him to kiss Mary.
Schaffer argues that (8) is acceptable against the backdrop of one causal inquiry: where
the question is ‘Why did John kiss Mary?, but unacceptable against the backdrop of
another: ‘Why did John kiss Mary?’. I think that this is quite possibly right. However,
the backdrop in this case, the one which contains the question, constitutes the context
and it is the context that fixes which counterpart relation will be invoked on the CCT
view. In this case the first version of the question, the emphasis on ‘kiss’ invokes
a counterpart relation such that the effect is essentially a kiss and the second, with
the emphasis on ‘Mary’, invokes a counterpart relation such that the effect essentially
involves Mary. In the scenario Schaffer is proposing, where kissing is the relevant
feature under consideration, then the CCT view can appeal to the same contextual
clues that Schaffer’s contastivist can.
Turning to the example of Multiple Alternatives:
9. The train’s taking Local caused it to arrive at the station.
This claim seems acceptable when the salient alternative is Broken but it seems un-
acceptable when the salient alternative is Express (since the train would have arrived
anyway).
If there is a feature of the context that fixes the salient alternative, then that feature
is part of what fixes the counterpart relation of the event. If the salient alternative
is Broken then the counterpart relation invoked in that context will reflect that—
perhaps its essence involves being a train route and being not-Broken. Express shares
this essence and so is not sufficiently different to constitute ¬Oc despite being different
in many respects from the actual world event. Such is the nature of counterparts:
whilst they are similar in some respect, they can be very different in another. Again,
the CCT view can appeal to the same contextual clues as Schaffer’s contrastivist.
Finally to the case of Selection: We commonly foreground certain causes and
relegate others to the status of background conditions. This selection varies with context
as in the following example.
10. The presence of oxygen caused the forest fire.
Perhaps a visiting Venusian [Putnam, 1982], astonished by the ubiquity of such a
combustible substance, would find this claim acceptable, but a forest ranger would not
(preferring instead to blame the stray matches). The acceptability of the causal claim
varies in relation to the background considerations at play.
Schaffer considers the Gricean maxim of relation [1968] as a possible explanation
of the context shift: it is relevant to Venusians, but not to rangers, that the oxygen
was present and so it is acceptable to Venusians, but not rangers, to cite the oxygen
as a cause.
Against this notion, Schaffer claims that we will ordinarily assert the negation of
(10):
11. The presence of oxygen did not cause the forest fire.
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If we would assert the negation, then (10) was not merely irrelevant, it was outright
false, implying a semantic variation across contexts.
It is not at all clear how this fits in with Schaffer’s contrastivism. Take the following
contrastive rendering of the Selection example:
12. The presence rather than absence of oxygen caused there to be a forest fire rather
than no fire.
This is true on Schaffer’s contrastive account quite irrespective of whether the rangers
utter it or the Venusians. What Schaffer requires is that when the Venusians say (10),
then (12) is indeed the appropriate contrastive to form, but when the rangers utter
(10) a different, false, contrastive should be formed courtesy of their different context.
What is this alternative false contrastive that emerges from the rangers’ context? I
see none, and nor does Schaffer (p52). Further, what contrastive truth is expressed by
(11) in the ranger’s context? Again, I see none and nor does Schaffer:
Lacuna: if [10] does not receive any natural interpretation then its denial
should not either, which does not quite fit that data in [11]. So it would
be smoother for me to say that [10] does receive some interpretation as a
contrastive falsehood in the context of the forest rangers. But I do not
currently have any contrastive falsehood to suggest for the role. [Schaffer,
2012a, p.61, my numbering]
Selection just doesn’t fit with his overall picture.
As it stands, the CCT view cannot account for the contextual variation in this case
either. The fire counterfactually depends on both the presence of oxygen and on (say)
the misuse of the matches, and I can see no reason to think that context is shifting the
event modality in such a way as to shift the nature of that dependence. In short: both
are causes. CCT therefore counts (11) as false.
I suggest that the problem with Selection is that accepting (11) amounts to beg-
ging an intimately related question about the selective nature of our causal concept.
Peter Unger [1977], for example, argued that the word ‘cause’ was selective such that
background conditions simply did not qualify as ‘causes’ by definition. Lewis, on the
other hand, took his philosophical mission to be one concerned with a pre-selective
[1973, p.558-559] account of causation—a task aimed at determining the broadest set
of causes of an event. For Lewis background conditions are causes, for Unger they are
merely background conditions. Clearly there are two distinct concepts at play here, one
broad and non-discriminatory, the other narrow and discriminatory, and it seems that
each different concept maps onto a different treatment of (11). The selective account of
‘cause’ can treat the oxygen as a background condition, in the right context, whereas
the pre-selective account cannot. Accordingly the selective account will accept (11)
whilst the pre-selective account will not.
Even if Unger’s account turns out to be a good account of the word ‘cause’ in
English, that does not preclude us from questioning what causal concept remains once
selection effects have been removed. Since Lewis is explicit that he is considering such a
pre-selective notion, he is entitled to reject (11) by fiat, even if not by intuition. I reject
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it twice over—once by intuition and once again by fiat. I do not share the intuition
that (11) appeals to,21 but even if I am later shown to be in the linguistic minority,
it will not matter to the concept that I am considering, only my entitlement to name
that concept ‘cause’. Since (11) was all that stood in the way of a pragmatic solution
to Selection cases, rejecting it makes the Gricean strategy available once more.
A dialectical aside: Schaffer does not directly consider the Causal Inquiry or
Multiple Alternative cases in his discussion of the prospects of a pragmatic solution.
Rather, he focusses on the establishing that no single existing pragmatic mechanism
could handle all of the cases he presents as data—what may work for Selection cases
(relevance) will not help with the Sentential Sensitivities examples. This is only im-
portant if we are committed to a wholly pragmatic account of the contextual variation.
My CCT view is not. Note, though, the work that Schaffer’s false dichotomy is doing
here: anyone who does not adopt a wholly pragmatic account is seemingly committed
to a semantic treatment in which the contextual variation is traceable to the word
‘causes’. Mixed views, or semantic approaches which trace the variation elsewhere are
simply overlooked.
So, having denied (11) and explained why some might accept it, I conclude that the
CCT view, combined the Gricean maxim of relation, can account for all of the data
that Schaffer presents in arguing for his preferred contrastivism.
2.5 Contrastivism in General
Thus far I have argued that events have inconstant modalities across contexts and
that this insight, coupled with a counterfactual analysis of causation gives intuition-
matching results in the relevant test cases of contextually sensitive causal claims. So,
the CCT view provides an account of the context variation of causal claims. I have
also pointed out that this approach is overlooked in Schaffer’s argument in favour of
a contrastivist semantics for causal claims. What is not argued here is that the CCT
view represents a definite improvement over Schaffer’s contrastivism. The treatment of
contextual variation cannot be expected to settle that question alone, but here I offer
some positive reasons in favour of the CCT view.
First, the central motivation behind the CCT view is the realisation that event
expressions invoke different modalities across contexts quite independently of any ref-
erence to ‘cause’. As such we should expect our event-involving causal claims to exhibit
at least some context variation in virtue of the events that constitute them. This pro-
vides the CCT view with independent motivation, i.e. motivation that is independent
from the desire to conform to any particular causal theory.
Second, for Schaffer, all context variation is due to shifts in implicit contrast
places—a view which requires a quaternary rendering of the causal relation. It of-
fends parsimony to posit four variables in a theory (c, e, c∗ and e∗) where two will
do, and according to the CCT view two will do, just as common sense would have
21As with Schaffer’s “more sophisticated speaker” [p.43] I consider it a background condition, but
presumably unlike Schaffer’s sophisticate I consider background conditions to be causes.
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predicted: when we say c caused e, we speak of two things, not four. It seems that
CCT may offer a more parsimonious account.
Third, the CCT view reads the counterpart relation from the context just as the
contrastivist reads the contrasts from the context. For any given contrast class for c,
say c∗, there is a counterpart relation for c such that c∗ is just equivalent to ¬Oc—one
in which the only ¬Oc-worlds are those c∗-worlds. If the context justifies a particular
contrast class, then we can expect that same contextual information will justify the
equivalent counterpart relation. Schaffer does not offer an analysis of causation [2005,
p.348] but the contrastive account on offer is supposed to improve on the original Lewis-
style accounts despite this precisely because it has the context-sensitive flexibility to
consider different contrasts to the c and e events under consideration. If CCT can
match this feature, and can do so within a more parsimonious structure, then that is
reason to think it might offer a more compelling package overall.
Of course it remains to be seen if such detailed counterpart information can be read-
off the context in this way. An account is owed by the defender of CCT.22 However,
I would say that an account is past due from the contrastivist as to how this is to
work on their picture, which remains underspecified—Schaffer ends his account in
puzzlement having failed to find appropriate link between context and his preferred
semantic theory. Even assuming each are able to give a satisfying account of how to
read the context, there remains cases where context is almost entirely absent, as in the
following adaptation of Hitchcock’s example:
13. Susan’s stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested.
In discussing this case earlier, I showed that shifting an emphasis on ‘stealing’
in (2) to ‘bicycle’ in (3) signalled a shift in the counterpart relation being invoked.
The contrastivist prefers to think of the event as being static throughout, but that a
contrast shift has occurred which tracks the shift in emphasis. This way the CCT and
contrastive approaches both match intuitive acceptance and rejection of the respective
claims.
However in the emphasis-free example given (13) what cause-side contrast is being
invoked? Without the emphasis (and absent further context to provide it) there needs
to be a very general contrast case which does not privilege any particular feature of
the target event. To consider a contrast where Susan does something else with the
bike (borrows) would be to act as if ‘steals’ was emphasised. Or to consider a contrast
where Susan steals something else (skis) would be to act as if ‘bicycle’ was emphasised.
It seems that the only justified contrast c∗, absent emphasis or other contextual clues,
is one where it is not the case that Susan steals the bicycle. Without emphasis or
further context c∗ simply equates to ¬Oc. Once emphasis or other contextual cues are
introduced a semantic shift is triggered and both CCT and contrastive accounts can
track this shift.
In short, the CCT view is independently motivated, parsimonious and handles the
standard test cases at least as well as the contrastivist alternative from Schaffer. That
22I offer the beginnings of such an account in Chapters 3 and 4.
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it can also be expected to match the contrastivist treatment in general suggests that
it should at least be considered a viable alternative.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events. Whilst
the actual-world referent of an event expression can remain fixed across contexts and
re-descriptions, the counterpart relations that the expression invokes may vary. I ar-
gued that this counterpart-theoretic view bridges the gap between fine-grained and
coarse-grained accounts of event ontology—it has the precision of the first with the
parsimonious ontology of the second. I have demonstrated that context variation is
evident in our inconstant de re modal attributions concerning events and I have shown
that this in turn impacts on certain counterfactual conditionals involving those events
(§2.1).
On the assumption that the truth of such counterfactual conditionals can be in-
dicative of causal connection, then tracking shifts in the counterpart relations that
events fall under can explain why the acceptability of certain causal claims varies with
context (§2.3, §2.4): the acceptability of the claim varies because its truth value varies.
Contra Schaffer, I propose that the context sensitivity in causal claims is traceable to
the counterpart variation of events across contexts, not to the presence of the word
‘causes’ (§2.5).
If this is correct, then the CCT view that I have proposed—coupling counterpart
theory and a counterfactual test for causation—retains a parsimonious binary model
of causation and accounts for the variation of causal claims across contexts. It should
therefore be considered a viable, even attractive, alternative to the contrastivist con-
textualism offered by Schaffer.
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3
Dare to Be a Doctor
Counterfactual theories of causation are beset by so-called pre-emption counterexam-
ples. In such examples there are two candidate causes which suffice for an effect and
so the effect depends on neither, and yet intuition is clear that one of these candidates
is the cause and the other is not. Standard counterfactual analyses, and contrastive
theories too, seem to give the wrong result in a particular species of pre-emption case
known as late pre-emption. In this chapter I aim to show that the CCT view that I
introduced in Chapter 2, coupled with a plausible pragmatics of our causal talk, can
give intuition-matching results in cases of late pre-emption.
I have argued that by adopting a counterpart theoretic view of events we could
account for certain instances of context-variation in our causal attributions. This was
in the service of my first aim in this thesis: (I) to give an account of our everyday
causal talk. Building on this view, I will give an argument in support of a fragile view
of events—a view by which even minute alterations in the timing or manner of an event
bring about a new event. At one point Lewis complained that the project of mapping
out a defensible account of event fragility was ‘not so much unfinished as unbegun’
[1986b, p199]. I take this chapter, and the thesis on the whole, to be the beginnings
of such a project. I will argue that the much-repeated ‘who would dare be a doctor?’
riposte from Lewis fails as an argument against the fragilicist.
My treatment will prompt a worry about the apparently fluctuating standard of
fragility to be applied. I will identify a key asymmetry in our attribution of event
fragility and use this asymmetry to show that a principled, and well-precedented, set
of pragmatic maxims can be deployed to achieve intuition-matching results, even in
cases of late pre-emption. The key is accepting that events can be fragile, not that
they always are.
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3.1 Counterfactual Dependence and Pre-emption
Hume argued that we never directly perceive the causal connection between occur-
rences. When c causes e, it is c and e that we are acquainted with, not the ‘causing’
that apparently links them.1 According to Hume the best we could claim was that one
thing causes another if and only if those sort of things, across a multitude of cases,
occur with just the right sort of regularity. According to Lewis [1973], the question of
what the right sort of regularity was had dominated the philosophy of causation for
over 200 years without resulting in a satisfying consensus.
A recalcitrant problem for such a view concerns cases of epiphenomena. If one cause
gives rise to two effects then the effects will stand in just the same regular relation
with one another as they do to the putative cause. So, low air pressure causes low
barometer readings and storms but, even if they were to occur with perfect regularity,
low barometer readings do not cause storms. Hume’s analysis is obliged to say that
they do and that is a failure of the analysis.
However, Lewis spotted greater potential in a rather different offering from Hume:
‘if the first object had not been, the second never had existed’ [1975, p.76]. In other
words, without the cause the effect would not have taken place—a strikingly different
proposal to the one it is offered in support of. This dependence of the effect upon the
cause goes beyond a simple actual-world regularity and speaks instead of other-worldly
contingency. This counter-to-fact reasoning about what would have happened in the
absence of the cause seems to be just what is missing in the air pressure problem
case—absent the low air pressure, the storm would not take place and so the low air
pressure causes the storm, but absent the barometer reading (and ceterus paribus) the
storm would still occur and so the barometer reading does not cause the storm. This
looks like a brighter prospect in terms of tracking our causal ascriptions.
Thus, Lewis offered us the following analysis of causation: c is a cause of e if and
only if c and e are linked by a chain of causal dependence, where causal dependence is
analysed as counterfactual dependence between distinct events. Event c counterfactu-
ally depends on event e iff were it not the case that c occurred, it would not have been
the case that e occurred. More formally:
¬Oc ¬Oe
The elegance of the analysis belies a complicated issue—how do we tell which would-be
claims are true? In other words, how do we establish the truth conditions of the coun-
terfactual conditional? As of 1973, Lewis [2001] and Stalnaker [1968] had each offered
a broadly similar semantics of counterfactual claims which, they claimed, established
objective truth conditions for the operator. Roughly speaking, ¬Oc ¬Oe is
true if and only if, in all of the closest worlds where c does not occur, e does not oc-
cur.2 Here closeness is to be understood in terms of overall similarity to the actual
world such that closer worlds are more similar to the actual world than more distant
1For a critical discussion of this typical reading of Hume and its implications, see Beebee [2009].
2As previously mentioned, I am using a simplification which implies the Limit Assumption. I
believe this is harmless. See Lewis [1973, p.561].
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worlds. Needless to say, this similarity ranking of worlds is controversial and Lewis left
it intentionally under-specified.
However, the benefits to be accrued from thinking in counterfactual terms, es-
pecially in causation, justify the effort that is required to understand the similarity
criterion. As interesting as it is I won’t discuss that issue in this thesis other than to
accept that the counterfactualist owes a fuller account of the specifics here.3 Here I
only wish to point to three key features of Lewis’s analysis: First the dependence (or
chains thereof) that holds between the effect and the cause is central to the analysis—if
this dependence fails to hold in a case of causation then the analysis fails; Second, the
relata are events. That is, the c and e in the causal expression ‘c caused e’ are to be
understood as events. Indeed all cases of genuine causation should be understood as
cases of relations between events; Third, a given event is taken to occur in more than
one world.
This third feature of Lewis’s analysis was later [1986b] clarified by Lewis as meaning
that events were genuinely transworld entities. In the preceding chapter I argued that
there was a benefit to understanding the context-sensitive nature of our causal ascrip-
tions if we adopt a counterpart theoretic view of events instead. Strictly speaking, both
theories of event modality are compatible with Lewis’s original counterfactual analysis.
In this chapter, however, I will talk within the counterpart-theoretic framework as I
believe it allows us to clearly express, and therefore disentangle, important ambiguities
in our causal expressions.
On a counterpart-theoretic view, events do not literally occur in many worlds (they
are concrete individuals which only exist in a given world) but we can nevertheless
think of events in other worlds as being counterparts of events in our world. So when
we say that the storm occurs in many worlds, we mean that there are many worlds in
which there is a counterpart of the storm. When we talk of worlds where the storm
does not occur, we mean that those worlds contain no counterpart of the actual world
storm. The counterpart relation that applies in the context of a given causal claim—
i.e. the relation that fixes what counts as a counterpart for each of the individuals
being referred to—is partly determined by the context and, when the individuals are
represented in a sentence, the mode of presentation of that causal claim.
With this in mind, I turn to the problem of pre-emption.
3.1.1 Dependence and Guarantee
Suppose that you depend upon your wages to pay your rent. If you later come to be
supported by a wealthy benefactor who offers to guarantee your rent in the event that
your wages fail to arrive, then you no longer depend upon your wages to pay your rent.
You still use the money that arrives from your wages to pay your rent so the internal
mechanics of the transaction are the same, and you may never call on the guarantee
so that it remains unused, but nonetheless the dependence relation is undermined by
the presence of your guarantor. The lesson seems to generalise—dependence relations
can be undermined by the presence of a guarantor or back-up.
3For an interesting short discussion, see Schaffer [2004b].
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Applying this lesson to Lewis’s analysis gives rise to the problem of pre-emption.
The pre-emption class of objections is built upon the guarantor structure so that an
effect is guaranteed in such a way that it no longer depends upon the putative cause.
Such examples appear to refute Lewis as they are cases where we have causation but no
dependence, a result that his analysis rules out. So much the worse for that analysis,
many have thought.
Pre-emption cases come in a variety of forms: early pre-emption, late pre-emption,
trumping pre-emption, pre-emptive prevention and super pre-emption. The guarantor
structure is common to each, but the cases vary in the details. In this chapter I focus
on the cases Lewis seemed to find most troubling—late pre-emption. I will return to
each of the others in subsequent chapters.
LP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
Whilst Billy’s rock does not connect with the window, it nonetheless guarantees that
the breaking of the window will occur. As such, there is no counterfactual dependence
of the window break upon Suzy: absent Suzy’s throw, the window still breaks. So,
whilst it is plain that Suzy caused the window to break, the counterfactual analysis
says that it does not. For Lewis, this was a terminal failure of his 1973 analysis.4
Yet it seems obvious that the window breaking that would occur absent Suzy is a
different breaking—it would happen later, and presumably in a different way. That
suggests that there are two window breakings under consideration: the one that comes
to pass when Suzy throws and the one where she doesn’t and Billy’s rock strikes
instead (call them s and b for short). If s and b are different, then there is no one event
which is caused by Suzy and backed-up by Billy. Rather there are two events, s which
counterfactually depends on Suzy and b which does not. If this is the case then s is
the actual world event we wanted to know about, and s depends on Suzy. As such,
the counterfactual analysis gets the case right—Suzy causes s. Lewis characterises the
solution thus:
There is an obvious solution to cases of late pre-emption. Doubtless you
have been waiting impatiently for it. Without Suzy’s pre-empting rock,
the [window] would still have shattered, thanks to Billy’s pre-empted rock.
But this would have been a different shattering. It would, for instance,
have happened a little later. The effect that actually occurred did depend
on Suzy’s throw. It did not likewise depend on Billy’s. Sometimes this
solution is just right and nothing more need be said. [Lewis, 2004a, p.85]
However, Lewis rejected this as a general response to late pre-emption cases. In the next
section I will expand on Lewis’s reasoning and argue that we should not be convinced
by a well known argument he gave against fragility, but that we should respond to a
related problem.
4In his [2004a] Lewis offers a revised analysis on the basis that his earlier analyses failed to ade-
quately handle pre-emption.
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3.1.2 Who Would Dare be a Doctor?
An event is fragile if and to the extent that alterations in timing or manner make it a
new event. Event s is fragile in this sense, since if the window had broken a little later
it would have been a different event, b, instead. The response which distinguishes s
and b, and thereby rescues the counterfactual analysis in the LP case above, requires
that we adopt a fragile view of events.
Lewis thought that fragility was deeply problematic and he offered the following
argument: if every alteration in the timing or manner of an event rendered it a different
event then every alteration of the past that in any way changes that event, will have
caused it. Surely not! If that were the case then every intervention on a patient by a
doctor that even slightly altered the timing and manner of that patients death would
have caused the death. On this account every doctor kills every patient. On those
terms, ‘who would dare be a doctor?’ [Lewis, 1986b, p.250].
In other words, too many things that we do not ordinarily deem to be causes,
are causes under the fragile view. The effect event is too counterfactually sensitive
to alterations to track our intuitive causal ascriptions. By the time we distinguish s
from b we have set a precedent whereby all manner of paradigmatic non-causes must
be considered causes under the counterfactual analysis. A dog barking several streets
away creates minor vibrations in the window just at the point of its breaking. On a
fragile view, the dog barking caused the window to break. Lewis took this to complete
a reductio of the fragile position [1986d, p.198].
Before moving to respond, it is important to make clear what is being disagreed
about here. On the one hand we have the view that the window breaking event could
have happened later, or differently. On the other hand we have the view that that
window breaking event could not have happened later or differently. The views are
differing on what features of the event are essential, what range of counterparts the
event is taken to have.
One sort of robust view of the event takes it to be essentially a window breaking,
and only accidentally at that time and in that way. As such all manner of other-
world window breakings would have the same essential features and therefore qualify
as counterparts of the window breaking event in our world even where the accidental
features vary. By contrast, a fragile view of the event takes it to have many more
essential features and far fewer accidental features than the robust view does. Only a
restricted set of other worlds contain events which have all of those essential features
and so the event has relatively few counterparts. It is often useful to refer to the event
itself as robust or fragile when it is taken to have a relatively large or small number
of counterparts respectively. However, it should be made clear that it is not the event
itself that is robust or fragile. The event is simply a region of a world and the robustness
or fragility of that event is a comparative measure of the number of counterparts the
event is taken to have in a given context. This idea is introduced and defended at
length in Chapter 2.
So, it is the counterpart relation that is at issue when considering the ‘two events’
response to late pre-emption problems. Throughout his career Lewis changed his view
on which features of a thing were essential and which were accidental. In 1968 he
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argued that (most) objects had fixed essences and therefore had a determinable set
of counterparts. By the time he wrote Things Qua Truthmakers [2003] Lewis had
conceded that the counterpart relation was probably not fixed and it was therefore a
vague and context dependent matter which other-worldly objects were counterparts.5
This later view supports the central claim of my thesis regarding causal talk : there is
no mind-independent fact of the matter about which counterpart relation applies to
events when we assess the content of an ordinary causal claim.
So, there is no independent fact of the matter about how fragile or robust the
window breaking event is when we say ‘Suzy caused the window to break’. Both the
robust and fragile views remain available and so the talk of the window breaking event
remains ambiguous across these two readings. In fact, it remains ambiguous across an
entire spectrum of readings.6 Where an event sits on this spectrum dictates what we
might refer to as the scope of the event—the range of counterparts that the event has
in a given context. Interestingly, data about what events are considered outside the
range of counterparts is evidence of what position on the spectrum is being considered
since this partially delimits the scope of the event.
This delimiting feature is exploited by causal contrastivism in an illuminating way.
Causal contrastivists come in a variety of forms (Maslen [2004a], Schaffer [2005, 2012a],
Northcott [2007] and List & Menzies [2010]) but one common feature is the following
insight—we can disambiguate a causal claim by rendering it in a contrastive locution.
In Chapter 2 I introduced Schaffer’s version of this theory which takes both the cause
side and the effect side to be contrastive, though often implicitly so. Making that
contrast explicit involves stating clearly what alternative is being considered in the
form: c rather than c∗. Take the following causal claim as an example: ‘moderate
smoking causes cancer’. This claim is ambiguous across two readings: (i) moderate
smoking rather than heavy smoking causes cancer, (ii) moderate smoking rather than
non-smoking causes cancer. The first claim seems false, and the second true, since
moderate smoking is likely to reduce your chances of cancer relative to heavy smoking,
but increase your chances relative to non-smoking. The contrastive ‘rather than’ clause
disambiguates the claim but it is important to note that this contrastive locution simply
gives us a single reference point for what is not to be considered a case of c occurring.
This makes it a useful short cut in ordinary language for specifying a limit on what
counts as c occurring (by giving an example of what does not count). So, whilst I
maintain that a counterpart theoretic understanding of the relata is preferable to a
contrastivist one, I will use the contrastive locution as a short cut instead of fully
specifying what qualifies as a counterpart of c.
Applied in the case of late pre-emption we can see the difference between the robust
and fragile readings of the window-break event more clearly when they are rendered in
contrastive language.
5For a detailed discussion of Lewis’s trajectory, which I substantially simplify here, see Beebee &
MacBride [2014].
6The robust and fragile views do not even represent the extremes of the spectrum—at one end the
event has every other region of every other world as a counterpart, at the other it has no counterpart
other than itself.
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Robust1 Suzy’s throwing the rock rather than dropping it, caused the window to
break rather than not break.
Fragile1 Suzy’s throwing the rock rather than dropping it, caused the window to
break the way it did rather than break a little later.
With Billy acting as guarantor, Robust1 comes out false—even if Suzy had dropped
the rock, the window would still have broken. However, Fragile1 comes out true since if
Suzy had dropped the rock, the window would have broken a little later. Suzy’s throw
does not make a difference between the window breaking and not breaking, but rather
it makes a difference between the window breaking the way it did and the window
breaking a little later.
When the contrastive interpretation is applied to Lewis’s dog bark case, we can see
the equivalent two readings:
Robust2 Dog’s barking rather than not barking, caused the window to break rather
than not break.
Fragile2 Dog’s barking rather than not barking, caused the window to break the way
it did rather than break very slightly differently.
Again, Robust2 is false because Billy and Suzy guarantee that the window will break—
Dog’s bark does not make the difference between breaking and not breaking. Fragile2
is true, however, since ex hypothesi Dog’s barking does alter the window break very
slightly—Dog’s bark does make the difference between the window breaking the way
it did versus it breaking very slightly differently.
Finally, returning to the Doctor case, the contrastive interpretation yields the fol-
lowing:
Robust 3 Doctor’s intervening rather than not intervening, caused the patient to die
rather than not die.
Fragile 3 Doctor’s intervening rather than not intervening, caused the patient to die
one way rather than die another.
No factor can ever be the difference between someone dying and not dying at all,
since it is (nomologically) impossible for a human to not die eventually. So, the doctor
never had any chance of influencing that. All we can ever do is alter the how and the
when. Fragile3 is the only sensible reading of such a claim—ex hypothesi the doctor’s
intervention made some difference to the timing or manner of death, therefore the
doctor’s intervention was the difference between the patient dying the way that they
eventually do and them dying some other way.
Lewis’s retort of ‘who would dare be a doctor?’ draws on the intuitive falsity of the
idea that every doctor kills their patient. But it could well be the case that every doctor
alters the timing and manner of their patient’s death without that warranting the claim
that this meant they had ‘killed’ the patient in question. Lewis seems sensitive to this
point elsewhere when he argues that your birth is in fact a cause of your death, despite
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the intuitive oddity of the claim [2004a, p.101]. The point is that ‘killing’ requires more
than simply having some impact on the timing and manner of the death, it requires
some particular difference is made by the act in question. That requirement is not
satisfied simply by establishing that a doctor alters (perhaps for the better) the timing
and manner of the death in question. On the assumption that any difference maker
deserves to be considered among the many genuine ‘causes’ of an effect, as Lewis’s
‘broad and non-discriminatory’ [1973, p556] analysis suggests, then the doctor must be
allowed to be a cause. On the further assumption that the doctor does not kill every
patient we should not conclude that the causal analysis is wrong but rather that being
one among the many causes of a death does not automatically render you a killer.
The claim that every doctor kills every patient is absurd, just as Lewis says it is, but
there is no reading of events which is committed to this claim. The Robust3 reading
of the death event would make it the case that if the doctor caused the death then the
doctor would have killed the patient. However the Robust3 reading also denies that
that every doctor counts as a cause of the death merely by altering the timing and
the manner of that death. The Fragile3 reading of the death event does consider every
doctor to have causally contributed to the death in virtue of (even slightly) altering
the timing and manner of the death and thereby every doctor counts as a cause of
every one of their patients’ deaths. However the fragilicist would not be committed to
the idea that mere causal contribution is enough to make you a killer since the causal
contribution in question need not have made the difference between life and death, but
could merely have altered the how and the when. So, either every doctor is a cause of
every death, but being a cause is not enough to make you a killer (Fragile3), or being
a cause is enough to make you a killer, but not every doctor is a cause of every death
(Robust3). Lewis is conflating the counting of causes as endorsed by a fragile reading
with the import of being a cause on a robust reading. Lewis’s argument rests on an
equivocation.
However, there is a more sophisticated argument lurking just under the surface.
I said that the fragilicist was not committed to the absurd result in Lewis’s doctor
argument, but that is not to say that a uniformly strict standard of fragility of events is
an attractive view of events. Such a view commits us to accepting that the gravitational
pull of Jupiter was a cause of my drinking the coffee before me and that Billy was a
cause of the window breaking since his gravitational influence made some difference
to the effect event. Such claims are counter-intuitive in light of the context we began
with: the context of kids throwing rocks at a window. However, to conclude that
fragility is the problem is premature. Looking back at the window break case we can
see that the window would likely have broken eventually at some point in the future,
by other vandals, by demolition or by some apocalypse. We were never worried about
those scenarios because there was already some implicit limit on the extent of the
window breaking event, even on the more robust renderings being considered. In other
words all the readings are fragile to some extent so it cannot be fragility itself which
is the problem. We can accept that there will be some contexts in which such minute
contributions as Jupiter and Billy’s gravity have to their respective effects may be
salient, but not in any normal context where some vandalism is being investigated.
So there is a contextual element here that the constant fragilicist ignores to their
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detriment. What is needed is an inconstant or, better, flexible standard of fragility
which remains sensitive to context.
The more sophisticated worry we might have about such a flexible standard of
fragility is that whilst events surely can be fragile, what is to say that the context
of the pre-emption cases is such as to justify considering them to be fragile in those
circumstances. What is it about pre-emption cases that justifies treating the event as
fragile to just the right degree so as to get the right result (that Suzy is a cause of
the window breaking), but not the wrong results (that the dog’s bark and Billy were
too). In the next section I will defend a view of the pragmatics of causal discourse
which meets the challenge. However, before moving on I should make clear the role
that contrastivism played here.
By plugging in the ‘rather than’ clause, the contrastive locution makes explicit what,
in a given context, is not to be considered a counterpart to the c or e events. c∗ and e∗
do not pick out every variety of ¬Oc and ¬Oe but some specific case of ¬Oc or ¬Oe
(drop the rock and break a moment later respectively). For it to make sense to contrast
c and c∗ requires that c∗ falls outwith the scope of Oc in that context. Of course, finding
what falls outwith some scope does not serve to completely define that scope, but it
does at least partially delimit it. For example ‘the window breaking when it did rather
than a minute later’ rules out counterparts of ‘window breaking’ that occur a minute
later. It likely also rules out window breakings two minutes later, ten minutes later
and an hour later. The contrast event c∗ implies a limit on the counterpart relation of
the target event c (and therefore a limit on the scope of Oc-worlds).
Note that the benefit of restating the claims in a contrastive form could have been
attained by explicitly delimiting the counterpart relation of the target event from the
outset. The contrast event signals the limits on the counterpart relation of the target
event, but if the target event and its counterpart relation had been thoroughly specified
to begin with, then that signal would be redundant. It is nevertheless a very useful
short cut to specifying the relevant portion of the counterpart relation in ordinary
language.
I make this point here to clarify that a contrastive semantics, and the baggage it
carries, is not strictly necessary to make my point about Lewis’s argument.7 I think
I have good reasons to avoid commitment to the contrastivist program, and I will
come to discuss them later in this thesis, but I still think that the contrastive form is
an excellent tool for disambiguating our event reference in causal claims—the window
breaking example being a case in point.
3.2 Pragmatic Maxims
In Chapter 2 I argued that there is an important variable in our causal claims, one
that can alter the truth or falsity of the claim: the modality of the events in question
(captured by a counterpart relation). In the first section of this chapter I argued that
this variable is at the heart of the debate about so-called fragile events. In this section I
7Recall from Chapter 2 that the contrastivist needs to posit four causal relata rather than two. I
consider that ontological baggage.
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will propose certain rules or maxims of accommodation for our causal discourse which,
when combined with the observations of the previous section, offer a principled reading
of late pre-emption cases such that the counterfactual analysis gets the cases right. I
will start with quite general and well-precedented pragmatic maxims, then show that
the pragmatic variables in causal claims have an important asymmetrical feature. This
will allow me to derive a more specific set of maxims for causal claims and show how
they apply to pre-emption examples.
3.2.1 Accommodation and Asymmetry
In ordinary discourse it is standard to interpret utterances that are not entirely explicit,
or carry some unstated implication, in line with certain rules or maxims. Famously,
Grice proposed a governing principle of well-conducted discourse—the Cooperation
Principle:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. [Grice, 1968, p.307]
Grice proposes that we interpret what people say as if they are acting upon this general
principle. He went on to specify more detailed sub-principles and I will invoke some
of these below. Lewis [1983e] argued in a similar vein that we should aim to be
accommodating of what people say so as to most charitably interpret what they said.
In particular Lewis offered this rough rule of accommodation:
If at time t something is said which requires presupposition P to be accept-
able, and if P is not presupposed just before t then—ceteris paribus and
within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence at t. [Lewis,
1983e, p234]
By accommodating fellow speakers in this way we are licensed to shift the implicit
presuppositions or implicature charitably. Before I discuss the application of this rule
to causal discourse, let me first introduce a useful example of context-relative vagueness
from Austin:
1. France is hexagonal.
There will be contexts in which 1 is acceptable, for example when teaching a child
how to remember which country on a map is France, and there will be contexts where
it will not, such as providing a diagram of a hexagon for geometry class. Given such
contextual variation, it is not possible to give a once-and-for-all standard of tolerance
for the concept ‘hexagonal’.
However there remains an important asymmetry of precision, someone who accepts
that France is hexagonal had better also accept:
3.2 Pragmatic Maxims 39
2. This shape is hexagonal.
And yet it remains open to someone else to insist that the slightly jagged lines dis-
qualify it from being a hexagon. Such a person is adopting a very strict standard
for hexagonality and so should also reject 1 if they are to be consistent. I take this
asymmetry to be general regarding precise and imprecise claims.
Adopting some more accommodating interpretation of what is said is advocated by
both Grice and Lewis but in cases of asymmetrical entailment, such as the cases of
precision above, a further restriction is needed. Suppose that there are three standards
of precision concerning what it is to be a hexagon: the strictest standard where only an
absolutely perfect hexagon will do; a less strict standard where hand-drawn shapes and
imperfect prints will suffice; and a much weaker standard where anything even broadly
of the right shape (e.g. France) can be considered hexagonal. To make virtually every
claim of hexagonality true, we could simply take the speaker to presuppose the weakest
standard every time. To make every denial of hexagonality true we could simply take
the speaker to be presupposing the strictest standard on every occasion. However, the
person who claims that the hand-drawn shape is hexagonal need not be committed to
the idea that France is hexagonal, so if we take the speaker to presuppose the weakest
standard of hexagonality we commit them to a position that they may not endorse.
Similarly with the person who wishes to deny that France is hexagonal: they need not
be committed to denying that any hand-drawn shapes are hexagonal. The important
point here is that so far Lewis’s rule of accommodation only tells us to impute some
presupposition that would make the claim true. Yet there is some further principle
required in order that the presupposition adopted does not overcommit the speaker
on related claims. This thought is related to Grice’s more refined maxims of Quantity
[1968, p.308]:
3. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of
the exchange).
4. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
These maxims concern the level of information that a speaker ought to produce,
but crucially they say that the speaker should go far enough, but no further than is
required. Applying this more general lesson to the attribution of presuppositions to
a speaker, we should accommodate as strong a presupposition as is required, but no
stronger than is required, to make the claim true. I use ‘as strong’ advisedly here in
place of ‘as many’ since I want to highlight the fact that it is not just the number
of presuppositions that we attribute that should be subject to the rule but also, as
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in the case of precision, the strength of the presupposition. When we attribute a
presupposition to the speaker who denies that France is hexagonal, we should suppose
some stricter standard for ‘hexagonal’ but no more strict a standard than is required.
Only certain presuppositions will have this asymmetrical scale-like feature where there
is some dimension, and direction, of extension which needs to be considered.
In the next section I will show that the context variable component of causal
claims—the counterpart relations of their constitutive events—demonstrate this feature
of extent. I will then go on to derive some more specific maxims for causal discourse
and apply these to the problem cases of late pre-emption.
3.2.2 Tend to Fragile, Tend to Truth
In this section I will argue that a causal claim which is false when the putative effect is
taken to be robust, can still be true when the putative effect is taken to be fragile. This
will justify tending to a fragile reading of the effect under consideration in ordinary
causal claims. I will first argue that all true causal claims with a robust effect are true
when the effect is strictly more fragile.
Here the terms ‘fragile’ and ‘robust’ should be clarified. An event is fragile if, and
to the extent that, varying the timing or manner of the event renders it a different
event. An event is robust if, and to the extent that, varying the timing and manner of
the event do not render it a new event. In counterpart-theoretic terms, a fragile event
is an event taken to have relatively few counterparts, and a robust event is an event
taken to have relatively many counterparts. Of course the event itself is not robust or
fragile on my view but describing an event as robust or fragile indicates that the event
is taken to have relatively more or relatively less counterparts respectively in each case.
To indicate that an event c or e falls under a counterpart relation x, I will represent
c in the context which invokes that counterpart relation by writing cx or ex. I now
introduce the further notion of an event being strictly more fragile under one particular
counterpart relation (< n) than another (n >) (i) when every counterpart of the event
under < n is a counterpart of the event under n >; and (ii) when the reverse is not
the case. In other words, every essential feature of the event when it is taken to be
robust is an essential feature of the event when it is taken to be fragile but not vice
versa. For the purposes of notation I will express the relative fragility of the event by
signifying its counterpart relation relative to n: e<n indicates that e is to be taken to
be strictly more fragile than when under counterpart relation n (and I will use << n
and <<< n... for the progression of counterpart relations that render e progressively
more strictly fragile than e<n); whereas en> indicates that e is to be taken to be strictly
more robust than when under counterpart relation n (and I will use n >> and n >>>...
for the progression of counterpart relations that render e progressively more strictly
robust than en>).
We can now make the following claims:
5. Any world in which there is a counterpart of e under relation < n will also have
a counterpart of e under relation n (by (ii) above).
And, since every e<n-world is an en-world:
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6. Any world in which there is no counterpart of e under relation n can have no
counterpart of e under relation < n, i.e. ¬Oen entails ¬Oe<n.
Applying this to a counterfactual account of causation yields an interesting result.
Once we fix which worlds are ¬Oc-worlds (i.e. once we fix the reference of c and its
counterpart relation n) then if all of those worlds are ¬Oen-worlds then, by 6 above,
all of those worlds are also ¬Oe<n-worlds.8 More formally:
7. ¬Ocn ¬Oen entails ¬Ocn ¬Oe<n.
This means that any true causal claim of the form ¬Ocn ¬Oen entails the truth of
the claim ¬Ocn ¬Oe<n. In other words, if a causal claim is true when e has a given
counterpart relation then that claim is true for any strictly more fragile counterpart
relation for e. An example may help bring this out: on the assumption that the window
broke into 357 pieces, if it true to say that if the rock throw had not occurred (¬Ocn)
the window would not have broken (¬Oen), it must also be true to say that if the rock
throw had not occurred (¬Ocn), the window would not have broken into 357 pieces
(¬Oe<n).
The reverse is not true. ¬Oe<n does not entail ¬Oen. For example, for the window
not to have broken in 357 pieces does not entail that the window didn’t break some
other way. So if a causal claim is true at some more fragile standard for e, that does not
guarantee that it will be true at any more robust standard for e. This means that it is
possible for a causal claim concerning an effect to be false under some robust reading
but for some claim, concerning the same events, to be true under some more fragile
reading of the effect. McEnroe’s serve has all of the same counterparts as McEnroe’s
awkward serve but it has many more besides, for example, the graceful ones. This
makes the awkward serve strictly more fragile than the serve. Even though it is false
to say that McEnroe’s tension caused him to serve, it is still true to say that his tension
caused him to serve awkwardly.
I have talked here of the features of the event but not its timing, and yet in standard
cases where fragility is discussed it is the timing of the event (rather than the manner)
that is considered. Is it the same death if it happens a moment later? A day later? A
week? The period in which the event could have been taken to occur in part dictates
which counterparts the event is taken to have in that context, and so is one measure
of the fragility of that event. If A knows that an event had to have occurred within
a minute then A will attribute a counterpart relation for that event that includes
counterparts within the minute span but none outwith it. If B only knows that the event
8This notation is helpful but potentially misleading. I take it that a given counterpart relation
relates c to its counterparts and e to its counterparts. That counterpart relation is a function of all
manner of contextual parameters but the resultant relation is one that relates all of the individuals
(c, d, e, f . . . ) in the situation to all of their counterparts. However I am trying to discuss the
impact of shifting the counterpart relation in respect of only one individual in the environment: e. To
signify that I am considering relations that assign the same counterparts for c, d, f . . . but different
counterparts for e, I am only altering the subscript for e. That does not imply that c and e are falling
under different counterpart relations but rather that c has the same counterparts under two candidate
relations and e does not.
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occurred within a given hour then they will consider the event to have counterparts
within that range as well as counterparts within the minute that A knows the event
occurred in. As long as A and B agree about the essential features of the event besides
its timing, then A’s counterpart relation for the event will be strictly more fragile that
B’s.9 Time is just another dimension of fragility.
So these two observations tell us that a true causal claim is never made false by
treating the effect event as more strictly fragile (as in the window-break example),
but a false causal claim can be made true by doing so (as in the McEnroe example).
This means that in cases where there is ambiguity or doubt regarding the counterpart
relation being invoked in a given context, if we tend to interpreting the effect as being
more fragile, we will tend to make the causal claim in question true.
3.2.3 Maxims of Causal Discourse
So far I have shown that some very general and well-precedented pragmatic accounts
of our general discourse advocate a charitable reading of what is said. I have argued
that there is a requirement for a limiting maxim on those cases where the extent of a
given presupposition is open to interpretation. I have also argued that the extent of the
counterpart relation attributed to events in causal claims is important to the truth of
those claims and, along with the example of precision discussed earlier, interpretations
of the counterpart relations at play in a conversation have an important asymmetry.
Here I aim to bring these elements together in establishing certain minimal maxims for
interpreting causal discourse.
Lewis’s revised version of his rule of accommodation will be useful here:
If at time t something is said that requires component sn of conversational
score to have a value in the range r if what is said is to be true or otherwise
acceptable; and if sn does not have value in the range r just before t; and
if such-and-such other conditions hold; then at t the score-component sn
takes some value in the range r. [Lewis, 1983e, p.240]
This refinement covers not just a static set of presuppositions, but rather of a dynamic
and evolving ‘conversational score’ where the presuppositions shift throughout the
language game. Within the conversation are elements (events) which take on a value
(counterpart relation) within a range (more/less fragile). This rule of accommodation
urges us to take the value to be such that it makes the claim true.
Bearing these notions in mind, consider again McEnroe’s serve. Suppose that two
attentive observers watch the serve, share a glance and a grimace and then one says:
“It was his tension that caused that”. The second ‘that’ here is ambiguous. At the
very least it could mean either that the tension caused the serve or that the tension
9An interesting complication: there may be some events that occur at intervals—like the arrival of
a train every quarter hour—so that there is not a smooth range of times that it could have occurred
but rather a set of discrete times. At which point we would better express the occurrences as occurring
at one of a disjunction of times rather than within a period of time. Such cases will be rare but they
do not impede the point made: one event is strictly more fragile than another if all of the times that
the first could have occurred are times when the second could have.
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caused the awkward serve. Assuming that the person spoke truly, and taking the
counterpart parameter of the conversational score to be such that truth would require,
we should take it that the counterpart relation is equivalent to that invoked by talk of
the ‘awkward serve’.
We got to this conclusion by operating on what could be called a ‘super-maxim’:
interpret the utterance as required to make it true. However, by drawing from the
observation in the previous section, perhaps we can formulate a more specific maxim
for the interpretation of vagueness in causal claims:
Maxim 1 Take the effect event to be as fragile as is required to render the causal claim
true.
In the McEnroe case, though, I only considered two options for the interpretation of
that. In fact a spectrum of interpretations were available from the very broad ‘made
a movement’ or ‘served’ to the highly precise ‘served awkwardly, facing east, wearing
white shorts and with a heart rate of 165 bpm’. The broad interpretations imply
broad counterpart relations and generate false causal claims when a counterfactual
analysis is applied—his tension did not cause him to make a movement or serve. These
interpretations are therefore ruled out if we are aiming to interpret the claim such that it
is true. The highly specific interpretation, whilst providing a true counterfactual claim
(and therefore being a value in range r), appears over-specified by normal standards.
This is where we should impose a limit on the extent of our supposition, as inspired by
Grice’s maxims of Quantity. In terms of our counterpart relations, this means that we
should not interpret the effect as being so highly specified (fragile) if it is not required.
Thus we add another Maxim as follows:
Maxim 2 Take the effect event to be no more fragile than is required to render the
causal claim true.
However there was another problem with the highly precise interpretation invoked: it
wasn’t just too precise but it was implausibly precise given what we can expect the
speaker to know. Taking inspiration from Grice once again, especially his second maxim
of Quality, we should not suppose that the speaker was making a claim for which they
lacked adequate evidence [1968, p.308]. Presuming that there was no public reading
of McEnroe’s heart rate at the time of his serve, there is no reason to think that the
speaker would know that it was at 165bpm. This bars us from interpreting the speaker’s
comment in a way that specifies the heart rate. The more general point here is that
the epistemic status of the speaker should limit the extent to which we can shift the
interpretation of what they say when we are being accommodating or cooperative. In
causal terms this means that the extent to which we interpret the effect as being more
fragile, is limited to within an epistemically accessible range.10
Maxim 3 Take the effect event to be no more fragile than the speaker could discern
or infer at the time.
10Since Maxim 3 limits the range of interpretation, Maxim 3 trumps Maxim 1.
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These three maxims are specific to causal claims but are derived from much more
general, and well-established, pragmatic maxims. Armed with these maxims, I will
shortly turn to the case of late pre-emption and show how these maxims of causal talk
can help resolve such problems for counterfactual analyses of causation.
A point of methodology deserves mention before I proceed, however. I have moved
smoothly from the maxims which speak of interpreting contributions as though they are
true, to interpreting those contributions as though they were true on a counterfactual
analysis. One might reasonably worry if this step isn’t problematically circular, given
that a counterfactual account is what is being defended overall. I think it would be
an unfair accusation, here, however. I am trying to show that some counterfactual
analysis (tentatively the CCT version I introduced in Chapter 2) coupled with some
general pragmatic maxims can give a coherent account of our causal discourse. In order
to show that it can, it is reasonable to hypothesise that such an analysis tracks truth
in order to show that it can fit within a workable theory.
3.3 Late Pre-emption
Recall the problematic case of late pre-emption (LP):
LP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
Such cases represent a problem for a counterfactual analysis of causation because
there appears to be none of the required counterfactual dependence between the effect
and, the obvious cause, Suzy’s throw. There is counterfactual dependence of the effect
upon Suzy’s throw if the effect is taken to be suitably fragile but if the effect is super-
fragile then it also depends upon a dog barking several streets away. If all events are
super-fragile, then every pre-empted thrower, and even every innocent bystander, is a
cause of the window’s breaking. A workable theory of counterfactual causation needs
to be able to give the right answer as to what causes the window to break without
giving the wrong answer in a host of new cases.
3.3.1 Fragility as Counterpart Variation
Both the example of the Billy, and of the dog barking, are taken by many to be spurious
‘causes’ that arise from adopting a fragile view of events. However they only arise if
the fragility applied is extreme—where any variation in timing or manner makes for
a new event—and if this extreme fragility is constant across contexts. If the extent of
fragility varies across contexts, however, then the ‘spurious’ causes may not arise:
So if we wanted to make away with the stock examples of [pre-emption],
what we would require is not a uniformly stringent standard of fragility, but
rather a double standard—extremely stringent when we were trying to show
that an effect really depends on its alleged [pre-empted] causes, but much
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more lenient when we were trying to agree with common sense judgements
that an effect is not caused by just anything that slightly affects its timing
and manner. It is not out of the question that there should be such a
double standard. But if there is, an adequate theory of causation really
ought to say how it works. To say how the double standard works may not
be a hopeless project but for the present it is not so much unfinished as
unbegun. [Lewis, 1986d, p.199]
The CCT view I argued for in Chapter 2 offers just such a double, or fluctuating,
standard of fragility—fluctuating, that is, with context. For the CCT view to assist
with cases of late pre-emption it would need to be the case that the context of pre-
emption cases somehow invoked a fragile reading of the events in question. I think
they do exactly that.
Once we realise that the appropriate counterpart relation for the effect event is
ambiguous, Maxim 1 is invoked. This justifies the reading of the event in such a way
as to render the causal claim that Suzy caused the window to break true. The second
maxim stipulates taking the effect event to be no more fragile than is required so,
on the assumption that the dog bark, or the gravitational pull that Billy exerts, are
not depended upon until much more fragile readings of the event are invoked, simply
interpreting the claim as fragile enough to make Suzy the cause does not commit the
speaker to accepting that the dog bark is a cause within the same context.
However, at no point is the time difference between Suzy’s rock and Billy’s specified.
For all the example tells us, the gap could be a second or a millionth of a second, so
there will be late pre-emption cases that we can construct in which the difference
between the two candidate events (s and b) is too small for any observer to plausibly
detect. Maxim 3 would therefore seem to bar interpreting the speaker as if they can
differentiate the window break s from the window break b.
Perhaps an observer could not plausibly detect the gap between Suzy’s rock landing
and Billy’s but the problematic pre-emption cases being considered here are described,
not observed. In the set up of the case we are told that Suzy’s rock lands before Billy’s
and that his travels through the void. This is all that we require in order to know that
there is a gap between their rock’s landing, even if we do not know what the extent of
that gap is. Say the gap is an unspecified x seconds, then given that the set up includes
the information that Suzy’s rock reached the window x seconds before Billy’s, Maxim
3 permits that we interpret the causal claim that Suzy caused the window to break in
line with this information. To see that we really are utilising this information, consider
the same case re-described without this detail:
8. Billy and Suzy are throwing rocks at a window. A rock reaches the window, the
window breaks.
Here the story is told without the chronological element concerning the two rocks
and on this description there is no justification for selecting Suzy over Billy as a cause
of the window breaking—the best that can be claimed is that ‘a child’ caused the
window to break. So the intuition that the counterfactual analysis seemingly fails to
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match (that Suzy is the cause) tracks the presence of a gap between Billy and Suzy. A
contexualist account of causation has the resources to incorporate this important clue.
First, take a contrastivist account of causation which takes the contrast events c∗
and e∗ to vary with context. If such a view remained insensitive to the presence of the
gap it may construct the following false contrastive claim:
9. Suzy’s throwing the rock, rather than dropping it, caused the window to break
rather than not break.
This is a false claim because had Suzy dropped the rock, the window would still
have broken thanks to Billy. Presumably this interpretation of the context is what
makes Schaffer believe that his contrastivism does not have the resources to resolve
pre-emption problems [2005, p.358, note 35]. However, if we pay close attention to the
clue given—that there was a gap between the rocks landing—then the following true
contrastive contrastive claim is more in line with the information at hand:
10. Suzy’s throwing the rock, rather than dropping it, caused the window to break
as it did rather than break later.
This contrastive claim is true because had Suzy dropped the rock the window would
have broken later courtesy of Billy. So, a suitably sensitive contextualist account can
use the content of the set-up to charitably interpret the causal claim.
On the rival contextualist account of causal claims that I am advocating, the CCT
view, the presence of this gap impacts on the truth conditions of the causal claim that
Suzy caused the window to break as it changes the counterpart relation for the window
breaking event to include only those breakings that happened within the period of
the gap between Suzy and Billy, whatever that gap may turn out to be. The maxims
introduced earlier justify this reading.
3.3.2 Disputes and Relevance
We can imagine Billy and Suzy’s parents disputing who broke the window. Perhaps
Billy’s parents claim it was Suzy who broke the window and Suzy’s parents claim that
it was Billy. On the assumption that Billy’s gravitational influence on the window was
such that his throwing the rock made a minute difference to the timing or manner of
the window breaking, there is some extreme level of fragility under which Billy’s throw
is a cause of the window breaking. So both pairs of parents speak truly according to
the view I have presented. This looks like a problem as we would ordinarily distinguish
Suzy’s role from Billy’s, especially when blame was being apportioned.
Of course Maxim 3 will rule out interpreting the requisite level of fragility for Suzy’s
parents’ claim—they simply do not have access to the level of detailed evidence that
they would require in order to detect Billy’s influence on the window breaking. However
if Suzy’s parents are physicists, or even just causal-savvy philosophers, they can reason
that Billy would have some such influence, much as I have been reasoning based simply
on the descriptions and the rudiments of current physics. That means that Maxim 3
cannot block such a claim if the person in question has a certain level of education
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or knowledge about the subject matter being discussed.11 Perhaps they were being
pedantic, and it is the right interpretation, or perhaps they did not mean such a fragile
level after all.
Suppose that they are being pedantic: they are claiming that Billy’s throw had some
minor influence on the window breaking event. However in the context of apportioning
blame, or working out how to avoid similar things happening in the future, citing
the gravitational influence of Billy is simply irrelevant. If that was the standard that
is being applied then Suzy, the dog who barked and even the parents several miles
away had a similar influence. Being pedantic in this way flouts the Gricean maxim of
relevance.
So, when Suzy’s physicist parent seeks to blame Billy, we can either take them to
be being pedantic, and therefore irrelevant, or take them to speak falsely. Either way,
the claim should be dismissed. In ordinary cases we should not take the person to be
so pedantic as to render what they are saying irrelevant to the discussion, it would be
kinder to take them to be mistaken about the matters of fact. That is why even the
physicist should not be taken to speak any more fragilely than the discourse requires,
just as the first maxim says.
Whatever interpretive maxims apply in normal discourse will also apply if that dis-
course contains a causal element. Insofar as the task of giving a complete interpretive
metric is incomplete for normal discourse, it will remain similarly incomplete for dis-
course with a causal element. However, the maxims that I have introduced show which
specific element of the context is open for interpretation in causal statements and how
we can most cooperatively interpret it. There will be problem cases for discourse with
a causal element, just as with Suzy’s physicist parent, but where the structure of such
cases is to be found in non-causal discourse too, then such a case is not a problem for
the causal theory on offer, but a problem instead for the pragmatic theory being em-
ployed. Pre-emption cases seem like a causal-specific issue and so a theory of causation
must account for them, but pedants are everyone’s problem.
3.4 Causes and Proportion
What I have said so far concerns the impact of varying the modality of the effect event,
in particular that as you tend to interpret the effect event as strictly more fragile, you
tend to render the causal claim true. The inverse is the case for the cause event: the
more fragile the cause event, the more the claim will tend to be false. For example,
‘slamming the door stopped the draft’ does not seem quite the right thing to say, since
any form of closing the door that wasn’t a slam would have achieved the same end
of stopping the draft. In fact, if you interpret the cause event in a more fragile way
(holding the fragility/robustness of the effect fixed) the claim will likely be false, since
the closest alterations of ‘slamming the door’ are very similar alterations which will
doubtless bring about a very similar effect. Similarly, citing the scarlet colour of the
patch that made Sophie the pigeon peck, when she was in fact trained to peck any
shade of red patch, is peculiar to say the least, and false if you consider the cause event
11I thank Daniel Nolan for this example and for pressing the objection.
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to be fragile since this renders the closest alternatives too close: the scarlet patch in
the actual world is replaced by an almost-scarlet one in the closest worlds where the
fragile cause does not occur.12
Conversely, describing the cause events in more general terms renders them more
robust and tends to make the claim true: moving the door caused the draft to stop,
the coloured patch caused Sophie to peck. Of course, not all movements of the door,
and not all colours of patch, would bring about the respective effects, but absent any
movement of the door the draft is not excluded, and a colourless patch would not make
Sophie peck. Further, if we know that closing the door, rather than any movement
at all, would exclude the draft then it would be odd to be less than specific about it.
Similarly if we know that the patch needs to be red for Sophie to peck, then it would
be odd not to specify that.
The maxims I offered earlier were derived from general principles of interpreting
what someone has said, but were specific in relation to the effect event. A different
specification of the first two maxims is required for the cause:
Maxim 4 Take the cause event to be as robust as is required to render the causal claim
true.
Maxim 5 Take the cause event to be no more robust than is required to render the
causal claim true.
These maxims justify the interpretation of the cause event in the examples respectively
as essentially a closing, and only accidentally a slamming, and as essentially red and
only accidentally scarlet.
This double-standard for cause and effect seems problematic. If causation is tran-
sitive, as I will assume it is for the moment,13 any event which is an effect can also be
a cause. If we have conflicting standards for the treatment of an event when it is a
cause and when it is an effect, what are we to say when it is both? Perhaps there is
no single context in which a cause is both, but if there is it may well be a restriction
in that context that the event meet all of the maxims (1–5) simultaneously. Is this
possible? I think it is. Sophie the pigeon was trained to peck all and only red things,
so specifying that the patch was coloured flouts Maxim 1 and specifying that the patch
was scarlet flouts Maxim 4. However specifying that the patch was red respects each of
the maxims: it is fragile enough, without being too fragile, and robust enough without
being too robust. We do not ordinarily require that a causal claim meets this exacting
standard in order to be acceptable but we are supposing that there is a context in which
the effect is both a cause and an effect so it may just be a feature of such contexts that
they have a far stricter standard of causal ascription than ordinary contexts. I will
argue that this is exactly the case when I come to discuss the transitivity of causation
in Chapter 7.
Before moving on, let me point out an interesting and useful parallel with a proposal
from Stephen Yablo [1992]. For Yablo the specification of the cause should neither give
12This is a particularly important issue quite apart from considerations of pre-emption. I will return
to it in Chapter 4.
13I discuss this more fully in Chapter 7
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too much information, nor too little, with respect to the effect.14 Specifying that Sophie
was presented with a scarlet patch gives too much information, specifying that it was a
coloured patch gives too little, but specifying that it was a red patch gives just enough
information. This requirement is known as Yablo’s proportionality constraint. For the
moment I simply want to point out this parallel with the proposal I offer and point
out a couple of important differences.
Firstly, if we take the proportionality constraint as a constraint on which causal
claims are true then it will provide an extremely high bar for correct causal talk: it
will be false to say that the scarlet patch caused Sophie to peck. However, if it is a
constraint on which causal claims are optimal then it is a pragmatic constraint which
is a rival to, and largely concordant with, the maxims I have advocated.
Secondly, Yablo’s constraint only makes reference to the cause and not the effect.
Perhaps the constraint could be extended so it applied to either side of the causal
relation so long as proportionality is reached in the end. It is not clear, though, how
this would help in cases of late pre-emption. In those cases it was not just that the
causal claims were out of proportion, it was that the context had justified a more precise
reading of the effect event in particular. Proportionality could have been achieved
instead by making the cause (Suzy’s throw) less precise (a child’s throw), but this
would have been to avoid the pre-emption problem that the counterfactual analysis
faced rather than resolve it. On the view I have presented, the set up of the case—
in which we know that there were two children throwing—rules out reading the cause
more robustly (a child’s throw) but justifies reading the effect as more fragile (a window
breaking at that time and in that way). Yablo’s constraint, in its current form, lacks
this important sensitivity to context.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Lewis’s ‘dare to be a doctor’ riposte against the
fragilicist is misjudged as it conflates two different readings of the causal claims being
made. Lewis’s related complaint about spurious causes (such as Billy and the gravita-
tional pull of Jupiter each being causes of the window breaking) requires us to believe
that someone who endorses a fragile view of events in the pre-emption context is com-
mitted to a similarly fragile view in all contexts. This simply does not follow. It does,
however, establish an explanatory burden for any view that wishes to hold that effect
events are fragile in pre-emption cases but not in others.
I have proposed a view of the pragmatics of causal talk that provides just such an
explanation. Taking some relatively basic pragmatic maxims from Grice and Lewis, I
have argued that certain causal-specific maxims can be derived (given a counterfactual
theory of causation). Applying those maxims in the context of pre-emption justifies a
fragile reading of the effect events without entailing a commitment to fragile events in
all contexts.
14This is a crude gloss of the view to be supplemented in Chapter 7 when I discuss transitivity.
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4
On the Non-occurrence of Events
In the previous chapter I argued that a counterfactual analysis of causation could give
the right results in the apparently problematic cases of late pre-emption, so long as a
certain contextualised reading of the effect event was deployed. This solution concerned
the fragility of the events in question and required that we be sensitive to the impact
of context upon the modality of the effect event in question. Shifting the modality of
the event shifted the conditions under which the event was taken to occur or not occur.
Of course many effects will go on to become causes and I argued in the last chapter
that causes and effects required inverted pragmatic maxims, though each is still gov-
erned by the same super-maxim: assume that the conversational contribution is true.
In this chapter I further explore the issue of event fragility and reach an interesting
and surprising conclusion: there is an asymmetry in the standard of non-occurrence
applied to cause events and effect events when reasoning counterfactually about them.
4.1 Recap
To begin, it is worth recapitulating the story so far. Lewis’s original [1973] counter-
factual analysis of causation states that one event is a cause of another iff there exists
a chain of counterfactual dependence between them. One event e counterfactually de-
pends on another c iff the following counterfactual conditional (or causal conditional)
is true:
¬Oc ¬Oe
In Chapter 2 I argued that the truth of this conditional could shift with context and
expression, suggesting that there is a variable in the semantics that is not represented
in Lewis’s test. I endorsed a counterpart-theoretic view of events which would explain
this variation and introduced new notation to help track this variable. Events c and e
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under counterpart relation n would be denoted by cn and en respectively. This yielded
the following revision of Lewis’s test for causal dependence between events:
¬Ocn ¬Oen (where n is provided by the context)
The revised analysis of causation that this then forms (together with the chaining
requirement) I named CCT for Counterpart-theoretic Counterfactual Theory of cau-
sation.
This approach helped me disambiguate two different claims that we could endorse
in cases of late pre-emption. In the Billy and Suzy example, it allowed me to distinguish
the window breaking exactly as it did and the window breaking in some way or other. I
argued that we could resolve the late pre-emption problems by tending towards a more
fragile (more restricted) reading of the effect event’s counterpart relation (I also argued
that such a reading was justified under a Gricean/Lewisian pragmatic framework).
So-called ‘fragile’ events are taken to have an abnormally rich essence, but quite
what a normal essence would be is far from obvious.1 In any case events under a
relatively strict counterpart relation will occur in relatively few worlds and will fail to
occur in relatively many. In other words, the negation of the proposition e occurs is
true in a larger range of worlds when e is taken to be fragile than when it is not. This
means that when e is considered fragile the consequent of our causal counterfactual is
weaker than when e is considered robust, and that in turn makes the conditional easier
to satisfy. So, tending to interpret the effect event as fragile in turn tends to yield
a true result in our CCT test. Thus the CCT test, combined with a fragile view of
events, is very permissive about when an event is to be considered a ‘cause’.
4.2 Fragile Causes and Excision
Fragile effects are one type of problem, but fragile causes are a different type. Where
fragile effects weaken the consequent of the causal counterfactual, and yield seemingly
too many causes, fragile causes weaken the antecedent and yield too few. On a fragile
reading the version of Suzy’s throw that takes place in a nearby world, in which Suzy’s
hair (or even just one of her hairs) is a slightly different shade, is a different event. This
nearby world then satisfies the antecedent of the causal counterfactual ¬Oc. However
even on the most fragile standard the effect event is unchanged. Had Suzy been slightly
larger, or shouted as she threw, such alterations could, in principle, be detectable in the
effect event by the difference in gravitational force or resonance. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the change in shade is not a difference that requires a gravitational
shift,2 the shade of Suzy’s hair in no way influences the window’s breaking. Here we
have a very close ¬Oc-world in which Oe is true.
1An essentialist may be able to claim that there is just such a ‘normal’ essence that applies but
I am operating under an anti-essentialist assumption by adopting a counterpart-theory of events.
Nevertheless, I will argue in Chapter 5 that there is a nominalist-friendly route to identifying a
default or canonical counterpart relation.
2It is not obvious whether or not this is plausible within our physics since it requires that the shade
be altered (presumably by altering the physical make-up) without an attendant shift in gravitational
influence. The ubiquity of gravitational influence in our physics muddies certain examples and so I
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Is it one of the closest worlds? Perhaps not as I have described it, but there will
be some alteration of c which concerns shade and which is sufficiently minimal so as
to occur in one of the closest ¬Oc-worlds. That is all that is required to show that on
the most fragile reading, the claim c caused e is false. It only takes one ¬Oc-world in
the closest sphere to be an Oe-world for the counterfactual analysis to deny that there
is a causal connection between one event and another.
One might think: so much the worse for the fragile view. However the problem
is not restricted to fragile cases. Once we see how the problem is generated we can
reproduce the issue at less fragile levels. Here is the formula: identify some essential
aspect of the cause event which, if varied, would have no impact on the effect event.
For example, assume that Derek’s throwing the heavy red ball caused the bottle to
break. Regardless of how fragile the treatment you apply to the bottle breaking is,
having Derek throw a heavy green ball instead would make no difference to the effect
event—again, I am stipulating that we keep gravitational complications in abeyance
by altering the shade. Throwing a heavy red ball is not the same as throwing a heavy
green ball and so the nearby world in which Derek throws the green ball is a ¬Oc-world.
Is it one of closest ¬Oc-worlds? Perhaps not as I have described it, but there will be
some alteration of c which concerns the shade, and which is sufficiently minimal, so as
to occur in one of the closest ¬Oc-worlds.
The problem in these cases is that Lewis’s counterfactual test fails if any of the es-
sential aspects of the cause are irrelevant to the effect. The requirement for a successful
causal claim on this test is that every aspect of the cause event impacts in some way
on the effect. Yet when we ask if one thing caused another, we are not asking if every
aspect of the first impacted the second, but rather if any aspect of the cause had an
impact on the effect. As it stands, the Lewisian test is inadequate for that purpose.
4.2.1 Clean Excision
Noting this problem, Lewis (1986d, p210-211, 2004a, p.90) points out that it stems from
ambiguity in what we mean by c’s non-occurrence. If we accept that any alteration, any
almost-c counts as a non-occurrence of c, then the problem discussed above emerges.
Lewis points out that such problems are avoided if we imagine that c is “cleanly excised
from history, leaving behind no fragment or approximation of itself”. The idea here
seems to be that when considering the non-occurrence of an event, we ought to imagine
that nothing remotely like it occurs. The proposal clearly lacks detail but I will run
with it for the moment and return to the detail in §4.2.3.
This clean excision policy leaves the original analysis intact but amends the inter-
pretation of ¬Oc. Applying this in the problem cases of Suzy and Derek we see that
it does resolve the problem. Ignoring Billy for the moment, had Suzy not thrown the
rock at all, the window wouldn’t have broken, and if Derek had not thrown the heavy
red ball at all, the bottle would not have broken.3 These are the right results.
use the device of altering the colour to side-step this contingent complication. If I were offering a
theory restricted to the physically possible worlds this would be a potential problem but since I am
not, I only need it to be conceptually, rather than physically, plausible.
3The emphasis of ‘at all’ is to signify that no close alternative is substituted.
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They are the right results so long as Billy remains ignored, but that would be to
ignore the problem of pre-emption that motivated the discussion of fragility in the
first place. Recall that our solution to the pre-emption problem was to specify the
effect event under such fragile standards as would allow a counterfactual test to detect
the difference between Billy and Suzy’s throws. This fragile approach distinguishes
between the window breaking in any way at all and the window breaking exactly as it
did. Combining this with the clean excision policy from above gives us: had Suzy not
thrown the rock at all, the window wouldn’t have broken exactly as it did. Again, this
is the right result but note that we have applied a double standard—a clean-excision
policy to the cause and a nearest-alternative policy to the effect. This is not a mere
quirk. If we apply either standard universally, we get false claims in straightforward
examples:
Clean Excision Had Suzy not thrown the rock at all, the window wouldn’t have
broken at all.
Closest Alternative Had Suzy not thrown the rock exactly as she did, the window
would not have broken exactly as it did.
Clean Excision is false because Billy would have brought about a close alteration
of the window breaking. In fact it is false even if the window breaks a century hence,
and so the problem is not unique to the standard pre-emption cases.
Close Alteration is also false: had Suzy not thrown the rock exactly as she did,
the window would not have broken exactly as it did. This is false because, as shown
above, changing the hue of the rock, or the colour of Suzy’s hair counts as a nearby
alteration (making ¬Oc true) but makes no difference to the effect event (leaving Oe
true). Again, this is not restricted to pre-emption cases.
From this I conclude that the solution to the pre-emption problem requires a mixed,
or double, standard of non-occurrence.
4.2.2 Two Standards of Non-occurrence
Such a double standard may seem theoretically untidy but not only does it offer a
solution to the pre-emption problem, I believe there is also independent motivation for
this asymmetrical treatment of cause and effect which justifies adopting the double-
standard.
The two standards under consideration can apply in four combinations. Both cause
and effect can be held to clean excision standards (CE-CE); both cause and effect can
be held to closest-alternative standards (CA-CA); cause can be held to a clean excision
standard and effect to a closest alternative standard (CE-CA); or vice versa (CA-CE).
Where either cause or effect is held to a clean excision standard, all of the aspects
of that event must be absent in its negation (i.e for its non-occurrence). Where either
one is held to a closest alternatives standard, the negation of the event-occurrence is
satisfied when any single aspect of that event is absent. Thus we can phrase our four
alternative analyses as follows.
c is a cause of e if and only if:
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CE-CE altering all aspects of c alters all aspects of e
CA-CA altering any aspect of c alters at least one aspect of e
CA-CE altering any aspect of c alters all aspects of e
CE-CA altering all aspects of c alters at least some aspect of e
It will be useful to test these alternatives in light of the example of Derek who
threw the heavy red ball. Clearly, Derek’s throw caused the bottle to smash. A causal
analysis must agree with this claim to be acceptable.
CE-CE will be too strong a requirement as even the complete excision of Derek’s
throw would leave some aspect of the bottle smash unaltered: the transparency of the
glass, the presence of a particular molecule, or the pattern on the base. CE-CE gets
the test case wrong.
CA-CA is also too strong a claim. Altering the hue of the ball does not alter the
bottle breaking event in any way. CA-CA gets the test case wrong.
CA-CE is an even stronger claim than CA-CA. If altering the hue doesn’t alter any
aspect of the bottle break, then a fortiori it cannot alter all aspects of the bottle break.
CA-CE gets the test case wrong.
CE-CA is the weakest claim. CE-CA is satisfied if the clean excision of the cause,
i.e. Derek’s throw, makes any difference to the effect, i.e. the bottle breaking. CE-CA
is the only standard that gets the test case right.
Note that this is a simple test of the available combinations once we realise that
there is an ambiguity in the notion of a non-occurrence of an event. The test case
used is not a pre-emption case and so the results of the test case are independent of
my argument concerning the required treatment in pre-emption cases. However, this
independent assessment points to the same conclusion: the Lewis analysis must be
amended to reflect a double standard in the treatment of non-occurring causes and
effects.
One reason to think that this double standard should not apply comes from reflect-
ing on the chaining nature of causation. If c causes d and d causes e, then d is both a
cause and an effect.4 If one event can be both a cause and an effect, then there should
be no asymmetry between the ontological status of causes and effects. Note, though,
that I am not advocating an ontological difference between cause and effect, nor even
a difference in counterpart relation, I am advocating an asymmetry in our analysis of
causation–that is, we apply one standard of non-occurrence to d when it is in the cause
role, and another when it is in the effect role. I will return to a deeper worry about
transitivity briefly in §4.4 and more fully in Chapter 7.
4.2.3 Refining Clean Excision
The notion of a clean excision is doing a lot of work in the preceding discussion but it
is very much underspecified by Lewis. In this section I propose a definition for each of
the alternative standards of non-occurrence.
4I owe this point to Schaffer [2005].
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The first thing to note about the CE and CA standards is that they are defined in
terms of event aspects. I am assuming a coarse-grained conception of events and those
events have properties which are synonymous with the aspects of the event. I am also
assuming a counterpart theory for events. According to this view an event described
as ‘the throwing of the red ball’ could easily be the very same event as described by
‘the throwing of the heavy ball’—it will be the same event if it occupies all and only
the same region of a world—but the first description is likely to invoke a counterpart
relation in which each counterpart involves a red ball (regardless of weight) but the
second is likely to invoke a counterpart relation in which some counterparts are not
red but in which all are heavy. The aspects of an event that are shared by all of its
counterparts are essential and the rest are accidental. Importantly, it is a context-
sensitive matter which counterpart relations obtain and, as argued in Chapter 2, this
context sensitivity tracks the context sensitivity of our causal ascriptions.
This context sensitivity would be lost if our causal test were not also sensitive to
which aspects of an event were essential and which were accidental. If every aspect
of the event were on a par, then the clean excision standard of non-occurrence of
the event would be the same regardless of how fragile or robust the event was. It
would mean that there was no difference between cleanly excising a fragile event and
a robust one which would undermine what I have said about pre-emption cases where
the robustness/fragility of an event makes a significant difference. Under a counterpart
theory of events, however, we can distinguish the different aspects of the event under
consideration. So, I propose the following definitions:
Fully-occurs An event c occupying region R of world w is taken to fully-occur (Oc)
at world wn iff there is some region of wn which corresponds to R in w and in
which all of c’s essential aspects are instantiated.
Partially-occurs An event c occupying region R of world w is taken to partially-occur
(Pc) at world wn iff there is some region of wn which corresponds to R in w and
in which at least one of c’s essential aspects are instantiated.
This allows us to define our two standards of non-occurrence, CE non-occurrence
and CA non-occurrence, as follows:
CE non-occurrence Actual event c CE non-occurs at world w iff ¬Pc is true at w.
CA non-occurrence Actual event c CA non-occurs at world w iff ¬Oc is true at w.
In other words, a close alteration of c exists in worlds where even one essential
feature of c is present in the appropriate region but c is cleanly excised in worlds where
no essential feature of c is present in the appropriate region.5
5I note here an issue with specifying the corresponding region in another world. Perhaps regions can
have counterparts as picked out on the basis of some extrinsic spatiotemporal features. This would fit
with Lewis’s belief that some minimal extrinsicality was required in specifying events—spatiotemporal
location and the laws were both bound up in the identity condition for events, according to his [1986d,
p.264].
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It is interesting to note that in Lewis’s original specification of the counterfactual
analysis of causation he used the propositions Oc and Oe but in subsequent discussions
it has become commonplace to drop the O for brevity. However, given the ambiguity
regarding the standards of non-occurrence of an event perhaps this short-cut was not
harmless.
4.3 Retrospective
In retrospect it is easy to see how this ambiguity remained so well hidden. Firstly, the
O representing ‘occurs’ is typically dropped in discussions of counterfactual analyses
so the pivotal variable (as I have identified it) is almost always glossed over in the
relevant literature. Second, English only has a limited range of locutions for specifying
the key idea: the non-occurrence of the event, the event does/did not occur. These lo-
cutions do not track the distinction between the different standards of non-occurrence
in question. Third, the two standards very frequently converge. This last point is
worth demonstrating in more detail: when the cause event is specified in such a way as
to trigger a counterpart relation with a single essential aspect, it makes no difference
whether you consider the ¬Oc scenario to require a counterpart without any of the
essential aspects of c (CE standard), or simply a counterpart that lacks just one essen-
tial aspect of c (CA standard). Since there is just one essential aspect the absence of
one aspect or all amounts to the same thing and the two standards of non-occurrence
converge and give equivalent results when plugged into a counterfactual conditional.
More generally, whenever the closest ¬Oc-worlds and ¬Pc-worlds are the same, the
CA and CE standards of non-occurrence will give equivalent truth conditions for the
causal counterfactual that takes c to be the putative cause.
Even when the closest ¬Oc-worlds and ¬Pc-worlds are different the causal coun-
terfactual can still yield the same results. For example, suppose that Suzy’s throwing
the rock causes the window to break and further suppose for simplicity that the cause
event has just three essential features: it involves Suzy, a rock and at throw. The clean
excision of this event requires that there be no Suzy, no rock and no throw. When c is
cleanly excised, the window doesn’t break and so the causal counterfactual comes out
true on the CE standard of non-occurrence of the cause (¬Pc). On the CA standard
of non-occurrence, ¬Oc fills the antecedent of the counterfactual. The worlds where
c does not fully occur include those where Suzy drops the rock, where someone else
throws the rock and those where Suzy throws some other object. Of those ¬Oc-worlds,
which is the closest? In this example it seems likely that the closest ¬Oc-worlds are
those where Suzy drops the rock rather than worlds in which she morphs into a dif-
ferent person or where the rock is suddenly supplanted by some other object. If the
closest ¬Oc-worlds (where Suzy drops) are all worlds where the window doesn’t break,
then the causal counterfactual will be true in that case. Of course I have manipulated
a toy example here but the point to make is that there will be some examples with
this form and in such examples whether the CE and CA standards of non-occurrence
are applied to the cause will make no difference to the truth of the causal conditional.
This further explains why the distinction between the standards remained hidden.
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If the two standards can and do agree, then perhaps it was an artefact of the
example chosen above that the CE-CE, CA-CA and CA-CE standards were rejected in
favour of the CE-CA standard. However, whilst these standards will all converge when
there is a single essential aspect of both the cause and the effect, they will not always
converge when the events in question have multiple essential aspects. This is all that
is required to justify distinguishing the standards. To illustrate: suppose that we have
a cause event with three essential features (P, Q and R) and an effect event with three
essential features (S, T and U). For the purposes of notation, I will define cP as the
occurrence of c, or a counterpart of c, with feature P and cQ as the occurrence of c, or
a counterpart of c, with feature Q, and so on. Now we can state the truth conditions
for each of our four standards of non-occurrence in this example:
CE-CE will be true if and only if ¬(cP ∨ cQ ∨ cR) ¬(eS ∨ eT ∨ eU) is true, that
is if, in all of the closest possible worlds, the total absence of any member of the set
{cP, cQ, cR} correlates with the total absence of any member of the set {eS, eT, eU}.
CA-CA will be true if and only if ¬(cP ∧ cQ ∧ cR) ¬(eS ∧ eT ∧ eU) is true, that is
in all of the closest possible worlds where any member of the set {cP, cQ, cR} are absent,
at least one of the set of set {cS, cT, cU} will be absent.
CA-CE will be true if and only if ¬(cP ∧ cQ ∧ cR) ¬(eS ∨ eT ∨ eU) is true, that is
in all of the closest possible worlds where any member of the set {cP, cQ, cR} are absent,
no member of the set {eS, eT, eU} will be present.
CE-CA will be true if and only if ¬(cP ∨ cQ ∨ cR) ¬(eS ∧ eT ∧ eU) is true, that
is if, in all of the closest possible worlds, the total absence of any member of the set
{cP, cQ, cR} correlates with absence of any single member of the set {eS, eT, eU}.
In a more concrete example, assume that a player shoots low (P) and hard (Q)
wearing purple boots (R) and that the keeper dives low (S), quickly (T) wearing yellow
gloves (U). Assume that had the player shot otherwise (high, soft, off target) the
keeper would have dived otherwise (high, slowly, not at all).
The CE:CA standard gets this case right: By the CE-CA standard the dive is
caused by the shot because in the total absence of any of the essential features of the
shot (P, Q or R) at least some aspects of the dive are altered it is no longer low and
quick. Thus the total excision of the shot alters the dive in some respect and this
makes the shot a cause of the dive.
All other standards get the case wrong: By the CE-CE standard the dive is not
caused by the shot because the gloves remain yellow (and so eT still occurs) even if
the shot is cleanly excised. By the CA-CA standard the shot does not cause the dive
because even in worlds where the boots are not purple (and so cR is absent) all essential
aspects of the dive (S, T, or U) remain unaltered. By the CA-CE standard the dive
is not caused by the shot because for every alteration of the shot (cP, cQ, or cR), some
alteration of the dive (eT at least) occurs.
I think that this example shows how the cases come apart with multiple essential
features being attributed to the cause and effect and justifies (i) distinguishing the two
standards, and (ii) applying those standards asymmetrically (CE-CA) in the causal
counterfactual. I now turn to the implications of this result.
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4.4 Revising the Counterfactual Analysis
If what I have said about the requirement of a double standard of non-occurrence is
correct, then I will need to propose an alteration to Lewis’s original counterfactual
analysis. More specifically I will need to alter the conditional that he claimed estab-
lished causal dependence. Lewis said that c is a cause of e iff (i) c and e are distinct and
(ii) there exists a chain of causal dependence between c and e where causal dependence
was established by the truth of the following counterfactual conditional:
Lewis ¬Oc ¬Oe
I have argued (Chapter 2) that we needed to amend this test to incorporate the coun-
terpart variable for events. Using subscripts to indicate different counterpart relations,
this yielded the following modified test for causal dependence (which I called CCT). e
causally depends on c relative to counterpart relation x iff the following counterfactual
conditional is true:
CCT ¬Ocx ¬Oex
In ordinary causal discourse, the value x is set to a specific value, n, which is determined
in part by the context of utterance and the mode of representation of c and e.
However, as we have seen O can be read either as partially occurs or as fully occurs
depending on the standard of non-occurrence that applies. The foregoing argument
is intended to show that applying either reading of O to both c and e will not give
intuition-matching results but that applying the first to c and the second to e will.
Hence I have proposed an asymmetrical standard for the non-occurrence of the cause
and the effect respectively. In place of my revised CCT test for causal dependence
from Chapter 2 I offer the following amendment: e causally depends on c relative to
counterpart relation x iff the following counterfactual conditional is true:
ACCT ¬Pcx ¬Oex
Here, I supplanted the first O for occurs with a P for part-occurs as defined above.
This amounts to applying a clean excision standard to one side of the conditional and
a closest-alternative standard to the other. The CCT test for causal dependence is
now supplanted by what I will call an ACCT test, adding the A for Asymmetrical in
reference to the asymmetric standard of non-occurrence being applied to the cause and
the effect respectively.
When the context in question is the ordinary context of causal talk, I will refer
not just to the ACCT test for causal dependence (which allows for any counterpart
relation to fill x) but to the ACCT Contextual test which takes variable x to be
set to value n, the counterpart relation invoked by the ordinary context of our causal
discourse. This will prove a useful distinction in Chapter 5.
Causation is still analysed as chains of causal dependence but my analysis of causal
dependence now reflects the findings of the previous chapters: that counterpart varia-
tion must be represented and that there is an asymmetric standard of non-occurrence
that applies to the cause and the effect in the relevant counterfactual conditional.
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This is a novel way of expressing the asymmetry between cause and effect but
positing just such an asymmetry is familiar from Paul [1998a]. Paul advocated taking
the effect event to be sensitive to time in such a way as to render the late pre-empting
Suzy to be considered a cause, but not Billy. No such sensitivity is applied to the
cause however. Lewis [2004a] extended Paul’s idea to include both the timing or the
manner of the effect to be salient to whether it had counterfactually depended upon
the cause. This newer theory from Lewis advocates using a ‘tailor-made’ proposition
about whether, when and how e occurred as the consequent in the counterfactual
conditional. When the counterfactual is true then that means that whether, when and
how e occurred depends on whether c occurred. This is very similar to the notion I
have adopted above—in my version we hypothesise c’s not-occurring at all and look to
see whether e happened at all, at a different time or differently.
Lewis’s modification doesn’t stop there however. Rather than leave an asymmetric
test that treats cause and effect differently, Lewis argues that we ought to look at a
range of alterations of c—alterations where c didn’t occur at all, where c occurred at
a different time and where c occurred differently—and ask whether e happened at all,
at a different time or differently in each case. This amounts to mapping a range of
non-actual alterations of c onto a range of non-actual alterations of e. If it is true that
at least some not-too-distant alterations of c correspond to different e alterations, then
c can be said to influence e. In this revised account, causation does not require chains
of causal dependence as it was in the original analysis, but rather chains of causal
influence understood in this revised way. The later analysis is weaker as every case of
dependence is a case of influence, but not vice versa.
I have two complaints about this revised theory from Lewis. First, it is unclear
about what the range of alterations under consideration are. Lewis obviously wishes
to rule out alterations to c which create a nuclear explosion or a black hole but, unlike
his account of the closest possible world in which ¬c is true, which he defends at length
in [1979], this idea of not-too-distant is vague and underspecified: it leaves intuition
doing all the running. However, even if a good account is given at to what the salient
alterations are, Lewis seems to have changed the subject from actual causation to
actual -or-possible causation. No longer are we focussed on the occurrence of c in the
actual world and what it achieved, we are now concerned with what some imagined
alteration of c would have achieved. I didn’t cause a riot, but if I had acted differently
I would have. I take this distinction between actual and possible causation to be
important and Lewis’s later theory collapses that distinction. I will return to this issue
of actual and possible causation when I discuss absence causation in Chapter 6 and I
will make similar complaints against the causal modelling project when I come to look
at it in Chapter 9.
Before moving on, I will note a problem with my asymmetrical approach. If the
cause and the effect are subjected to different standards then an event which is the
effect at one link in the chain could promptly become a cause in the next link. So, when
the player shoots and the goalkeeper dives, then we might say that the shot caused the
dive since the clean excision of the shot would result in the keeper’s not diving. But
we might also say that the keeper’s presence in the goals at that point caused someone
to think about a particular shade of yellow (from the gloves) since had the keeper been
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cleanly excised, the thought would not have crossed their mind. If we further suppose
that the thought about the yellow would have occurred whether the keeper dived or
not (the gloves being visible either way), then it should be clear that the player’s shot
did not cause the thought about the shade of yellow. Yet the dive is caused by the
shot and the diving keeper causes the thought of yellow to cross the spectator’s mind
so, on the assumption that causation is transitive, the shot does cause the thought of
yellow. Something has gone wrong.
Interestingly, Lewis discusses this problem in relation to his revised theory which,
whilst symmetric, remains open to this sort of counter-example [2004a, p.93-96]. Lewis,
by insisting on the transitivity of causation, bites this bullet. For my part, I note the
issue now and leave it to one side until I return to the substantial topic of transitivity
in Chapter 7.
4.5 Conclusion
I have argued here that pre-emption problems help to reveal a more general problem
with Lewis’s original analysis concerning an ambiguity in the conditions for the non-
occurrence of an event. I have argued that we have independent motivation, quite apart
from pre-emption cases, to distinguish two senses of non-occurrence and to apply them
asymmetrically in our causal analysis. Lewis spotted this issue too but rather than
clarify the notion of non-occurrence, he instead liberalised his theory in a way that
collapsed the important distinction between actual and possible causation. That is a
distinction I am not willing to collapse.
The ACCT view that I have developed over the last three chapters can account
for contextual variation and pre-emption cases within a binary account of our causal
talk. This relates to aim (I) of the thesis—to give an account of our everyday causal
talk—and in the next chapter I will relate this discussion to my other aims: (II) to
give an account of the mind-independent, objective standard for causal connectedness
between events; and (III) to explain the relation of (I) and (II).
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5
The Privileged Context
In the preceding chapters I have argued that the truth of certain causal assertions
varies with context. I have also argued that such variation can be traced to shifting
counterpart relations that apply to the events referred to in those assertions, and I
have offered an outline pragmatics for interpreting this element of the semantics across
different contexts. In short, I have argued for a contextualist reading of causal claims
in our everyday talk in line with aim (I) of this thesis.
Such a contextualist approach might appear to be in tension with aim (II) of the
thesis: to give an account of the mind-independent, objective standard for causal
connectedness between events. According to Menzies, the idea that causation is just
such a ‘natural’ relation is the central platitude of our causal concept (albeit one that
Menzies does not subscribe to [2009]) and it is reasonable to think that this naturalism
is incompatible with the mind-dependent, context-variant account of causal talk that
I have been arguing for. If causal facts have objective truth conditions, how then can
assertions about causation be true in one context and false in another?
In this chapter I aim to give an account of this natural relation in line with aim (II)
and then go on to show that aims (I) and (II) are compatible. I will argue in favour
of treating one particular context as privileged and I will argue that doing so allows us
to hold both naturalist (in Strawson’s sense of a mind-independent, objective relation
[1992, p.109]) and contextualist views about causation and our causal assertions. I
will show a deep connection between the natural causal truths that relate to aim (II)
and the highly contextualised truths of our causal talk that relate to aim (I). This will
allow me to offer a further revised analysis of causation and a closely related account
of the truth conditions of our causal talk.
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5.1 Tension
There is no direct conflict in advocating shifting truth values for our causal assertions
whilst holding that the causal facts are fixed—the first posit concerns causal assertions
and the second causal facts. If the subject matter is different then there is no direct
contradiction.
However, it is obvious that causal claims and causal facts are related and it is
incumbent upon the compatibilist to show how this relation avoids the seeming con-
tradiction of contextualist and naturalist positions. For example, if causal claims were
simply propositions whose truth supervened upon the causal facts, then there could
be no change in the truth-value of a causal claim without an attendant change in the
causal facts. Such a standard reading would give rise to a contradiction as it would
rule out it being the case that causal truths vary with context whilst causal facts do
not.
There may be no contradiction, though, if the causal claims conceal an implicit
variable that tracks context and the causal facts do not. If a causal claim is not
semantically complete without reference to a context then the variation across contexts
of a single causal assertion, i.e. ‘throwing the ball smashed the window’, is not really
the variation of a single causal claim at all but rather the same sentence expressing
different propositions in different contexts. The same words can be used in one context
where the ball in question is heavy and in a second context when there is a different
ball which is light. We should expect the truth values of such claims to vary when the
event being referred to varies.
Yet, those causal claims which are standardly taken to vary with context (i.e. those
cases discussed in Chapter 2) do not vary which event is being referred to, but rather
how that event is being referred to. Suppose that these two sentences are uttered in
reference to a single serve by McEnroe:
McEnroe’s tension caused him to serve awkwardly.
McEnroe’s tension caused him to serve.
The first seems right but the second does not and yet the same actual cause (tension)
and the same actual effect (serve) are being discussed. Contrastive approaches to
contextual variation cases argue that there is indeed a missing variable in causal claims
that tracks context, but that the variable does not shift which events are being picked
out. On such views the actual-world relation of events remains the same across contexts
but an implied contrast is generated by the causal context. So, when we talk of an
awkward serve in a causal context, this implies a contrast scenario in which a graceful
serve is executed. But when we discuss the serve without making reference to its
awkwardness then this implies a contrast scenario in which no serve takes place at all,
graceful or otherwise. Thus, the suppressed variable in causal claims is the implied
contrast case, and it is the contrast case that varies with context.
This does not yet resolve the contextualist-naturalist tension. The contextualism
on offer—contrastivism—does identify a suppressed component in causal claims, but
that does not establish that the truth-value of a causal claim can vary independently
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of the causal facts. In the McEnroe examples, the contrastivist holds that both claims
concern the same actual-world events but bear different truth values. The naturalist
will hold that there is a fact of the matter about the actual-world causal relation
and so the two claims that pick out the same actual-world events can be expected to
correspond to a single causal fact concerning those events. So, the tension remains.
Or at least it would remain if the proposed contrast cases were merely benign con-
text variables, floating free of the causal facts. However, that is not the standard
contrastivist position. Contrastivism does not simply hold that there are implied con-
trast cases in our causal talk, but rather that the structure of causal facts is itself
contrastive. In Schaffer’s version,1 this amounts to the claim that causation is not
binary as we might have expected, i.e. c causes e, but rather that it is quaternary, c
rather-than c∗ causes e rather-than e∗. This way a causal claim can concern the same
actual-world c and e, as in the McEnroe case, but still vary with respect to c∗ and e∗.
The contrastivist position is that the implied contrasts vary with context and alter the
causal fact being expressed (and therefore the truth value of the sentence stating that
causal fact). Once the contrast is made explicit, and contextual variation removed, we
have the objective standard of causal facts that naturalism required. The contrastivist
has accounted for the context variation but also provided an objective standard of
assessment for causal truth. The tension has been resolved.
Two issues fall out of this version of the contrastivist position. First, it requires
that we jettison the assumption that causation is a binary relation. Second, it requires
that causation not be a relation between actual events, but between actual events and
possible events. I will not take issue with the content of these commitments here, but
I will point out that they are revisionary. If the same theoretical gains can be made
without requiring such revisions, then that will be preferable and I intend to show that
they can.
5.2 Counterpart Variation
In this thesis, I present an alternative view which can endorse contextualism without
revising our assumption of binarity (aim (I)), and which takes causation to be a natural
relation between actual events (aim (II)).
Chapter 2 has already demonstrated the contextualist component. A reminder:
causation is to be analysed as chains of counterfactual dependence linking distinct
events. Causal claims include event expressions which invoke context-variable coun-
terpart relations for the actual world events being picked out. As such, our event
expressions, rather than implicit contrast cases, carry the context variable component
of our causal claims. Thus, contextualism is endorsed whilst causation remains a binary
relation.
1Hitchcock [1996] offers a significantly different form of contrastivism where only the effect triggers
a contrast. Schaffer [2005] takes both the cause and the effect components in a causal claim to trigger
contrasts, as do Menzies & List [2010], but unlike List and Menzies Schaffer considers the contrasts to
be particular contrasts c∗ rather than sets of contrasts C∗. It will serve me best to discuss Schaffer’s
version here since it is neatly and explicitly laid out in his Schaffer [2005].
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In this section I argue for the naturalist component by showing that there is a
‘natural’ or canonical counterpart relation that applies to events mind-independently
and where the context is undefined. This counterpart relation underpins the natural
causal relation between actual world events. I will further argue that this natural
relation has a particular logical priority: for any true causal claim relating c and e, the
actual world events c and e must be causally related under the natural, or canonical,
counterpart relation.
5.2.1 The Spectra of Counterpart Relations
For any given event c there exists a spectrum of potential counterpart relations. At
either end of the spectrum are the extremal counterpart relations. At one end of this
spectrum the event has no essence and so anything goes—the counterpart relation is so
permissive as to allow any region of any other world to count as a counterpart of c. Call
this MAX and any event c under that counterpart relation can be represented by cMAX.
At the other end of the spectrum every feature is essential and only a perfect intrinsic
and extrinsic duplicate will qualify as a counterpart. A perfect intrinsic duplicate of c
can occur in a different world, but a perfectly intrinsic and extrinsic duplicate can only
occur in a world which is a perfect duplicate of the actual world in every way—that
is not another possible world, that just is the actual world.2 So under this maximally
strict counterpart relation all claims about c in non-actual situations are false as c has
no counterparts in non-actual worlds. I will call this counterpart relation MIN and
represent event c under MIN as follows: cMIN.
Plugging actual world event c into Lewis’s original causal conditional under either
of these extreme counterpart relations does not yield substantially informative propo-
sitions:3
L1 ¬OcMAX ¬Oe is always true for any e, since the antecedent is trivially
false—there are no ¬OcMAX-worlds, worlds where cMAX does not occur.
L2 ¬Oc ¬OeMAX is always false, unless there are no ¬Oc-worlds (i.e unless
c occurs in every world), since the consequent is trivially false—there are no
¬OeMAX-worlds, worlds where eMAX does not occur.
L3 ¬Oc ¬OeMIN is always true. Since eMIN only occurs in the actual world,
the consequent ¬OeMIN is true in every non-actual world. Where the conse-
quent is always true, the conditional is always true.
L4 ¬OcMIN ¬Oe is a little more complicated. Since cMIN only occurs in the
actual world, the antecedent is true in every non-actual world. This means
2This assumes that no two distinct worlds are qualitatively identical. I think this is a reasonable
and simplifying assumption but it is not strictly necessary. Even if there are distinct worlds which
are qualitatively identical, and so there are worlds where c occurs under this minimal counterpart
relation, conditionals which take c in the antecedent place, will never be substantially informative.
3For the purposes of illustration I revert temporarily to Lewis’s formulation where the cause side
and the effect side are subject to the same (somewhat ambiguous) standard of non-occurrence: ¬Oc
and ¬Oe.
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that the conditional is false unless there is some ¬Oe-world which is closer
than every Oe-world. It is hard to imagine a case where the counterpart
relation is such as to render every ¬Oe-world closer than every Oe-world
and where the L4 counterfactual is substantially informative. For example,
if e was taken to fall under the MIN counterpart relation too, then every
¬Oe-world would be closer than any Oe-worlds (since there are no Oe-worlds
other than the actual). However, if both OcMIN and OeMIN occur only in the
actual world, then every causal counterfactual that takes their negation in
the antecedent and consequent place will be trivially true.
If events were subject to such extremal counterpart relations, and if a Lewisian
counterfactual analysis of causation is remotely plausible, then they would be caused
by everything (or nothing), or would cause everything (or nothing) irrespective of
the physics of the world that c and e occupied. This cannot be right. Given that
Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation is antecedently plausible, I conclude that
the problem lies with the extremal counterpart relations. These cannot feature in a
meaningful and substantial causal test.
Interestingly, the result is the same (albeit for slightly different reasons than in L4)
when we introduce the asymmetric standard of non-occurrence that I introduced in the
last chapter (the ACCT test for causal dependence):
ACCT 1 ¬PcMAX  ¬Oe is always true for any e, since the antecedent is trivially
false—there are no ¬PcMAX-worlds.
ACCT 2 ¬Pc ¬OeMAX is always false, unless there are no ¬Pc-worlds (i.e unless c
partially occurs in every world), since the consequent is trivially false—there
are no ¬OeMAX-worlds.
ACCT 3 ¬Pc ¬OeMIN is always true: since eMIN only fully occurs in the actual
world, the consequent ¬OeMIN is true in every non-actual world. Where the
consequent is always true, the conditional is always true.
ACCT 4 ¬PcMIN  ¬Oe is always true. Recall that cMIN is c under a counterpart
relation in which every intrinsic feature of c and every extrinsic feature of
c’s world (the actual world) are essential. For c to partially occur under
that standard of counterpart relation merely requires that a single essential
feature remains, so for c not to even partially occur (¬PcMIN) would require
that there be an alteration of c in a world where no feature of the actual world
remained. Since e occurs in the actual world, every ¬PcMIN-world must be
a world where no feature of e remains and so ¬Oe must be true. So, in all
the closest ¬PcMIN-worlds, ¬Oe must be true rendering the conditional true
regardless of what c and e pick out.
Again, the extremal counterpart relations make a nonsense of an other-wise plausible
theory. These counterpart relations cannot apply in our counterfactual causal reason-
ing.
68 The Privileged Context
Notice, though, that the spectrum of counterpart relations splits into two sub-
spectra: there are those counterpart relations whose members stand in that relation
in virtue of some intrinsic property or combination of intrinsic properties (e.g. the
counterpart events are those that contain an object which is round and metal), and
those counterpart relations whose members stand in a counterpart relation at least
partly in virtue of extrinsic properties (e.g. where all counterparts take place north of
the equator) or who stand in that relation regardless of their properties (e.g. where
the only counterparts are the laying of an egg, a performance of Macbeth and the
spinning of a single electron). I will refer to the first sort of relation as ‘natural’ and
the second as ‘arbitrary’. The sub-spectrum made up of only the arbitrary counterpart
relations has the same two extremal relations as the original spectrum of all counter-
part relations, MAX and MIN. However, because MIN relates only those intrinsic
and extrinsic duplicates, it does not feature on the sub-spectrum made up of only the
natural counterpart relations, since the natural relations exclusively concern the intrin-
sic features. That means that the strictest natural counterpart relation there can be
is one which relates the intrinsic duplicates regardless of their extrinsic similarities or
dissimilarities. I represent this counterpart relation by adding subscript i, so c under
counterpart relation i is written as ci.
This counterpart relation does not trivialise our causal test since it is a substantial
question whether the following conditionals are true or false:
ACCT 5 ¬Pci ¬Oe. This conditional is true iff all of the closest worlds where the
best candidate counterpart of c does not share a single intrinsic feature of c
are worlds where the best candidate counterpart for e does not share all of
e’s essential features.
ACCT 6 ¬Pc ¬Oei. This conditional is true iff all of the closest worlds where the
best candidate counterpart of c does not share a single essential feature with
c are worlds where the best candidate counterpart for e does not share all of
e’s intrinsic features.
These conditionals are substantial because we must know more about the nature of
c and e to know if they are true or not. This was not the case with the extremal
counterpart relations. What is more, this counterpart relation seems to have a certain
logical priority as it is the strictest counterpart relation that can be formed on the basis
of intrinsic properties.
5.2.2 The Canonical Counterpart Relation
I think that there is an independent reason to embrace one particular non-extremal
counterpart relation as canonical in our ontology. This conviction is based in part on the
Humean assumption that there are no necessary connections between distinct entities.
When giving our total description of an object, x, we will include intrinsic features, such
as is round, and extrinsic features, such as is on earth. This total description picks out x
but does so in reference to distinct entities such as earth (or any other object mentioned
in its extrinsic feature set). If this total description entered our ontological canon, x
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would be defined, at least in part, in reference to these distinct entities—it could no
longer be x without them. This would establish a necessary connection between x
and the distinct entities in x’s world and so would violate the Humean assumption.
The nature of an object would no longer just be a ‘local matter of particular fact’ as
the Humean picture requires, according to Lewis [1986d, ix], but a matter of the fact
concerning local and non-local parts of a system.
Respecting the Humean assumption requires that the canonical description of the
object is that description which details only its intrinsic features. Reference to ex-
trinsic features is useful and entirely unproblematic for our ordinary discourse, but
when it comes to detailing our fundamental ontology and giving the most basic and
fundamental (i.e. canonical) description of the world, then such descriptions should be
eschewed.
Objects and events are analogous in this respect4—the canonical description of an
event should detail only its intrinsic features lest it violate the Humean assumption.
Having eschewed the extrinsic features of the event, the maximally strict counterpart
relation that it can now fall under would require all of its intrinsic duplicates to be
present in every counterpart.
Furthermore, the canonical description is neutral in respect of background grouping
and so none of the intrinsic features are more or less important than any other. In
the context of a canonical description, then, either all of the features are essential
or none are. If none of the features were essential, then the counterpart relation in
the canonical context would be equivalent to MAX, which, as we saw above (5.2.1
and 5.2.1), led to triviality in causal claims in particular, but also makes a nonsense
of our modal attributions in general since every event would have a counterpart in
every world rendering every event modally necessary! That cannot be. However, if
all of the natural intrinsic features of the event are essential, then our causal and
modal attributions make sense, and the Humean assumption is not violated. So, the
counterpart relation invoked by the canonical description of an event should treat all,
rather than none, of the intrinsic properties as essential. This is exactly what the i
counterpart relation introduced above does. I take this to motivate thinking that the
i counterpart relation is the canonical counterpart relation for events.
Some will object that without context there can be no sensible discussion of which
counterpart relation applies to an object or event. I am inclined to think otherwise but
I need not argue for this position here. It will suffice for this purpose that in the context
of a canonical description, there is a canonical counterpart relation that applies. The
context in which the canonical description applies is an idealised context and resides
firmly outwith our practical reach. Nevertheless it is the context in which the object or
event get its definitive place in our inventory of the world—it is the privileged context.
All that this demonstrates is that there is some some stand-out counterpart relation
(the strictest) on the spectrum which is non-arbitrary and which does not trivialise
counterfactual conditionals concerning that event. What remains to be shown is that
this counterpart relation has some important relation to our causal talk and that it is
4This is a consequence of my ontology of events, where events are taken to be space-time regions
of a world—see Chapter 2.
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useful in resolving the contextualist-naturalist tension.
5.2.3 Canonical Implications
Before going on to argue that the canonical counterpart relation does indeed help
resolve the contextualist-naturalist tension within causation, I will first consider some
of the implications that follow from adopting this counterpart relation for events within
a counterfactual theory of causation.
Each version of counterfactual analysis I have considered so far has agreed on the
following: c is a cause of e if and only if there exists a chain of causal dependence
between c and e. I have argued for certain refinements of what determines causal
dependence, i.e. which counterfactual conditional determines causal dependence. At
the end of Chapter 4 I settled on an asymmetric, counterpart-theoretic, counterfactual
theory of that dependence (ACCT) which takes e to causally depend on c relative to
a counterpart relation x iff ¬Pcx ¬Oex. In the privileged context, the counterpart
relation in question is the canonical counterpart relation (i.e. the variable x is set to
i). So, in the privileged context, e causally depends on c iff: ¬Pci ¬Oei. Call this
test for causal dependence in the privileged context ACCT Canonical, or Canonical
for short.
Now, let us suppose for the sake of discussion that the test for causal dependence in
the privileged context (Canonical) is the definitive test for causal dependence between
distinct events in our theory of causation. According to our present physics, this would
provide an extremely permissive test for causation indeed. Within relativistic physics,
every event in the backwards light cone of an effect will have had at the very least a
gravitational influence on that effect. Cleanly excise any past event relative to the effect
and the effect will be altered in some way, however minute. Therefore, by adopting
Canonical as part of our definitive causal test, every event in the backwards light cone
of an effect is a cause of that effect.5
Of course, had our physics been different, this may not have been the case. Endors-
ing Canonical as part of our definitive causal test does not directly result in the claim
that every event in the past of some effect is a cause of that effect, but it does give that
result when the physics tells us that this is how events influence one another. This is a
positive result for three reasons: First, Canonical is sensitive to what the physics of the
world is, surely this is a pre-requisite for a viable theory of causation. Second, assume
it were otherwise and our causal theory was not sufficiently sensitive so as to attribute
causation where our physics can detect an influence. A pedantic physicist could claim
to have discovered and been able to manipulate causal connections that our causal
theory could not endorse—a disaster for that causal theory. Third, and most impor-
tantly, we know from the chaotic nature of our world that minute differences in initial
conditions can yield enormous differences elsewhere in the system. If we were to ignore
some variables at the initial conditions, we could never tell the complete causal story of
some later macro-level event. So, our causal theory needs to be able to accommodate
all of the features of the initial conditions. Adopting Canonical as our definitive test
5This point is familiar from Latham [1987], Field [2003] and Schaffer [2005].
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for causal dependence avoids these issues by endorsing every claim of influence that
our physical theory can support as causal. Of course, that makes for a very great deal
of causation in our world. It is simply too much for some.6
I take it this is what Lewis had in mind when he rejected a ‘uniformly stringent’
standard of event fragility [1986d, p.199]. Lewis was concerned that a test such as
Canonical let in too much: it makes the bystander, the pre-empted back-up (Billy),
the dog barking several streets away and the gravitational influence of Jupiter all count
as causes of the window breaking event. By adopting the Canonical test within our
causal theory, however, they are all considered causes, as is the firing of the gun last
year, the Great Fire of London or the movement of the remotest dust mote on Mars.
Absolutely everything in the backwards light cone is a cause of the death. And yet we
discriminate between the guilty and the innocent, the vandal and the bystander, the
person who fired the gun and the person who tried to stop them, the relevant factors
from the background conditions and so on. We discriminate as a matter of course but
a uniformly strict standard of fragility, i.e. the standard applied in Canonical, cannot.
Lewis thought this a reductio of the fragile view of events (and, we may presume, the
Canonical test by extension). I do not.
We do discriminate between causes and non-causes and between background and
foreground conditions for an effect, this much is obvious from our causal attributions,
but why should that make us think that there is such a discrimination at the level
of metaphysics? Recall Putnam’s Venusians [1982] arriving at earth and noting all of
the combustible oxygen lying around. They may well think that it was the oxygen
that caused the fire, not the spark that we humans typically blame. Or take the
normally oxygen-free lab where sparks are common. The oxygen we typically consider
a background condition for ordinary fires is suddenly taken to be the cause of the fire in
the lab. The selections we impose when making causal attributions are influenced by a
wide range of contextual factors, and these are surely relevant in analysing our causal
talk and our causal assertions, but if there is a mind-independent, objective matter of
fact that we track with those assertions, we had better look for a fact which is neutral
with respect to such selections. We need a pre-selective account of the metaphysical
relation of causation quite irrespective of the obviously selective nature of our causal
talk.
Here we reach a methodological fork in the road. Either we treat our causal asser-
tions as transparently manifesting a context sensitive, selective, notion to be analysed
and work on that or, instead, we take our causal assertions to imperfectly track some
objective feature of the world and seek an understanding of that feature. The former
path is well trodden: Hitchcock & Knobe [2009], McGrath [2005], Menzies [2009] and
Schaffer [2000b] can all be seen to be following this methodological road. The latter
path is something of a tightrope as it requires using causal assertions and intuitions at
once as evidence and at another time as data to be explained away. But which are the
good examples of causal talk and which are the bad? Which are good evidence and
which are to be explained away? I believe it is worries of this sort that make the first
6Objectors include Paul [2000, p.236], Lewis [2004a, p.88-90], Schaffer [2005, p.334] and Menzies
[2009, p.349-351].
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path so popular by comparison and the second so lonely.7 Nevertheless, I think the
latter path remains worth exploring. If there is a mind-independent, objective feature
of the world that our causal assertions track, the first path will never lead us to it. It is
antecedently plausible that such a feature of our world exists so it is reasonable to start
with the hypothesis that such a feature exists and see if the data can be understood in
light of that starting assumption. If it cannot, or if the concessions required to make
the data fit are just too much then we will have made progress, albeit of a negative
sort. If it can, and if the explanations for the deviant data are plausible then that
leaves our central causal platitude intact. I think that that is a balancing act worth
attempting.
So, revisiting Lewis’s objection, we see the complaint is that the fragilicist’s meta-
physics does not map directly onto our causal talk. I would prefer to put it around the
other way: our causal talk does not map directly onto the metaphysics being proposed.
Put that way it is no surprise. Our assertions about objects are loose and vague in
a way that our physics most certainly is not. We talk of windows breaking and fires
starting and these macro-level assertions do not precisely map on to the micro-level
facts about atoms and molecules, let alone electrons, fields and wave functions. We can
reasonably (though not uncontroversially—see Anderson [1972] and Batterman [2013])
suppose that with a dose of charitable interpretation our assertions about the macro
level will meaningfully relate to the micro-level facts and it is an interesting project
to investigate what that relation might be. However, along the way we are bound to
come across acceptable, yet strictly false, claims about matter being solid (all matter
is very nearly entirely made up of empty space) or wood not conducting electricity (it
does, just very little) that can be charitably read as being true relevant to context-
given values for solidity or conductivity. It is no threat to our scientific theory that
such divergence from common talk exists but it does highlight a double standard: a
canonical fact of the matter about a value, and a contextually variant fact about the
relevance of that value. What is interesting to note is that for the canonical fact of the
matter to be truly canonical, it must be consistent with the widest range of contexts in
which it is invoked, but for any non-canonical claim made concerning that fact there
can be no certainty that the claim will hold in another context. Take the conductiv-
ity of wood, for example. The canonical fact (as I am calling it) is that wood does
conduct electricity. The person that says it does not may be saying something useful
or interesting in their context but there still remains another context—the physics lab
perhaps—where the conductivity of wood is known and discussed. The canonical fact
that wood conducts at least some electricity must remain stable across these contexts
whereas the contextually embedded claims need not. This is an important asymmetry.
Of course, it would be a grievous error to let the tail wag the dog here. Our common
sense assertions are held to account if they deviate from scientific findings, not the other
way around. Philosophical theorising cannot hope to take such epistemic precedence
over common sense, but if there is a mind-independent, objective truth of the matter
7To my knowledge Hall and Paul [2013] are the only philosophers in recent years to have take
seriously the notion of a reductive account of causation, and even they are not persuaded that it is
viable.
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about what causes what then the lesson from scientific progress strongly suggests that
we will only loosely approximate the truth in our ordinary talk. Taking such talk too
seriously begs the question against the naturalist. However, if the naturalist can show
that our causal talk tracks some mind-independent feature of the world, even loosely,
then there remains hope for their position.
I will offer an analysis of causation which would make causation a natural relation
between distinct events (naturalism). I will show that our causal talk tracks this natural
relation between events despite varying in truth across contexts (contextualism). The
resultant view will give a two-tiered test for causation. The first test will determine
the natural fact concerning the causal relation of c and e, the second will determine
the context-sensitive truth of a causal assertion concerning c and e.
I am now in a position to outline my central thesis:
Thesis 1: There is a mind-independent fact of the matter about whether
one event c caused another e simpliciter: e causally depends on c relative
to counterpart relation x iff ¬Pcx ¬Oex; and c is a cause of e simpliciter
iff there is a chain of counterfactual dependence between c and e under the
canonical counterpart relation i (i.e. between ci and ei). This is my analysis
of the causal relation.
Thesis 2: Our causal talk must at the very least track this fact of the
matter about the causal relation if it is to express literally true causal
claims. However, that does not mean that the only true causal claims are
those which directly express such facts.
Thesis 1 is simply Lewis’s original counterfactual analysis, applied in the canonical
context and with a disambiguated asymmetrical standard of non-occurrence applied
to c and e. I have argued for the stand-out status of the canonical context in this
chapter and for the double-standard of non-occurrence in Chapter 4 and, by plugging
these refinements into Lewis’s counterfactual analysis, I have proposed an extremely
permissive, mind- and interest-independent, analysis of the causal relation. At the
heart of this analysis of the causal relation is the ACCT Canonical test for causal
dependence: e causally depends on c relative to the canonical counterpart relation iff
¬Pci ¬Oei is true.
As I have already noted, however, our causal talk is not so permissive and does
not take place in the privileged context. Our causal talk operates in contexts where
the i counterpart relation does not apply and so we should not expect our causal talk
to be subject to the analysis offered for the causal relation itself. In Chapters 2, 3
and 4 I argued for a contextualist understanding of our causal talk that was subject
to variations in the counterpart relations of the events in question. That contextualist
argument held that the claim ‘c is a cause of e’ is true iff c and e in that context (i.e.
cn and en) were linked by a chain of causal dependence, where causal dependence was
determined by the truth of a context-sensitive counterfactual: ¬Pcn  ¬Oen. At
the heart of this analysis of our ordinary causal talk is the ACCT Contextual test for
causal dependence: e causally depends on c relative to the contextually determined
counterpart relation n iff ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true.
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So, I have two analyses on offer: one for our ordinary causal talk (featuring ACCT
Contextual) and the other for the causal relation itself (featuring ACCT Canonical).
They share a common core in that each requires that there be chains of causal depen-
dence between c and e events, and they even agree on the form of the counterfactual
dependence relation that must hold if there is to be causal dependence: ¬Pcx ¬Oex.
Applied to our causal talk the counterpart place (x) takes the value n as given by the
ordinary context. In the context of questions about the causal relation in our world,
the counterpart place takes the value i, as is mandated by the privileged context. The
first fits the contextualist data discussed in Chapter 2 and the second fits the ‘cen-
tral causal platitude’ that whether c and e are causally related is a mind-independent,
objective, matter of fact. I will refer to this two-tier application of the asymmetrical
counterpart-theoretic counterfactual theory of causal dependence as Double-ACCT.
The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to show that these two analyses
are compatible and how they relate. Each analysis differs only on standards of causal
dependence on offer so I will focus on how those standards—ACCT Canonical and
ACCT Contextual—relate. I think it is obvious that the two analyses are aiming at
different goals—one aims to analyse the causal relation, the other our causal talk—
and so there is no deep conflict here, but it is important to understand how these
two notions relate. If there is no relation between the two then there are two topics
being conflated in my discussion—it would amount to a verbal dispute about what the
topic of concern was: the causal relation or causal talk. This would be particularly
problematic for my view as I am using some of the data from our causal talk to inform
my account of the causal relation. They had better not be different topics!
On the other hand, it is antecedently plausible that there be a relation between
the truth of our causal assertions and the causal truths of the world (assuming there
are any, which I do), so it would be good for my theory if it explained and articulated
that relation. For example if it were the case that ¬Pcn  ¬Oen were true only
if ¬Pci  ¬Oei were true, then that would show that, within Double-ACCT, for
any given causal assertion to be true there must be a corresponding causal relation
in the world that made it true. That would be a satisfying result, indicating the
fundamentality of the causal relation and our success in tracking that relation in our
ordinary causal talk. Things are not quite so simple, however, as I aim to explain in
the next section.
5.3 Causal Talk
In this section I will show that, with an important exception, if a causal assertion is
true under in some ordinary context, i.e. if ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true, then it is true in
the privileged context, i.e. ¬Pci ¬Oei will be true. The exception in question will
ultimately motivate an addendum to my analysis of causal talk. First I will introduce
the terms and notation I will be using, then I will argue that ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true
only if ¬Pci ¬Oei is true. I will then introduce a counter-example to that argument
and derive a crucial lesson from it.
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5.3.1 Terminology
I will first introduce some terminology and notation that I will be working with. Some
of it will be familiar already but here I state the terms for clarity.
• x y is true iff in all of the closest possible worlds where the proposition x is
true, the proposition y is true.8
• The variables c and e range over events. I take events to be regions of spacetime
of a world and I will use c and e respectively to denote the (putative) cause and
effect.
• I will take the counterparts of c and e to be regions of worlds. The regions
occupied by c and e in the actual world are automatically counterparts of c
and e respectively and no other region of the actual world is. Which regions of
non-actual worlds qualify as counterparts of c and e is determined by a similarity-
metric. This similarity metric is determined, at least in part, by context and by
how c and e are represented. This makes counterparthood a mind-dependent
matter. Reference to candidate counterparts will indicate that we are to remain
neutral on which standard of similarity applies in the context in question. This
will be useful when comparing a range of prospective similarity metrics within a
context.
• The counterpart relation is that relation which holds between individuals and
their counterparts. Given the context-sensitivity of whether a given individual is
a counterpart of another or not, the counterpart relation varies with context. I
have argued in this chapter that in the privileged context, an individual c shares
all and only its intrinsic features with every one of its counterparts. I have referred
to this as the canonical counterpart relation for c. There is a weaker similarity
metric, where c shares at least some particular intrinsic feature or features with
all of its counterparts. When that is the case, the counterpart relation that
applies in that context can be said to be natural with respect to c.9 Notice
that the canonical counterpart relation is a special case of a natural counterpart
relation and that those features which are essential under a natural counterpart
relation—I’ll call them n-features of c—are a proper subset of the features which
are essential under the canonical counterpart relation—I’ll call them i-features of
c.
• I will use ci to refer to c under the canonical counterpart relation. This coun-
terpart relation is determined by the i-features (complete set of intrinsic features
8As previously, I am simplifying the truth conditions here is a way that implies the Limit Assump-
tion. I believe this is harmless in this context.
9This is to be contrasted with unnatural or arbitrary standards of similarity between c and its
counterparts. Such standards of similarity take non-actual individuals to be counterparts of an actual
individual on the basis of some non-intrinsic features of c, or which base the similarity on no common
features of the set of counterparts at all.
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plus spatiotemporal location) of c. I will use cn to refer to c under a natural coun-
terpart relation. This counterpart relation is fixed by which i-features (intrinsic
features plus spatiotemporal location) of c are taken to be essential in a given
context.
• I argued in Chapter 4 that there are two distinct standards which we might
invoke when we consider the negation of ‘c occurred’. The first standard of non-
occurrence I refer to as clean excision and this is a particularly strong standard
of non-occurrence of an event. On this standard, to say that c did not occur in a
world means that by the standards of similarity that apply in that context, there
is no candidate counterpart of c in that world which shares even a single essential
feature of c. In other words c does not even partly occur in that world relative
to a given counterpart relation. The set of worlds which meet clean excision
standard of non-occurrence for c will be represented as ¬Pcx where x indicates
the counterpart relation. The second standard of non-occurrence I refer to as
closest-alterative. On this standard, to say that e did not occur in a world means
that there is no candidate counterpart of e in that world which shares all of the
essential features of e. In other words e does not fully occur in that world. The
set of worlds which meet closest alternative standard of non-occurrence for e will
be represented as ¬Oex where x again indicates the counterpart relation.
I have introduced a two-tier thesis: one test for our causal talk and another for
the relation of causation itself. Both share the following ACCT element: e causally
depends on c relative to counterpart relation x, iff ¬Pcx ¬Oex is true. My account
of our causal talk sets x to n, where n is a function of context and representation. My
account of the causal relation sets x to i, where i is the canonical counterpart relation
as mandated by the privileged context. Now I can express the truth conditions for the
two tests for causal dependence, which sit at the heart of the analyses of causal talk and
the causal relation respectively, using the terminology and notation just introduced:
• ACCT Contextual: ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true iff in all of the closest possible worlds in
which no counterpart of c with even a single n-feature occurs of c, no counterpart
of e with every n-feature of e occurs.
• ACCT Canonical: ¬Pci ¬Oei is true iff in all of the closest possible worlds in
which no counterpart of c with even a single i-feature of c occurs, no counterpart
of e with every i-feature of e occurs.
5.3.2 The Reduction Argument
Having established the terminology and notation in the previous section, and having
re-introduced the ACCT Contextual and ACCT Canonical tests for causal dependence,
I am now in a position to argue for the target proposition: if e causally depends on
c under any ordinary counterpart relation then e causally depends on c under the
canonical counterpart relation too.
First, notice that if e does not fully occur in some world by the standards ordinary
context, it does not fully occur in that world by the standards of the privileged context.
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1. Suppose a natural counterpart relation n is given. If a candidate counterpart of
e lacks even one of the features that are essential given that relation—if ¬Oen is
true—then that candidate counterpart lacks one of the i-features. Therefore, any
world in which ¬Oen is true, ¬Oei is true. ¬Oen entails ¬Oei.
Example If throwing the heavy red ball did not wholly occur, then nor did
the throwing of the heavy, red, shiny, leather...etc. ball.10
Second, notice that worlds in which c has been cleanly excised relative to to an ordinary
context are at least as close to the actual world as worlds in which c has been cleanly
excised relative to the privileged context:
2. Those possible worlds in which cn is cleanly excised lack some of the i-features
of c. Those possible worlds in which ci is cleanly excised lack all of the i-features
of c. Therefore, all else being equal, the closest ¬Pcn-worlds will be closer than
the closest ¬Pci-worlds, except where n is fixed by all of the i-features in which
case they are equally close. So the closest ¬Pcn-worlds are at least as close as the
closest ¬Pci-worlds.
Example All else being equal, the worlds where you throw nothing (no heavy
thing, no red thing, no ball) are further away than the worlds where you throw
something (a heavy rock) similar to that which you threw in the actual world (a
heavy red ball).
Third, suppose that ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true. By 1, this entails that ¬Pcn ¬Oei.
For clarity:
3. ¬Pcn ¬Oen entails ¬Pcn ¬Oei
Example If you hadn’t thrown the rock then the window would not have bro-
ken therefore if you hadn’t thrown the rock the window would not have broken
exactly as it did (into 357 pieces, at such-and-such a time... etc.)
Fourth, we are supposing that ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true and so by 3, we can infer that
¬Pcn ¬Oei is true too. For ¬Oei to be true in a world requires that the candidate
counterpart for e in that world be unlike the actual e in at least one i-feature. If the
closest of the ¬Pcn-worlds are sufficiently unlike the actual world to make ¬Oei true,
then (from 2) the no-closer ¬Pci-worlds will be sufficiently unlike the actual world to
make ¬Oei true there as well. Thus in all of the closest of the ¬Pci-worlds, ¬Oei is
true. So:
4. ¬Pcn ¬Oei entails ¬Pci ¬Oei.
10It will help to indicate a list of all of the intrinsic features of an event with an ellipsis and an ‘etc.’.
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Example If you hadn’t thrown the rock, the window would not have broken
into 357 pieces at such-and-such a time... etc., therefore if you hadn’t thrown the
rock in just that way at just that time... etc., then the window would not have
broken into 357 pieces at such-and-such a time... etc.
So, on the assumption that ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true, we can derive that ¬Pci ¬Oei
is true. If correct, this would mean that any causal claim that passes the ACCT test
for causal dependence in an ordinary context (ACCT Contextual), will also pass the
same ACCT test in the canonical context (ACCT Canonical). Relating this back to
the analyses offered of our causal talk and of the causal relation in the Double-ACCT
theory, this result suggests that if it is true to say that c is a cause of e, then it
must be true that c and e are causally related. This indicates that our causal talk
asymmetrically depends on the way the world is. A neat and plausible result.
5.3.3 A Problem for Reduction
There is a problem in the foregoing argument. The argument for 4 states:
If the closest of the ¬Pcn-worlds are sufficiently unlike the actual world to
make ¬Oei true, then (from 2) the no-closer ¬Pci-worlds will be sufficiently
unlike the actual world to make ¬Oei true there as well.
However, this inference is fallacious. It is an instance of strengthening the antecedent
which Lewis discusses in Counterfactuals [2001, p.32]. When we adopt a new, stronger,
antecedent we alter where the closest antecedent-satisfying worlds are: they are now
further away since a greater alteration has had to take place to satisfy the more-
demanding proposition that ¬Pci occurs. The inference would be valid if we could
guarantee that a more distant world ensured the consequent remained true (¬Oei), but
we simply cannot guarantee that: it may be the case that as the closest antecedent-
satisfying worlds become more dissimilar overall, they at some point become more
similar in respect of the region associated with the consequent (the region corresponding
to e in the actual world). Whilst it is not guaranteed, the cases where it fails will be
quite specific: for ¬Pcn ¬Oei to be true and ¬Pci ¬Oei to be false, requires
that the shift from ¬Pcn to ¬Pci is attended by a shift from ¬Oei to Oei. What would
such a case look like?
Gun-Balloon: Taking aim at an escaped balloon, a child squeezes the
trigger on a toy gun. The safety catch is on and the bearing does not fire.
The balloon floats away on the wind.
Let us signify the event where the child squeezes the trigger as c and the balloon
floating off as e. Does c cause e? Adopting the ACCT Canonical test for causal
dependence (and ignoring their gravitational influence on one another just for the
sake of illustration), we start by assessing the truth of the following counterfactual:
¬Pci ¬Oei. Since absent the ci event (i.e. in the closest worlds where ¬Pci is true)
the balloon still floats off (Oei is true), e does not causally depend on e in the privileged
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context and so c is not a cause of e simpliciter. My contention in this discussion has
been that for every true claim of the form ‘c caused e’ (where the context determines
the counterpart relation n), it would be the case that c was a cause of e simpliciter, i.e.
in the privileged context. So, if the latter is false (as it seems to be in the gun/balloon
example above), there had better be no claim of the form ‘c caused e’ pertaining to
those same events which is true.
In the example given, however, such a claim seems to be true by the Double-ACCT
theory: where we take the safety catch being on as the only essential feature of c then
c does appear to be a cause of e since all of the closest worlds where the safety is off
(¬Pcn is true) the trigger is still squeezed, the bearing fires, and the balloon is popped
(¬Oen is true). So, for that standard of n, ¬Pcn ¬Oen is true but ¬Pci ¬Oei
is false, refuting my original claim that the truth of the first entailed the truth of the
second. Again, assuming my two-part causal analysis, we cannot simply move from
the truth of a causal claim in one context, analysed in terms of the ¬Pcn  ¬Oen
condition, to their being a causal connection between the two events involved in the
canonical context (¬Pci ¬Oei). My neat and plausible result was wrong.
5.4 A New Causal Analysis
5.4.1 A New Causal Test
This problem example is interesting however because it is a case of prevention, a
particular example of the broader category of absence causal claims. I will discuss
absence causal claims in much more detail in the next chapter but for now it will
suffice to say that I am not alone in being sceptical that we should endorse absence
claims as literally true causal claims, despite their widespread use in our causal talk.11
When we say that the rain prevented the fire, I think we give a causal explanation
without the rain and fire ever having any actual connection. They cannot have an
actual connection, of course, since the fire did not actualise!
Will all exceptions to my neat result have this absence structure? Not quite, but I
think they will all demonstrate something very like it. The problem cases arise out of
there being no actual connection between the cause event and the effect in the canonical
context—that is to say that the clean excision of the cause will have no impact on the
effect—but where a specified alteration to the cause will bring about some alteration
in the effect. The specified alteration in the cause concerns a non-actual configuration
of the features of the cause event and so it is a supposition about how the cause might
have been different. The clean excision of that version of the cause would make a
difference to the effect and so that would-be event should be considered a cause of that
would-be effect. All of this is at a remove from the actual occurrences of our world, as
it must be to create the problem in the first place. Put that way, it should be clear
that would-be causation is not a case of genuine causation, as genuine causation relates
actual-world events and would-be causation relates possible-world events. I will argue
in the next chapter that all cases of absence causation are cases of would-be causation
11See Beebee [2004], Dowe [2004b] and Schaffer [2004a] for example.
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and should not be considered examples of genuine or actual causation. That argument
remains to be made, however, so for the time being I will consider the problem cases to
split between would-be causal claims (which are manifestly not genuine causal claims
about our world) and absence causal claims about which I appeal to existing scepticism
in the literature.
Taking this scepticism about absence causal claims at face value for the moment,
it suggests that ACCT Canonical test (¬Pci ¬Oei) gave us the right answer about
the causal connectedness of the two events. That is in line with my analysis of the
causal relation as given in §5.2.3.
Thesis 1: There is a mind-independent fact of the matter about whether
one event c caused another e simpliciter: e causally depends on c relative
to counterpart relation x iff ¬Pcx ¬Oex; and c is a cause of e simpliciter
iff there is a chain of counterfactual dependence between c and e under the
canonical counterpart relation i (i.e. between ci and ei). This is my analysis
of the causal relation.
The second part of the analysis outline then concerned the connection between this
natural fact and the assertions of our causal talk:
Thesis 2: Our causal talk must at the very least track this fact of the
matter about the causal relation if it is to express literally true causal
claims. However, that does not mean that the only true causal claims are
those which directly express such facts.
In section 5.3.2 I attempted to argue that if ¬Pcn ¬Oen were true then ¬Pci
¬Oei would be true too. The idea was to show that if a causal claim is true in one
context (i.e. with counterpart relation n) then that same claim would be true in the
canonical context (i.e. with the same events under counterpart relation i). Were this
correct it would have established a connection between the contextual and canonical
causal claims being made just as Thesis 2 requires. However, it was not true as the
problem case of prevention demonstrated. If we assume, as I do, that absence causal
claims are literally false then the fact that ¬Pcn ¬Oen was true in the prevention
case demonstrates that this counterfactual test for our causal assertions (incorporating
the ACCT Contextual test for causal dependence) has failed—it gave a true result for
a false causal claim. So, we need a new test for the truth of our causal assertions.
Notice that the false result in the prevention case does not establish that the ACCT
Contextual test (¬Pcn ¬Oen) is irrelevant, just that it is not sufficient to determine
the truth of the causal assertion. In order to rule out the false positives a further
constraint is required, one which tests not only whether a certain modification of the
cause would alter the effect, but if the cause as it actually was contributed to the
effect. For this, I propose adding the following condition which I call ACCT Actual:
e actually depends on c iff ¬Pci ¬Oen. To meet this ACCT Actual condition it must
be the case that in all of the closest possible worlds where the cause event is cleanly
excised (including all of its intrinsic features, not just those taken to be essential-in-
context) the candidate counterpart for the event lacks at least one context-sensitive
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essential feature. This means that if the cause simply had not occurred, and if the
effect would have remained (essentially) unchanged, the conditional would be false.
Unlike the fully contextualised ACCT Contextual condition: ¬Pcn ¬Oen, this new
Actual condition will not give false positives in cases where if a specific feature of c
had changed, then e would have been different. ACCT Contextual cannot tell actual
from possible causal connections, but the new condition, ACCT Actual, can. That is
why the new condition is required.
Can the new condition replace the old? No. As with the Canonical test, it simply
lets in too much—anything in the backwards light cone that contributed to the effect
having a certain essential feature will be a cause. Our causal talk is much more selective
than this and it is our causal talk that this condition is supposed to help capture. Also,
it will give false positives. Suppose a colour-blind bull is trained to charge at the waving
of a certain embroidered rag but someone, not knowing this, said ‘it was the red colour
of the rag that caused the bull to charge’. On the ACCT Contextual test they would
be taken to have spoken falsely as in all of the closest worlds where the red colour
(essential feature) of the rag is absent, the bull still charges because the rag is still
embroidered in the same way. On the ACCT Actual test, however, the clean excision
of the rag-waving event, complete with all of its intrinsic features, means that there is
no redness, no rag and no embroidery in the closest possible ¬c-worlds. Without the
embroided rag the bull will not charge and so the new hybrid counterfactual test comes
out true: ¬Pci ¬Oen. This erroneous result shows that the ACCT Actual test is
not sufficient to establish the truth of a causal assertion. Both tests are required.
But what of the connection between this new two-part test for causal assertions—
ACCT Contextual and ACCT Actual together— and that of the natural causal relation,
ACCT Canonical? My outline analysis requires that the test for the causal talk track
the test for the natural causal relation between the events. The new two-part test for
causal assertions does track the natural relation in the following way: if some causal
assertion concerning c and e is true on both ACCT Contextual and ACCT Actual
tests, then that entails that c is a cause of e simpliciter. This follows simply from
combining the new ACCT Actual test, which is satisfied when ¬Pci ¬Oen is true,
and the conclusion in §5.3.2, item 1, that if any world satisfies ¬Oen then that world
satisfies ¬Oei. So, if all of the closest ¬Pci-worlds are ¬Oen-worlds (as it must be
for ACCT Actual to be satisfied), and all ¬Oen-worlds are ¬Oei-worlds, then all of the
closest ¬Pci-worlds are ¬Oei-worlds (which satisfies ACCT Canonical). So, the truth of
¬Pci ¬Oen (ACCT Actual) entails the truth of ¬Pci ¬Oei (ACCT Canonical).
Thus, any causal claim that is true in an ordinary context, is true in the privileged
context. I take this to show that the truth of our causal assertions asymmetrically
depends on the objective causal facts of our world.
5.4.2 The Final ACCT Analysis
I can now state my causal analysis. Given the common ACCT structure of the con-
ditionals involved I will refer to this simply as the ACCT Analysis: actual event
e causally depends on actual event c iff c and e are distinct events and the following
conditional is true: ¬Pc ¬Oe; c is a cause of e simpliciter iff ci and ei are connected
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by a chain of causal counterfactual dependence; a causal assertion of the form ‘c caused
e’ is true in context C iff enis connected by a chain of counterfactual dependence to
both cn and ci, where counterpart relation n is a function of the context C.
So, for any events c and e there are three tests to establish the causal connection
between them:
1: ACCT Canonical Test ¬Pci ¬Oei (or chains thereof)
If this conditional (or chains thereof) is true for c and e, then c is a cause of e simpliciter.
2: ACCT Actual Test ¬Pci ¬Oen (or chains thereof)
If this conditional is true for c and e then c made some specified difference to e—i.e.
the difference concerning the essential features in that context.
3: ACCT Contextual Test ¬Pcn ¬Oen (or chains thereof)
This test establishes that a specified difference in c makes the specified difference to
e—i.e. the differences concerning the essential features of c and e in that context.
Two events can only be causally connected if they pass the ACCT Canonical test
or are linked by a chain of events that do. A causal assertion can only be true if
the events involved pass both the ACCT Actual and ACCT Contextual tests (or are
linked by a chain of events that do). One might wonder about performing a reduction
here. Passing ACCT Actual entails passing ACCT Canonical (but not vice versa) so
it is tempting to drop Canonical altogether. However, this would be to remove the
important distinction between our causal talk and the causal facts of our world. What
is more, it is possible to pass the Canonical test and fail the Actual test, as in the
case of prevention. I intend to make use of this fact in my discussion in the remaining
chapters.
5.5 Resolving the Tension
We are now in a position to see that the analysis that I am advocating is both con-
textualist and naturalist regarding causal claims. For any c and e there is a fact of
the matter about whether c is an actual cause of e without reference to the context of
utterance. That fact of the matter is determined by the counterfactual dependence of
c upon e in the privileged context, under the canonical counterpart relation. Causal
facts are context invariant, just as naturalism requires. In ordinary contexts, whether
‘c is a cause of e’ is true is determined by the counterpart relations that each is taken
to have in the context of the causal claim being made. Thus, causal claims are context
variant, just as contextualism requires.
It remains to be seen how the ACCT Analysis fares when applied to the problems
of absence causation, transitivity and symmetrical redundant causation which beset
extant counterfactual analyses. In the following chapters I will address each problem
in turn and consider the prospects of my proposed counterpart-sensitive counterfactual
analysis.
6
Absences, Prevention and Would-be
Causation
Our causal talk is littered with examples of negative causes or omissions, as in when
we say that the absence of oxygen caused the fire to go out, or when we say that the
gardener’s failure to water the plants caused them to die. It is incumbent upon a
viable theory of causation to account for such talk of omissions. Whilst counterfactual
theories of causation tend to be able to match intuition in the standard examples,
three ontological worries emerge: First, where are these omissions supposed to occur?
Second, if they occur at a distance from the effect doesn’t this establish a highly
controversial physical theory of action-at-a-distance too cheaply? Third: ordinary
events such as my typing on this keyboard counterfactually depend on the omission of
certain extraordinary events such as there being nerve gas or a velociraptor in the room
with me. Are these ordinary omissions of extraordinary events causes of my typing?
All of them?
The first of these problems I call Location, the second Non-locality and the third
Profligacy. In §6.1 I will introduce and discuss each of these problems in turn before
considering how certain existing treatments of absence causation handle them in §6.2.
In §6.3 I introduce a novel approach and argue that it solves each of the problems
neatly. I will then show that this approach coheres with my broader thesis.
6.1 Three Problems of Absence Causation
Why did the plants die whilst you were on holiday? It seems sensible to say they
died because the gardener did not water them since, we suppose, if she had then they
would not have died. Clearly “the gardener’s omission caused the plants’ death” is an
acceptable assertion. An adequate account of causation should be able to accommodate
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this datum. In this section I will discuss the problems of Location, Non-locality and
Profligacy in turn. In the next section I offer a solution.
6.1.1 Location
At first glance a simple counterfactual analysis of causation appears to be well-equipped
to accommodate absence examples. If there had been water, the plants would not have
died, so the lack of water caused the plants to die. Absent the acid, the plants would
have flowered, so the acid caused the plants not to flower, if there had been oxygen
in the space, the fire would have continued to burn, and so on. The counterfactual
apparatus seems to be able to give the right results by matching the truth of the
counterfactuals to the causal intuitions in each case.
However, most counterfactual analyses are committed to an events ontology for
the causal relata, where events correspond to regions of spacetime and so must have
spatiotemporal location, but there appear to be at least two initial candidates for the
location of the gardener’s not watering the plants : it could be located at the plants
where she would have watered them or it could be located where she was instead (on
the couch having a nap). Without a definite location, an events-based analysis of
causation cannot get started.
It gets worse, for there is quite a large window of time in which watering the plants
would have averted their death and within that window any number of other ways in
which the plant could have been watered and so specifying that the event took place in
any given one of these precisely defined spatiotemporal locations would be arbitrary.
Equally, however broad the window of time is within which the gardener could have
successfully watered the plants then the period of her failure to do so is equally broad.
No longer is the nap on the couch the obvious alternative to the location around the
plants. Every location the gardener occupied during the many hours or days in which
the plants could have been watered is now a candidate location for the omission of
watering. Locating the omission is therefore a serious issue for a simple counterfactual
analyses of causation involving events.
6.1.2 Non-Locality
Following Hall [2002], if we do suppose that the absence is located wherever the gar-
dener is instead, then the gardener causes the plants to die at a distance—she need
never disrupt the intervening space between herself and the plants to cause their death.
Perhaps action at a distance is possible at our world, it is certainly conceivable, but
physicists take this to be a substantial question about the physics of our world, not a
trivial question answered by appeal to such everyday examples. Genuine action at a
distance would demonstrate the non-locality of our physics and would contradict Spe-
cial Relativity. Absences surely do not carry such weight for if they did, they would
establish non-locality very cheaply indeed. We would have refuted relativity from the
armchair.
Perhaps this is reason to locate the absence of water at the would-be location of
the watering at the plants rather than at the gardener. However, this does not help in
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prevention cases such as the following from Hall1:
Prevention Bomber is heading to Target but Fighter intercedes and shoots down
Bomber. Target survives.
Here Fighter prevented the destruction of Target but did so at a spatiotemporal dis-
tance. We can suppose that Fighter has never been to Target, and has never disrupted
the intervening space between Target and where Bomber was downed. If we take the
failure to bomb to be located at Target where the bomb would have been dropped, then
that establishes action at a distance on the cheap since the cause (Fighter’s intercep-
tion) and the effect (Target’s survival) are spatiotemporally disconnected. On the other
hand if you locate the failure to bomb at Bomber’s wreckage then you avoid positing
action at a distance in this case since Fighter and the wreckage are spatiotemporally
proximal.
So, to avoid the problem of non-locality we need to locate the omission at the
actual location of some positive event that takes place in some cases (e.g. the gardner
example) and we need to locate the omission in the would-be location of the absent
event in some other cases (e.g. the Bomber example). This is a problem: there is no
consistent way of locating the omission which will avoid the non-locality problem.
6.1.3 Proliferation
A separate problem compounds the issue. It is surely not metaphysically salient that
we expected the gardener to water the plants (or that they had promised to, or were
paid to, or usually did...). Metaphysically speaking, the failure of the gardener to water
the plants is on a par with the failure of the next door neighbour to water them, or
a failure of aliens to water them or even a failure of the Queen to water them. The
death of the plants counterfactually depends on every one of these absences since, had
any one of them not been absent, the plants would not have died. For every way there
could have been a watering, there is a failure of that way to occur. Not only does this
give us vastly more causes of the plant’s death than we might ordinarily assume, but it
also compounds the issue of location. Every problem we had in locating the gardener’s
failure is now multiplied by every way in which the failure to water might not have
obtained—by the neighbour, aliens, Queen and so on.
Perhaps there is a convergence argument we can mount to establish the location
of failure. All of the ways in which the omission could have failed to obtain share one
region in common, i.e. the region around the plants. The options for where to locate
the failure converge on a sort of ‘shell’ around the plants.2 We could take the event to
1This standard prevention case has Fighter shoot down Bomber to prevent the attack on Target,
whereas a double prevention case has some further event, say an under-fueling, which prevents Fighter
from preventing Bomber. This sort of more complicated case drives home the non-locality point yet
more emphatically and poses a worry for those who wish to endorse that absence causation is genuine
and that causation is a largely intrinsic matter (see Hall [2000, p.201–202]; [2004b] and Lewis [2004a,
p.84]. The solution I will go on to give is not impacted by this embellishment and so I will stick to
the standard cases of prevention in this chapter for simplicity.
2Reference to shell in this context I take from Frisch [2010]
86 Absences, Prevention and Would-be Causation
occur there. Further we could treat the event there as essentially involving the failure
to water the plants such that it has counterparts in worlds where there is no watering
but not in worlds where someone (anyone) waters the plants. Thus all of the closest
worlds where the failure does not occur are worlds where someone waters the plants
and so are worlds in which the plants do not die. So far so good. Even better, worlds
in which the gardener waters the plants will be far closer than those where it is aliens
or the Queen who do and so this treatment also explains why we prefer to say that it
was the gardener’s failure rather than that of the aliens or the Queen.
Unfortunately this strategy will not work. The gardener is a mile away napping on
a couch whilst the neighbour is just next door, so a far smaller ‘miracle’ is required
to have the neighbour water the plants than to have the gardener water the plants,
so the neighbour-watering worlds are closer still than the gardener-watering worlds.
This means that the closeness-of-worlds solution cannot explain why we prefer the
gardener to the neighbour as a cause of the plant’s death. Lewis proposed that we
take the contextual cues—that we had an agreement with the gardener, that she had
taken payment, that she normally did the work—to indicate the greater salience of the
gardener, as opposed to the Queen, the aliens or the neighbour. This proposal accepts
the truth of the claims that the Queen, aliens and neighbour all caused the plants
death3 by their failure, but simply elevates the gardener to the top of the candidate
list on the basis of relevance.
This pragmatic solution bites the bullet of the problem of proliferation but explains
away our qualms about the proliferation and oddity of true negative causal claims.
However, McGrath [2005] argues that Lewis’s explanation is not a satisfying one. If
Lewis simply had to explain why we do not assert irrelevant truths such as ‘the Queen’s
failure to water the plants caused them to die’ then an appeal to a Gricean pragmatics
[Grice, 1968] may indeed offer justification. However, McGrath argues, the claims
about the Queen and the alien are not merely irrelevant but are outright false, as
evidenced by the fact that we will assert their negation: ‘the Queen’s failure to water
the plants did not cause them to die’. Grice offered an account of why we might not
assert irrelevant truths but, McGrath contends, he did not offer an account of why we
would explicitly deny those truths. An appeal to Gricean pragmatics does not do the
work that Lewis requires.
An alternative solution, offered in different forms by McGrath and Menzies, treats
absence causal claims (and possibly causal claims in general) as identifying a deviation
from a norm. The anticipated norm (be it a norm of regularity, etiquette, morality
or any other sort) has it that the gardener should have watered the plants. Thus, the
failure to water the plants is the failure of the gardener. There was no equivalent norm
in place for the Queen or the aliens. Even if there was some such norm in place for
the neighbour—it would be kind of them to water an obviously drooping plant—this
is outweighed by the normative burden on the gardener who promised to, accepted
payment to and regularly did water the plants.
3Menzies, personal correspondence, points out that this argument hinges on assuming a naturalistic
similarity criterion for worlds such that the neighbour-watering worlds are closer. If, on the other hand,
promises, duties and such like also factor in the ordering of the worlds, this result does not follow. I
largely agree and I will discuss such normative options later in the chapter.
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Note that this solution must be more than simply a way of understanding the
pragmatics at work in the context, otherwise the ‘assert the negation’ response will re-
emerge. If a negative causal claim is to be literally true then the normative dimension
needs to be built in to the meaning of the word ‘cause’ in order to make it true that
the gardener’s failure caused the plants to die but literally false that the Queen’s
failure did. This suggestion has the merit of avoiding a proliferation of causes and
identifying the gardener above the Queen or the neighbour as the cause of the plants’
death. However, treating causation as a normative notion does not, by itself, resolve
the issues of location and non-locality. What is more, it has one serious consequence: if
causation itself, and not just some pragmatic selection on our causal talk, is normative,
it no longer conforms to what Menzies identified as our ‘central causal platitude’: that
causation is a natural relation. If what is or is not a cause is subject to mind-dependent
notions such as expectation or etiquette then it is no longer a mind-independent matter.
Taking stock: It seems that if we treat absence causal claims as genuine then we
are going to have to accept that they establish non-locality on the cheap as there
is no consistent option for locating the absences that avoids action-at-a-distance in
fairly ordinary cases. We may be able to respect our strong preference for identifying
the gardener and not the Queen or neighbour as the cause of the plants’ death but
only at the expense of the assumption that causation is a natural relation. A satisfying
solution should locate our absences, avoid establishing action-at-a-distance and respect
the seemingly normative selection that we apply to our negative causal attributions
without giving up on causation as a natural relation. In the next section I look at the
existing proposals from those who accept that there is genuine absence causation in
our world (Lewis, Menzies, Schaffer) and from those who do not (Beebee, Dowe) and
then go on to offer my own proposal, consistent with my earlier commitments.
6.2 Existing Approaches
6.2.1 Accepting Absence Cases as Causal
Lewis’s [2004a] approach to the problem of profligate causes was to cite pragmatic
parameters which would dictate which true causal claims were salient and which were
not. On this view, pragmatic concerns justify our preference for asserting that it was the
gardener rather than the queen who caused the plants to die—in the relevant context
we simply expect the gardener to have done it and so the failure to water the plants is
a failure of the gardener in particular. This selection highlights one of the many true
causal claims that could have been made and elevates it on account of its salience in
the context, just as it is true that the big bang is the cause of every subsequent event,
and yet it is rarely salient to mention it. However, as it treats absence causation as
genuine, this solution falls foul of the problems of location and non-locality. It accepts
profligate causes but fails to satisfactorily account for McGrath’s datum that we will
assert the negation of what Lewis takes to be true but irrelevant claims.
Contrastivists such as Menzies and Schaffer offer semantic accounts and argue that
for any two-place causal claim ‘c caused e’ we must read the context in order that
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we semantically complete the claim. A semantically complete causal claim, they say,
requires a four-place relation involving c, e, c∗ and e∗ (where c∗ and e∗ are specific
alternatives to c and e respectively) so once we have the c and e of the binary assertion,
we must further read the context to work out which c∗ and e∗ complete the claim.
Thus it is context which provides us with the salient alternative to c in the un-watered
plants case: c∗ is read as ‘the gardener watering the plants’. This being the case, the
contrastivist interprets ‘the gardener’s failure to water the plants caused them to die’
as ‘the gardener’s failure to water the plants, rather than water them, caused the plants
to die, rather than not die’. Further, the contrastivist can (and Schaffer does [2005,
p.301]) take the negative nominal to pick out an actual event, such as the gardener’s
nap. We would perhaps be squeamish when it came to asserting that the gardener’s
nap caused the plants to die in a binary mode, but that simply explains why we use
the negative nominal in order to trigger the correct contrastive. Holding the contrasts
fixed we can substitute-in the positive nominal for the same event and the contrastive
causal claim still rings true: ‘the gardener’s having a nap, rather than watering the
plants, caused the plants to die, rather than not die’.
Perhaps the contrastivist can locate the negative event, but it is not obvious that
they can stifle the proliferation of causes. Surely it is true that had the Queen watered
the plants they would not have died. If so then the contrastive claim ‘the Queen’s
failure to water the plants, rather than her watering them, caused them to die instead
of not die’ is true. This can be iterated for the neighbour, the aliens or the velociraptor
that didn’t water the plants either and so creates just as great a proliferation of causes
as a non-contrastive account. Of course, the contrastivist can say that this is not a
relevant claim to make, but McGrath’s point against the pragmatist re-emerges: it
is not just infelicitous to say that it was the Queen’s failure to water the plants that
caused them to die, many would assert the negation of this and so it must be outright
false and not just irrelevant. The contrastivist needs to explain why the binary claim
is false and so must argue that the binary claim does not yield the true quaternary
claim that I offer above. Schaffer argues [2005, p.354 fn.10] that the positive event
that we pick out when we talk of the Queen’s failure to water the plants is in fact
some regal event, such as a feast, that she is occupied with at the time. The salient
alternative to such a feast is some other queenly event, not watering the plants, so the
correct interpretation of the binary claim that the Queen’s failure to water the plants
caused them to die is: the Queen’s attending a feast, rather than attending to her
corgies, caused the plants to die rather than not die. This claim is false and explains
our willingness to assert the negation of the binary claim, according to Schaffer.
I think this rides roughshod over the binary claim which was very much about the
Queen, the plants, and water but was interpreted as being about a feast and corgies
instead. You need know nothing of what the Queen was doing, or that she has corgies,
in order to reject the claim that her failure to water the plants caused them to die.
I just do not think Schaffer’s interpretation is plausible. Menzies adopts a different
strategy, one which takes the contrast to be supplied by normative considerations. In
relation to a parallel example he says:
[T]he contrast between the doctor’s omission and the normal course of
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events explains why the patient died rather than survived, but there is no
comparable explanatory contrast between the hospital cleaner’s omission
and the normal course of events. [Menzies, 2009, p.364]
Analogously, the gardener has promised to water the plants, taken payment for the
service and has done so consistently in the past. Relative to a range of different norms
(moral, contractual, regularity) the gardener can be expected to water the plants but
there is no norm at play in which the Queen can be expected to water them. Citing
the Queen’s failure to provide water does not explain why the plants died, because the
Queen had nothing to do with the violation of the relevant norms (moral, contractual
and behavioural). To truly explain the plant’s death we need to explain why the
expected failed to materialise and talking about the Queen is simply not an explanation.
Whilst this suggestion is an improvement on Schaffer’s, I note three deficits: First,
by reifying omissions the problem of non-locality emerges. Either the omission is
located where the positive event is in the actual world, i.e. at the gardener, in which
case it causes at a distance, or it is located where the would-be event would have taken
place, in which case it acts at a distance in prevention cases, such as that of Bomber and
Target. Second, Menzies solution requires that absence causation is itself normative
in nature. In his own words this ‘violates the strictures of causal naturalism’ [2009,
p.364]. Third, Menzies shifts the emphasis from causal truth to explanatory virtue. It
is the explanatory force that makes one causal claim acceptable and another not, not
truth. If we were analysing causal explanation, then perhaps this approach would be
reasonable—in fact I think that it is what the contrastive project does analyse and I
think that, in that context, it is a reasonable approach—but I am interested in the
causal relation itself, not just causal explanation. Menzies appears to have shifted the
topic.
6.2.2 Rejecting Absence Talk as Causal
The pragmatic and semantic camps, as I characterised them in the last section, are
both accepting of our negative causal attributions and both seek to include them in
their causal theory. An alternative strategy is to take the metaphysical issues around
absence causation to indicate that the claims themselves are problematic. A simple
error-theory of absence talk will not do as our negative causal attributions are simply
too pervasive—perhaps our most pressing need to understand the causal workings of
our world are cases of death, but all cases of death are cases of the absence of life
via the absence of blood, or oxygen or whatever else we need. So, if absences are to
be dismissed as non-causal, our negative causal claims need to be explained, not just
written off as aberrations. Here I discuss two such explanations.
Dowe [2001] has argued persuasively that our most problematic negative causal
claims, including simple absence cases like the un-watered plants and more complex
cases of prevention and double-prevention, can all be understood as would-be causal
claims rather than actual causal claims. The idea is that when we say that the gar-
dener’s failure to water the plants caused them to die, we are really saying that if the
gardener had watered the plants then they would not have died. As such, the claim
90 Absences, Prevention and Would-be Causation
about the failure to water is not genuinely a claim about our world but instead a claim
about some other world in which the gardener does water the plants. This will often
be useful to cite, and does concern causation of a sort, just not actual-world causation,
and so Dowe considers such cases examples of what he calls ‘quasi-causation’ rather
than actual-causation. This move allows Dowe to avoid tricky questions about the
actual-world location of the negative events since, on his view, there is no actual-world
event to locate. Further, the proliferation of genuine causes does not occur on this
view as only actual-world events are genuinely causal and it is merely the would-be
quasi-causes that proliferate.
One might complain, as Schaffer has [2004a], that our negative causal ascriptions
carry more weight in our everyday lives than such a second class status would allow.
We take tremendous pains to avoid harm, prevent damage and stop erosion and we do
so as part of otherwise positive causal paths: we put on a protective suit, catch a ball
or apply a varnish to cause these negative events and then we go on to swim, to throw
and to sail as a result of having done so. Absences slot neatly into causal chains that
are canonical examples of causation, so relegating them to second-class ‘quasi’ status,
or indeed insisting that they have a fundamentally different status, requires significant
motivation.
It is worth noting that there is broad disagreement in the literature about the status
of absence causation.4 Such disagreement may well indicate that absence causation is
some sort of special case deserving of a distinct treatment. Note too that Dowe’s
revision does not involve rejecting all talk of negative causes, but instead admits that
such claims do share the concept of causation, just at a remove from the actual world.
Where Dowe holds that actual causation is to be analysed as a physical process (i.e.
not in counterfactual dependence terms), he holds that quasi causation is the same
type of physical process in some other world, some would-be world, which does not in
fact obtain. Of course this sort of view is an affront to those partisans who take absence
causation to be as genuine as any causation can be, but by stepping back to see the
literature as a whole, we can appreciate the bi-partisan nature of Dowe’s solution. The
would-be causal approach accommodates the intuition that preventions and omissions
do play some sort of causal role, but it does so without opening up the problems of
location, profligacy and non-locality.
I note two issues for my adopting Dowe’s approach: First, Dowe analyses causation
as a physical process, not as counterfactual dependence. I will not debate the relative
merits here—it is a subtle and complex issue and one that hinges on whether there are
any plausible counterfactual theories of causation, which is, in part, the topic of this
thesis—however I will point out that the nature of Dowe’s analysis of causation, and
therefore of negative causation, only works in worlds with laws like ours whilst counter-
factual accounts have broader ambitions. Secondly, in the face of problems concerning
the closest-world treatment of would-be causal claims Dowe [2009d] embraces a causal-
modelling semantics. Again, entering the causal-modelling debate is not the objective
4A cross-section of the literature discussing negative causation : Beebee [2004], Bennett [1988],
Bernstein [2014], Bernstein [2013], Collins [2000], Collins et al. [2004], Dowe [2001], Hall [2002], Hall
& Paul [2003], Hall [2000], Lewis [2004a], Lewis [2004b], Mellor [2004], Menzies [2009], Sartorio [2010],
Schaffer [2004a], Weslake [2013b].
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of this thesis,5 but I do point out that Dowe requires a significant theoretical departure
to handle these cases.
Finally, Beebee [2004] has argued that our commonsense intuitions concerning neg-
ative causation, those intuitions that Schaffer, Menzies and Dowe are so keen to respect
in their causal theories, are unstable. Beebee argues:
[C]ommonsense intuitions about which absences are causes and which aren’t
are highly dependent on judgements that it would be highly implausible
to suppose correspond to any real worldly difference at the level of the
metaphysics of causation. For instance, sometimes common sense judges
the moral status of an absence to be relevant to its causal status. But no
philosopher working within the tradition I’m concerned with here thinks
that the truth conditions for causal claims contain a moral element. It
follows that whatever we think about whether or not causation is a relation,
we’re going to have to concede that common sense is just wrong when it
takes, say, moral differences to determine causal differences. There is no
genuine difference between those cases that common sense judges to be
cases of causation by absence and those that it judges not to be cases of
causation by absence. Hence... commonsense judgements about causation
by absence are often mistaken. [Beebee, 2004, p.293]
Note the shift in dialectic here between Schaffer’s criticism of Dowe and Beebee’s
argument against our intuitions about negative causation. Beebee is operating on the
assumption that we are trying to identify some mind-independent, real-world relation,
what Strawson has called a natural relation, and so intuitions that are inconsistent
with such a relation are to be questioned. Schaffer, by contrast, takes the intuitive
and conceptual role played by absences as base data and so any theory, or naturalist
assumption, that conflicts with the data has failed to live up to its billing as a theory
of that concept.
An explanation is due from those who wish to undermine the negative causal data
as to why negative causal intuitions are formed, why they are so persuasive and why
they are so prevalent. Dowe offers quasi-causation as a way of understanding the
negative causal claims but Beebee makes the less-conciliatory claim that there is no
negative causation. Negative causal claims, and the intuitions which fuel them, are to
be understood not as literal causal claims but instead as causal explanations. Following
Lewis [1986a, p.217], Beebee advocates understanding causal explanations as aiming
to “provide some information about [the] causal history” of an event. Importantly,
this approach allows one to give negative information about the causal history without
that negative information being part of the causal history. By analogy: saying “Neil is
not nine feet tall” provides information about my height without actually stating my
height. Driving this wedge between causation and causal explanation allows Beebee to
maintain that there is no genuine negative causation, but that negative causal claims
can still make sense if they are taken to be causal explanations rather than direct causal
claims. This is revisionary in the sense that it requires a re-interpretation of the literal
5Though I will compare my ACCT Analysis with causal modelling accounts in Chapter 9.
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form of what was said, but it is a modest revision when compared to the contrastivist’s
four-place reading of our binary causal claims.
Beebee’s solution also fares well in relation to the problems of locating absences, and
of profligate causation. Absences are not events and so claims concerning absences do
not need be spatiotemporally located. This means that there is no problem of locating
the cause in a negative causal claim as there is none to locate. Also, it is explanatory
to cite the failure of the gardener to water the plants, but it is not explanatory to cite
the failure of the Queen to water them. This is what makes the gardener, and not the
Queen, the right absence to cite.
I note three issues with Beebee’s view. Sometimes we really do want to locate an
absence in a particular place—such as the absence of oxygen in the lungs, or absence
of food in the stomach—so saying that absences never have location is at least coun-
terintuitive. Further, we offer something more than mere correlation when we identify
the lack of water as being relevant to the death of the plants and we would expect a
good account of negative causation to explain that. As it stands, saying that there was
no water, and that the plant died succeeds in being an explanation simply in virtue of
providing some information about the causal history. However, negative causal claims
do not simply state that there was no water and that the plants died, but rather that
there is some meaningful connection between the two occurrences such that the plants
died because there was no water. So, just giving some information about the causal
history is not enough, we need to give the right sort of information. Finally, McGrath
[2005] has complained that Beebee’s approach cannot account for our literal denial of
those outlandish negative causal claims involving the Queen, nerve gas or a velocirap-
tor. According to Beebee’s view each such claim ought to be read as an explanation,
and each is a true explanation of the effect in question. Why, then, do we consider
such assertions to be literally false?
6.3 A Positive Proposal
In this final section of the chapter I will introduce my own proposal. First I will
recapitulate my commitments so far, then endorse a normative, explanatory, reading
of our negative causal claims. I will then argue that this view meets the desiderata
outlined at the end of 6.1 and conforms with the counterfactual view defended so far
in this thesis (dubbed the ACCT Analysis). Finally I will show how the proposed
treatment of absence causation relates to a recent proposal from Weslake.
6.3.1 The ACCT Analysis
Recall my ACCT Analysis from Chapter 5: actual event e causally depends on actual
event c iff c and e are distinct events and the following conditional is true: ¬Pc ¬Oe;
c is a cause of e simpliciter iff ci and ei are connected by a chain of causal counterfactual
dependence; a causal assertion of the form ‘c caused e’ is true in context C iff enis
connected by a chain of counterfactual dependence to both cn and ci, where counterpart
relation n is a function of the context C.
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So, for any events c and e there are three tests to establish the causal connection
between them:
1: ACCT Canonical Test ¬Pci ¬Oei (or chains thereof)
If this conditional (or chains thereof) is true for c and e, then c is a cause of e simpliciter.
2: ACCT Actual Test ¬Pci ¬Oen (or chains thereof)
If this conditional is true for c and e then c made some specified difference to e—i.e.
the difference concerning the essential features in that context.
3: ACCT Contextual Test ¬Pcn ¬Oen (or chains thereof)
This test establishes that a specified difference in c makes the specified difference to
e—i.e. the differences concerning the essential features of c and e in that context.
Applied to the case of the gardener, not all the conditions are met. As a quirk
of our physics, the gardener napping on the couch does make some difference to the
plants as she exerts some gravitational pull on them, so the Canonical test (1) is met.
The failure-to-water aspect of whatever else the gardener is doing (i.e. napping on the
couch) does indeed make a difference to the dying of the plants for had she not had
that aspect (i.e. had she watered the plants) they would not have died. This means
that the Contextual test (3) is also met. However, the Actual test (2) is not met. The
clean excision of c does have some impact on e thanks to our physics, but that clean
excision does not make a difference to the aspect of e that we are interested in—the
dying of the plants. Thus, on the ACCT Analysis, ‘the gardener’s failure to water the
plants caused them to die’ is false.
So it also goes in the case of Prevention. The event in which Bomber is downed
does exert a (merely gravitational) influence on Target and, had Fighter not shot down
Bomber, Target would have been destroyed so tests 1 and 3 are satisfied. But the
clean excision of the event, that is the total removal of that event including Fighter,
the missiles and Bomber and its wreckage, without any replacement with something
similar, does not make the difference to Target’s survival—it survives anyway. Thus,
on the ACCT Analysis, ‘Fighter’s shooting down Bomber caused Target’s survival’ is
false.
So, on the ACCT Analysis I advocate, certain negative causal claims will turn
out straightforwardly false. Notice this is not a stance motivated by the problems
of location, non-locality or profligacy, but rather a direct consequence of the ACCT
Analysis already on offer. This means I owe an explanation of why negative causal
claims are so prevalent and why they seem so natural.
I will shortly flesh out my proposed account of absence causal claims but before
I want to highlight two features of the ACCT Analysis. First, absence cases fail the
three ACCT tests in a distinctive way—they pass the third test, but not the second.6
6That they pass the first in the examples given is a quirk of our physics in which minor gravitational
influences are exerted by every region with mass. I do not rest my case on this contingent feature.
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I will refer to these cases as F-T cases in reference to the False value for the second
conditional and the True value for the third. The F-T structure is only possible where
one aspect of the c event correlates with one aspect of the e event, but where there
is no intrinsic feature of the c event which alters the salient aspect of the e event. If
correct, this allow us to identify absence cases purely by their counterfactual structure.
Second, not all cases involving a negative nominal will fail the test. Those situa-
tions where a positive state of affairs within a region is merely picked out by a negative
nominal, such as where my lack of technique when shooting is relevant to the wayward
result, will pass it: to cleanly excise the arrangement that constituted a lack of tech-
nique is to cleanly excise my shot altogether, not to replace it with a graceful version.
So excised, there is no result which can be wayward. Such cases are not genuine cases of
absence causation but merely positive states re-described. The proposed test tells the
two apart in a way that I think is in line with Lewis’s observation regarding causation
by omission:
It is one thing to suppose away the event simpliciter, another thing to
suppose it away qua omission. [Lewis, 1986d, p192-193]
My test requires that both be satisfied for genuine causation.
6.3.2 Would-be Causation
Those who think that there are genuine cases of absence causation in the actual world
(Lewis, Menzies and Schaffer are such) will surely complain that the ACCT Analysis
has gotten the wrong answer and should be rejected on those grounds. However, those
who deny that there are genuine cases of absence in the actual world, such as Dowe
and Beebee, may see this as a positive result. For my part I take seriously the intuitive
appeal of absence causal claims and I take it that I owe an explanation as to why they
are so appealing if they are in fact strictly false.
I think the first step is to understand that absence causal claims are not just claims
about some absence or other, they refer to the absence of some specific alternative. To
suppose away the absence of that alternative is just to suppose that the alternative
did in fact occur. Unlike causal claims about throwings, floods and explosions, causal
claims about failures-to or lacks-of are focussed not on the actual world and its occur-
rences but rather on another world in which things go differently—a specific sort of
differently.
If absence causal claims have this implicit other-worldly focus, then it seems that
they are claims about some other world which reflect the state of the actual world by
contrast with the alternative—the actual world is just one of many ways in which the
specific alternative failed to occur. This suggests that the absence claims are centred
on some other world, not ours, just as Dowe has argued. When we talk of a world
where Oswald doesn’t shoot, and where Kennedy doesn’t die in Dallas, we characterise
that world by pointing out what it lacks relative to ours. I suggest that when we talk
of omissions we conduct a sort of Copernican shift: our world is no longer the centre,
some other world is, and it is relative to that world that we characterise the events in
our own.
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This view explains our problem of location. The location of counterpart events is
often indeterminate—where do we locate candidate counterparts of the fight between
Ali and Foreman in worlds where the two men never meet? Do we locate it with Ali?
With Foreman? Or in a boxing-ring shaped space in Kinshasa? Such ambiguity in
finding the counterparts exists even when there is no ambiguity about the location of
the target event. If I am right, and absence causal claims are centred on some other
world, then our world contains merely the counterparts of the target events. This would
explain why we are ambivalent about the location of the failure to water the plants in
the actual world since there is some determinately located watering in another world,
our world only contains counterparts to that watering and, as we have just seen, the
location of counterpart events is often ambiguous.
Borrowing heavily from Dowe, my proposal is not simply that the target events of
our absence talk are other-worldly, but that the causal relation between them is too.
I take the claim ‘the failure of the gardener to water the plants caused them to die’ as
being acceptable because ‘the gardener’s watering the plants caused them to survive’
is true in the alternative world. In Dowe’s early discussion of this would-be causal
strategy [2001] he specifies that the solution is supposed to allow you to plug in your
own (“B.Y.O.” [p.221]) semantics for the other-worldly causal claim. That means that
the causal claim in the other world is subject to just the same causal analysis as I offer
in the actual world, modulo which world acts as the relevant centre, i.e. which world
contains the target events, when considering which worlds are closest.
This view explains our problem of non-locality. The events that are causally related
are not those in the actual world, which are merely counterparts, the events that are
causally related are those in the alternative world. Sufficiently close alternative worlds
will share our physics and so we can expect most of the causal connections to happen
as ours do: by a chain of spatiotemporally continuous occurrences. It was a mistake to
think that in absence cases the ordinary, proximal, causal connections in the alternative
world meant that their counterparts were causally related in ours. It was this mistake
that gave rise to the problem of non-locality.
This strategy succeeds, then, in two of the problems raised in part 1. As it stands,
however, the strategy does not address the problem of profligacy and fails to specify
how we are to pick out the all-important alternative world. This is related to the
problem of nested counterfactuals that Dowe [2009d] later raises for his initial “B.Y.O.”
semantics proposal from [2001]. In the next section I will explore this issue and suggest
a normative strategy which locates the alternative world and addresses the problem of
profligate causation.
6.3.3 Problems with Would-be Causal Semantics
In his [2009d] Dowe argues that the Lewisian semantics won’t work for negative causal
claims and so it is not B.Y.O. semantics after all [p.703]. I will consider the two
problems he raises here before positing my own solution.
The first problem stems from the closeness of the closest would-be worlds. The
closest worlds where you suppose away something that did occur can be problematic
enough (see [Lewis, 1979]) but the worlds where you suppose in something that did not
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are worse because they require a greater miracle to bring them about. To suppose that
the rock had not been thrown at the window we can enact a relatively minor ‘miracle’
upon Suzy to change her mind about throwing and so ensuring that she holds onto
the rock or drops it instead. To suppose that the plants had been watered, however,
requires that we enact a far larger miracle, bringing the gardener and water to the right
spot at the right time. But where does the miracle begin? A small miracle in the past
may have been enough to bring the gardener to the plants in an otherwise unremarkable
way, but if we hold fixed the past until shortly before the would-be watering, then the
miracle required to bring the gardener suddenly from her sofa several miles away is a
very large deviation indeed. Lewis’s standard methodology is to hold fixed the past
as much as possible, but not at the expense of large-scale miracles (again, see Lewis
[1979] for details), so it seems that we should favour the small miracle in the past
over the large-scale miracle. The problem with this is much the same as the problem
of backtracking counterfactuals in general, according to Dowe: the altered path the
gardener takes to water the plants in the small-miracle scenario means that she cannot
go home, feed the cat and go for a nap as she does in the actual world. This means that,
in this alternate world, her watering the plants prevents the cat from being fed. This
sounds odd enough but becomes particularly bad when we consider that the watering
of the plants happens at a later time than the cat’s being fed—Hall was worried about
non-locality on the cheap but here we seem to have backwards causation on the cheap!
Of course I do not think that we do have backwards causation on the cheap here
at all, as a little care will reveal. If we are considering the consequences of an earlier
deviation then the causal supposition is not simply: had the gardener watered the
plants, the cat would not have been fed, but rather: had the gardener come to work
and watered the plants as she was supposed to, then the cat would not have been
fed. The difference is subtle but in the second the antecedent alludes to the path
that took the gardener to the plants, not merely the act of watering in isolation. On
this interpretation the failure to water the plants is not just a localised event around
the plants, but rather a whole alternate path that would have occurred had history
diverged at some earlier point. That alternate path has many consequences but that
should not be confused with the final step on that path—the watering—having those
consequences. Had she made the decision to go and water the plants, that decision
would have prevented the cat from being fed (perhaps that is why the gardener deviated
in the first place!). This decision is prior to the feeding and so does not establish
backwards causation on the cheap.
Dowe’s second complaint is more serious. First, Dowe’s analysis of would-be cau-
sation takes would-be causal claims to have the following counterfactual form c [c
causes e] where this is to be understood as: in all of the closest c-worlds it is true that
c causes e, and where [c causes e] is understood by whatever semantics of causation
turns out to be the right one. On the assumption of a simple counterfactual account
of causation7 this becomes c [¬Pc ¬Oe] which is to be read as: in all of the
closest c-worlds it is true that had c had not occurred then e would not have occurred.
7This example does not require the resources of the three-step test I propose and so, for simplicity,
I demonstrate the point with simpler apparatus.
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For this claim to be true all of the closest ¬c-worlds to all of the closest c-worlds must
be ¬e-worlds too. Note that when we suppose-in the closest c-worlds we perform a
law-defying miracle, and from each of these various c-worlds, with each of their deviant
laws, we must perform a second law-defying miracle from that world and now check to
see if all these two-step removed ¬c-worlds are e-worlds.
Following Barker [1999] and Jago and Barker [2012], Dowe does not believe we can
be confident in such assertions. Here is an illustrative example adapted from Barker
[p.430]: Fred was booked to travel on the ship but cancelled at the last moment. A
week later he reads that the ship has sunk with the loss of all lives and thinks ‘had I
gone, it would have caused my death’. On Dowe’s reading, this is only true if in all of
the closest worlds where Fred boards the ship it still goes on to sink, he dies and had
he not boarded the ship he would not have died. This last clause is important so that we
get causation between the supposed-in boarding and the death, not just correlation.
However, this clause requires that we assess a two-stage counterfactual: the first stage
violates some laws by supposing-in Fred’s boarding; the second stage violates some
more by considering the counterfactual from the perspective of the supposed-in worlds.
So, to assess the embedded counterfactual we are considering what happens at worlds
at a two-miracle remove from the actual world. How can we be sure that all of those
primary worlds are worlds where Fred dies and be certain that all of the secondary
worlds are worlds where he does not? We do not have to be certain of this example
to see that the truth or falsity of such a claim is very difficult to assess. We are much
surer of our absence claims, and of the claim that had Fred boarded the boat he would
indeed have died. So it seems that the embedded counterfactual account is a poor
analysis of the negative causal claims.
I think that we can take a lesson from these objections, but it is not the lesson
that Dowe himself takes. Recall that Dowe is a process theorist about causation and
does not hold to a counterfactual analysis of causation. Dowe’s conclusion is that the
problems with these cases stem from plugging in a counterfactual analysis of causation.
However, his own preferred probabilistic account of causation is in trouble if it is plugged
in to counterfactual structure too. So long as the boat does not sink in at least one
of the closest supposed-in worlds, an outcome that is likely (as Barker [1999, p.430]
points out because boats rarely sink), then the claim that Fred would have died comes
out false, just as it does when a counterfactual test is plugged in instead. This strongly
suggests that the problem is with the would-cause semantics, not the causal semantics
which are used. So, the lesson I take from his objections is that we need another way
of specifying the alternative world(s) that our absence causal claims imply. In the next
section I am to answer that need with a semantics of would-be causal claims that is
consistent with a range of causal accounts—it will be B.Y.O. semantics once again.
6.3.4 A Norm-centred Approach
I propose that we view the alternative world in which the would-be events occur as
a normal world, in some very broad sense of normal. This world is not necessarily
the closest world where the supposed in event occurs, but is instead the closest of the
most normal worlds where the event occurs. I follow McGrath and Menzies in my
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use of normal here, as meaning almost any kind of norm: regularity-based, moral,
social, contractual, legal or whatever else and is supposed to capture the framework of
expectations that the person making the claim brings with them when they suppose
in the event. So, the absence of heating causes the room to be cold by the lights of the
person expecting heaters, but not by the lights of the person who doesn’t. The first
models a normal world in which there are heaters, which stop the cold in that world,
but the second models a different normal world in which there are no heaters and so
they never supposed in the antecedent condition.
So a would-be causal claim is analysed in whatever way a causal claim in the actual
world is, but the claim is taken to refer to some close normal world, not the actual world
or closest possible world. The causal claims can be thought of as centred on the normal
world and so I call this approach a ‘norm-centred’ account of would-cause semantics.
Which normal world such claims are to be centred on can be highly dependent on
the expectations of the person making the claim but where the norms are statistical
or are expectations supported by our natural sciences, then that subjective dimension
will not necessarily undermine general agreement on which would-be causal claims
are acceptable. Those who do disagree on what the would-be scenario entails can be
expected to disagree on the causal attributions in that would-be scenario. None of this
changes the causal facts in the actual world, or the causal facts at any given world, it
simply varies which alternate world is being considered. So, on this view, it remains
plausible that causation is a natural relation between events despite our negative causal
claims having a substantial normative dimension.
I think this approach neatly resolves Dowe’s first worry about the miracles required
in would-be causal claims when plugging in a counterfactual analysis of causation.
The gardener was supposed to come to work and water the plants and so that is what
we model when we consider the closest worlds in which ‘the gardener watered the
plants’ is true. Perhaps they are not the closest worlds that get the watering to occur
(the neighbour does it in those), but they are the closest worlds in which the normal
trajectory is maintained and hence it is the normal worlds, not the closest ones that
our would-be causal claims should be centred on.
It also resolves the second worry about nested counterfactuals. A norm-centred
view does not look to all of the closest worlds where Fred gets on the boat but rather
some closest normal world in which he does. The normality of that world shifts when
he finds out about the sinking of the boat. Before reading the news he supposes that
had he gotten on the boat he would have gotten to the destination. After the news he
updates his assessment of the closest normal worlds and he now supposes that had he
gotten on the boat he would have died. The shift concerns what Fred holds fixed when
he models the alternative world and that is sensitive to things like what he knows and
what he expects. When supposing in Fred’s getting on the boat, if we simply hold
the past fixed up until the point that he got on the boat then the boat may well sink
in one of the (very many) worlds in which he embarks, or the causal counterfactual
‘had Fred not boarded he wouldn’t have died’ might be false at that world. That is
why the nested-counterfactual strategy fails. However holding fixed many elements of
the past and some specific element of the future—the sinking—tracks what Fred was
really meaning: had he gotten onto the boat, and if it had gone on to sink as it did
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in the actual world, then his getting on the boat would have caused him to die. By
taking the alternative world to be normal in respect of Fred’s updated expectations,
the norm-centred view tracks Fred’s assertions before and after the news report about
the sinking.
Perhaps most importantly, the norm-centred approach helps us get a grip on the
problem of profligate causes. Recall that the absence of watering by the gardener was
on a metaphysical par with the absence of the Queen, aliens or the next door neighbour
doing the watering instead. Worlds in which the gardener does water the plants are
closer than worlds where the Queen or some aliens do and this lends support to a
closest-worlds approach to supposing in the watering since it tracks our preference for
citing the absence of the gardener, over that of the Queen or aliens, for her role in
the death of the plants. The closest-worlds approach does not, however, track our
preference for citing the absence of the gardener over the absence of the neighbour.
If it takes a smaller miracle to suppose in the neighbour watering the plants, then it
is the neighbour and not the gardener who we should, according to the closest-worlds
approach, cite as the cause of the death of the plants. And yet we do not.
The norm-centred view on the other hand does track our preference for the gar-
dener over all other candidates, precisely because it models the world we would have
expected—the one with the gardener doing her job, what she promised to etc. The
person who thinks that the Queen is the most normal candidate to water the plants
(perhaps they think she promised to or had a secret agreement with the gardener) will
deny that it was the gardener’s failure to water the plants that caused them to die,
in just the same way that most people will deny that the plants died because of some
omission by the Queen. If correct this would show that our expectations determine
which absence claims we are willing to make and which we are not. In fact, this seems
to explain McGrath’s datum that we will assert the negation of those more obscure
absence claims since a watering by the Queen, aliens or velociraptor simply do not
feature in the world that we are modelling. They are not present to do the causal work
in our would-be scenario and so it is literally false to cite them as a cause at that world.
Allowing this degree of normativity into the treatment of absence claims is familiar
from the work of McGrath and Menzies and so a familiar objection can also be raised.
If you are analysing causation in terms of normativity then you have just given up the
central causal platitude that causation is a natural relation. As I have shown above,
however, the normativity concerns which would-be world is under consideration, not
which causal claims are true at that world. Causation remains a natural relation
regardless of whether there is a normative influence upon would-be or possible causal
claims.
6.3.5 Explanation
I have indicated which causal claims are supposed to receive a would-be reading—
those which have a F-T profile on the Actual and Contextual ACCT tests—and I have
proposed an account of the would-cause semantics that resolves the existing problems.
What remains is to clarify the resultant status of our absence causal claims: why do
we say that the absence of one thing caused another if that is, strictly speaking, false?
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Here I borrow heavily from Beebee. Absence causal claims are literally false in our
world but their positive correlates may or may not be true in some other close normal
world. For example, ‘the absence of rain caused the reservoir to be empty’ is false in
our world (since it fails the ACCT Actual test), but in some close normal world where
the rain did occur, the reservoir is full. From the vantage of the close normal world,
the rain caused the reservoir to be full, as had there been no rain, there would not
have been a full reservoir. However absence causal claims made in our world do give
some information about the causal history of our world, albeit negative information
about what didn’t happen, and, following Lewis, that makes them candidates to be
considered causal explanations of what occurred or failed to in our world. Absence
causal claims are not causal claims at all, they are causal explanations.
Nontheless, they are not always good explanations. Where our expectations about
the would-be scenario differ, such as when you expect the Queen to do the watering
and I do not, then the explanation that I provide for the death of the plants (that
the gardener failed to do it) will rank as a bad explanation in your estimations. In
forming each rival explanation we have no need to address what occurred in the actual
world beyond verifying that neither the Queen nor the gardener watered the plants
and that the plants did indeed die. Any world where we suppose-in a waterer will save
the plants but our strong preference for the gardener in the standard example suggests
that that not just any waterer will do. The absence of the gardener and the absence of
the Queen may be on a metaphysical par but they are not on an explanatory par. Seen
as explanations, our preference for one negative causal statement over another makes
perfect sense.
McGrath might rejoin here that I have only accounted for our preference for one
causal claim over another but that I have not yet accounted for her datum that we
assert the negation of claims which meet the requirements for a causal explanation.
Furthermore, I have been holding alternative views to account using this datum, so I
cannot very well abandon it now. If McGrath’s point stands against Beebee’s causal
explanation account, then shouldn’t that same point apply against the account I have
just given too?
I do not think McGrath’s point stands against my account, however. Characterising
Beebee’s strategy, she says:
The idea seems to be that [the omission] explains e iff the fact that [the
omission] occurred (together, perhaps, with the fact that e depends on [the
omission]) rules out some hypothesis about the causal history of e.
This is not how I read Beebee’s account and it most definitely is not the account that
I will endorse8. If a statement concerning an omission does convey some information
about the causal history of e, then the fact that the omission occurs does formally
qualify as an explanation. However ‘explains’ is a success term, it implies not just that
any old explanation has been given, but that an adequate one has. This leaves plenty
of scope for omissions which meet the formal requirement to be an explanation without
8Of course if I am wrong about Beebee’s view in this instance, then my view is just a little more
novel.
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in fact successfully explaining the phenomenon under consideration. This is true for
positive claims too: it may be the case that the big bang is present in the causal history
of the death of the plants but that does not mean it explains their death.9
It is clear then what I (and Beebee) should say to McGrath’s asserting the negation
examples: The omission featured in the negative causal claim being negated may have
formally qualified to sit in the explanatory role vis-a´-vis the effect, but it was never-
theless inadequate as an explanation of that effect. The Queen’s failure (or that of the
aliens or a velociraptor) are simply inadequate explanations of the plant’s dying and
so we will assert the negation of any claim which implies the contrary.
6.3.6 Absences and Proportionality
A recent paper by Sartorio [2010] embellishes the plant watering example by introduc-
ing the Prince of Wales as an actor in the story. By specifying what the Prince of Wales
would have done instead of watering the plants, Sartorio argues that counterfactual
analyses of causation are forced to radically over-count causes. In this chapter I con-
sidered the proliferation of negative causes that emerge if we endorse a counterfactual
analysis of causation and accept the existence of negative events. Sartorio extends this
problem by showing that those who do endorse absences as causal have a related prob-
lem: there are many minor positive events (scratching your nose, reading a paper) that
occur when the watering ought to be being performed and upon which the failure to
water the plants depends. This being so, the counterfactualist is forced to over-count
not only negative causes but positive ones too. Sartorio advocates a proportionality
constraint (akin to that found in Yablo [1992]) on causes to avoid this problematic
proliferation of causes: speaking roughly “nothing with a poorer essence would have
been sufficient for the effect to happen, and nothing with a richer essence was necessary
for the effect to happen.” [Sartorio, 2010, p.17]
Sartorio’s Prince of Wales problem only applies to those theories which endorse
absences as genuine causes, which mine does not, so the objection does not directly
impact on my position. However, a recent response from Weslake [2013b] teases out an
interesting and important distinction concerning the role of proportionality. Weslake
distinguishes the metaphysical problem that Sartorio has posed which concerns the suf-
ficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and what he calls the psychological
problem which concern our rejection of claims such as ‘the Queen’s failure to water the
plants caused them to die’. This is a familiar distinction from the pragmatist regarding
absences (i.e. Lewis) who allows for (metaphysically) true causal claims to be unhelpful
or misleading. However, Weslake points out that this distinction gives us two places to
consider imposing a Yablo-esque proportionality constraint. Yablo [1992] along with
List & Menzies [2010] and Sartorio [2010] take proportionality to be a metaphysical
constraint on which causal claims are true but Weslake instead endorses proportional-
ity as a constraint on what makes for a good causal explanation. The diagnosis offered
9Perhaps all that the formal criteria for a causal explanation establishes is that there is some
possible scenario for which this would successfully explain the phenomena, not that it explains that
phenomena in every possible scenario.
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is that some theories of causation may confuse principles concerning what makes for a
good explanation with what counts as a true causal claim.10
This exchange between Sartorio and Weslake is helpful on two fronts. Firstly,
Weslake is making a similar point regarding the distinction between rejecting a causal
claim and rejecting that same claim in the role of an explanation. I think this gives
my view additional credence. Secondly, this distinction foreshadows my discussion in
the coming chapter regarding transitivity and the role of proportionality.
6.4 Conclusion
Some causal claims involving negative nominals for events will come out true on the
ACCT Analysis—those where the negative nature of the nominal is dispensable, such
as with the waywayd kick example I gave in §6.3.1—but others will fail the causal test
in a distinctive F-T pattern. Those that exhibit this pattern should be read as making
a would-be causal claim, not an actual causal claim, where the would-be situation
is modelled as some close normal alternate world in which the absence is taken to
occur. I call this approach to absence causal claims norm-centred. The norm-centred
approach is a blend of Dowe’s would-cause semantics and the normative approach of
McGrath and Menzies but unlike the first it can account for our normative preferences
and unlike the second it can hold on to my standing assumption that causation is a
natural relation. The norm-centred approach escapes the problems of location, non-
locality and profligate causes and it does so in a way consistent with my standing
commitments in this thesis.
10I suspect that the causal contrastivists, who take their lead from theories of causal explanation,
make exactly this mistake when they endorse absence and would-be causal claims.
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Transitivity and Proportion
That causation is, necessarily, a transitive relation on events seems to many
a bedrock datum, one of the few indisputable a priori insights that we have
into the workings of the concept. [Hall, 2000, p.198]
7.1 Transitivity Problems
In ordinary cases we reason via chains of causal connections to the conclusion that the
first part of the chain caused the last. For example:
Billy broke the window, which in turn set off the alarm, so Billy caused the
alarm to go off.
This pattern of reasoning appeals to the intuitive notion that causation is a transitive
relation. Such reasoning requires something like the following transitivity thesis:
transitivity If c is a cause of d and d is a cause of e, then c is a cause of e.
Counterfactual dependence is not transitive and so, in order to respect the intuitive
notion that causation is transitive, Lewis built transitivity into his original account of
counterfactual causation by fiat. This addendum is essential for the success of such a
counterfactual analysis, as is made clear in cases of early pre-emption. Recall:
EP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Suzy reaches for the only rock
and throws it at the window. Had she not thrown it Billy would have, and
he is notoriously accurate. The rock strikes the window and the window
breaks.
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Here the window breaking does not depend on Suzy’s throw as Billy would have brought
it to be anyway. Thus, counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation, but
rather chains of counterfactual dependence are. When c causes d and d causes e, c, then
d and e form a causal chain. There is such a chain that connects Suzy and the window,
but not Billy and the window, and so Suzy is a cause of the window break and Billy is
not. The pivotal difference is that had the rock not been at some midpoint in its flight
(call this event d) the window would not have broken and had Suzy not thrown the rock
it would not have reached that midpoint. Thus d is a pivotal, or partisan, midpoint
that separates Billy and Suzy in terms of their causal role. Without the stipulation of
transitivity the counterfactual analyst cannot identify Suzy as the cause—that would
be a failure of the counterfactual analysis. So, a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis
requires that causation be transitive and my ACCT Analysis is no different. I too
appeal to chains of causal dependence for just the reason that Lewis does. Chains of
counterfactual dependence between events makes for causation between those events,
so transitivity is built into the fabric of my account.
Whilst transitivity seems to be a requirement for dependence-based accounts, sev-
eral problem cases for the transitivity thesis have emerged. Many have taken these
to be counterexamples to transitivity, but Hall [2000] has argued that we should
retain transitivity and instead take the examples to indicate that there is a problem
with dependence-based accounts of causation in general.
I side with Hall in thinking that the transitivity of causation must be preserved, at
least in some form. As briefly discussed in Chapter 3 §3.4 and Chapter 4 §4.4, transi-
tivity is important to my thesis and I will argue in this chapter that such transitivity is
compatible with a dependence-based account of causation, albeit not exactly as tran-
sitivity has it. In the first part of the chapter I will show that remaining sensitive
to the counterpart relations that each event is taken to fall under is the key to under-
standing what has gone wrong in the ‘failure’ of transitivity cases. The broad strategy
will be familiar from Paul [2000] and Schaffer [2005]: identify illicit shifts in the middle
place of the c—d—e chain. I will then consider a worry about what justification there
is for reading the d event in the way that undermines the counterexamples.
In the second part of the chapter I will introduce a positive thesis: causation is only
transitive when it is proportional in roughly Yablo’s sense. This requires a modification
either of the dependence account of causation, of the transitivity thesis, or both. I will
discuss the options and offer a tentative conclusion.
7.2 Counterexamples to Transitivity
Here I consider three apparent counterexamples to transitivity from the literature.
Purple Flame:
Jones puts some potassium salts into a hot fire. Because potassium com-
pounds produce a purple flame when heated, the flame changes to a purple
colour, though everything else remains the same. The purple flame ig-
nites some flammable material nearby. Here we judge that putting the
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potassium salts in the fire caused the purple flame, which in turn caused
the flammable material to ignite. But it seems implausible to judge that
putting the potassium salts in the fire caused the flammable material to
ignite. [Menzies, 2014]1
In this case, in all of the closest worlds where the potassium salts are not added there
remains a flame, just not a purple one. So, ‘if there had been no salts then there would
have been no flame’ is false, but ‘if there had been no salts there would have been no
purple in the flame’ is true. So, the potassium salts caused there to be purple in the
flame, but not for there to have been a flame simpliciter.
The clean excision of the flame would avert the ignition, but simply altering the
colour of the flame would not. So, ‘if there had been no flame, there would have been
no ignition’ is true, whereas ‘if there had been no purple in the flame, there would have
been no ignition’ is false. So, the flame caused the ignition but the purple in it did not.
Conjoining the two true causal claims you get: the salts caused the purple in
the flame, and the flame simpliciter caused the ignition. There is one middle event
but under two different counterpart relations: in the first counterfactual the event is
essentially purple, but only accidentally a flame whereas in the second it is essentially
a flame and only accidentally a purple one. So, this case does not have the format cn
caused dp and dp caused em, but rather cn caused dp and dq caused em. Since the middle
place shifts between the first claim and the second, it is not a candidate for transitivity
and so cannot act as a counterexample to the transitivity thesis.
Dog Bite:
Terrorist, who is right-handed, must push a detonator button at noon to
set off a bomb. Shortly before noon, he is bitten by a dog on his right hand.
Unable to use his right hand, he pushes the detonator with his left hand at
noon. The bomb duly explodes. [Hitchcock, 2001a, p.277]2
In this case we assume that if the dog bite had not occurred, the button would still
have been pressed, just not with the left hand. So, ‘if there had been no dog bite then
there would have been no press’ is false, but ‘if there had been no dog bite there would
have been no left-handed press’ is true. Thus the dog bite is a cause of the left-handed
press but not a cause of the press simpliciter.
If there had been no press, the bomb would not have exploded, so it is true that ‘the
press caused the explosion’. However it is not as clear whether, if there had been no
left-handed press, there would have been a right-handed press instead. Suppose that
in at least some closest world there would have been a right-handed press instead and
so, ‘if there had been no left-handed press, then there would have been no explosion’
is false. So the press simpliciter is a cause of the explosion but the left-handed press is
not.
Conjoining the two true causal claims you get: the dog bite caused the left-handed
press, and the press simpliciter caused the explosion. There is one middle event but
1This example is originally due to [Ehring, 1987, p.323].
2This example is attributable to McDermott [1995] but the phrasing is Hitchcock’s.
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under two different counterpart relations: in the first conjunct the event is essentially
left-handed, but only accidentally a pressing whereas in the second it is essentially a
pressing and only accidentally left-handed. So, this case does not have the format cn
caused dp and dp caused em, but rather cn caused dp and dq caused em. Since the middle
place shifts between the first claim and the second, it is not a candidate for transitivity
and so cannot act as a counterexample to the transitivity thesis.
Bomb:
Billy places a bomb under a bench. Suzy goes to sit on the bench but spots
the bomb and runs away instead. The bomb explodes. Suzy gets a clean
bill of health the next day. So, the bomb caused Suzy’s good health.3
In this case the clean excision of the bomb does not result in Suzy running away, but
rather sitting down. So, ‘had the bomb not been placed, Suzy would not have run
away’ is true and so the bomb is a cause of Suzy’s running away.
If Suzy had not run away, she would have been blown up and so ‘had Suzy not run
away she would not have had a clean bill of health’ is true and so Suzy’s running away
is a cause of her good health.
Conjoining these two true causal claims: the bomb caused Suzy to run away and
Suzy’s running away caused her to be in good health. This case does have the format cn
caused dp and dp caused em since there is no shift in the middle place. This case, then,
is the only one of the three to formally qualify as a counterexample of the transitivity
thesis.
7.2.1 Responses
Turning first to Bomb, this is the only example that has the correct structure but
it will only act as a counterexample of the transitivity thesis if the result invokes
transitivity and yields an absurd result. I do not think that the result is absurd.
Bombs don’t cause good health, you might think, and you would be right, in general,
but spotting a bomb does cause good health and you can only spot a bomb if it is
there. One might be squeamish that bomb has made no difference to Suzy’s health
and should not count as a cause, but to hold such a line is to forget why transitivity is
so important to Lewis in the first place: paradigmatic causes such as the assassin who
kills the target are no less causes because the outcome was guaranteed by a back-up.
Thus, they are causes even where they make little or no difference and transitivity
explains why. Bomb is a case in point.
Purple Flame and Dog Bite do give absurd results, but those results are based on a
mistaken application of transitivity. Mistaken, that is, on the reading of the middle-
place event that I offered. It is essential to this outcome that the middle event shifts
its counterpart relation between the first and second causal claims. In Dog Bite the
essentially left-handed press must become only accidentally left-handed and in Purple
Flame the essentially purple flame must become only accidentally purple.
3I know this example from Hall [2000], Maslen [2004a] and from Yablo [2004] but the case is widely
attributed to Hartry Field (unpublished).
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Discussing transitivity, Mackie [1980] points out that it is a ‘very old form of fallacy’
to offer ‘a syllogism with an ambiguous middle term’ and in recent times both Paul
[2000] and Schaffer [2005] have exploited the strategy of disambiguating the middle
term. Paul argues that the causal relata are event aspects and so the middle term d
is a right-handed press in the first claim of Dog Bite but a press simpliciter in the
second, so there is no one event aspect d common to both claims. Schaffer applies his
contrastive account of analysing the causal claims to bring out the same difference: in
Purple Flame the effect of the salts is to make the flame purple rather than not purple,
but it is the fact that it is a flame rather than not a flame, that brings about the ignition.
Since Schaffer takes the causal relata to be such contrastive pairs, and since there is
no single contrastive pair that fits d, there is no case to answer for transitivity.
However, where the contextual reading of the event is typically implicit, we can
create a genuinely problematic case for my view can by making the counterpart relation
for the event explicit:4
Explicit Purple Flame:
The potassium caused the purple flame (which was essentially purple and
essentially a flame), and the purple flame (still essentially both purple and
a flame) caused the ignition.
This case does satisfy the transitivity thesis and so the absurd conclusion that the
potassium caused the ignition renders this a counterexample to either transitivity
or the counterfactual account that I am defending. (I leave it as an exercise to apply the
same explicit formulation in Dog Bite). So, assuming that the counterfactual account
is correct, either the transitivity thesis is false or there must be some principled reason
to reject this second claim.
7.3 Proportionality
Suppose Derek’s ball is scarlet and that he places it in front of Sophie, a pigeon trained
to peck at all and only red things. Sophie then pecks the ball. What caused Sophie to
peck the ball? Consider this causal scenario under two different descriptions:
1. The placing of the red ball caused Sophie to peck.
2. The placing of the scarlet ball caused Sophie to peck.
In the first, take redness to be an essential feature of the ball and so the clean excision
of the cause event means cleanly excising the ball and the redness. Whatever replaces
the ball in the closest ¬c-worlds will not be red and so Sophie will not peck. Thus, the
clean excision standard for the cause gets the right, intuition-matching, result.
4Schaffer’s view may have a related problem with contrived middle-place constrasts where the
contrast case is ‘rather than something else’. See his discussion of a boulder example in his [2005], in
particular the endnotes 22-24 on p.326.
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Compare this with the second description where the scarletness is flagged as essen-
tial: perhaps it is reasonable to suppose that all of the closest possible worlds in which
the essentially scarlet ball is cleanly excised, no red thing takes its place. Perhaps it
is, but I think it is difficult to say for sure—unlike the red case above where we can be
confident—so the counterfactual test may still get the right result, but our certainty
about it has shifted.
The difference between scarlet and red in this sort of case was discussed by Yablo
in his [1992]. Yablo argues that the relationship of scarlet to red is that of determinate
to determinable where the determinate, P, determines the determinable Q only if: (i)
necessarily, for all x, if x has P then x has Q; and (ii) possibly, for some x, x has Q
but lacks P [p.252]. More simply, if something is scarlet, it must be red, but if it is
red it need not be scarlet. This can be translated into counterpart theoretic terms: if
something is essentially scarlet, then all of its counterparts will also be red, but if it is
essentially red then it may well have non-scarlet counterparts.
In the case of Sophie, Yablo points out that citing the determinate scarlet, when
citing the determinable red will do, amounts to giving too much information. It need
not have been that precise shade to make Sophie peck, so to be that precise about the
shade is to be, if not strictly wrong, at least misleading about what was required to
make Sophie peck. I may be left thinking, wrongly in this case, that my crimson ball
won’t illicit a peck too.
Too little information can be just as bad. Suppose that a second pigeon Trevor had
been trained to peck all and only scarlet things. Does placing the red ball cause Trevor
to peck? If it had not been red, then Trevor would not have pecked, so the claim looks
true on a counterfactual account, but intuitively it is much better to cite the scarlet
colour of the ball in explaining Trevor’s peck. Being too imprecise in respect of the
colour of the ball may mislead: I may be left thinking, wrongly in this case, that my
crimson ball will illicit a peck too.
In the Sophie case, the scarlet was sufficient for the peck, but not required for it—it
is not required because any other red would do. In the Trevor case the ball being scarlet
is required, but just being red is not sufficient. Here is a proposal: for a causal claim to
be properly formed the cause must be both sufficient and required for the effect. This
is the essence of Yablo’s proportionality constraint: the cause must be specific enough,
but not too specific, with respect to the effect.
More formally, Yablo offers the following definitions:
Proportionality:
Where X is an event defined in terms of some property and where + and
− indicate, respectively, more or less specificity or determinateness of the
property in question.
sufficient: X− is sufficient for effect E iff for every X+, if X−, had occurred
without X+, E would still have occurred.
needed: An event X+, is needed for E iff for every X−, if X− had occurred
without X+, E would not have occurred.
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This formulation adopts a fine-grained event ontology, not my preferred coarse-
grained event plus counterpart ontology so I cannot adopt it as it stands, but I can
translate it. In Chapter 3 (p.40) I introduced the idea of strictly more fragile and
strictly more robust.5 A reminder: Suppose that an event e can be taken to be relatively
robust in context D. I will refer to its counterpart relation in D as n in that context
and write en when referring to e under counterpart relation n. In some other context
C in which e is taken to be strictly more fragile than it is when under counterpart
relation n, I will refer to that counterpart relation as < n (and << n and <<< n... for
the progression of strictly more fragile counterpart relations). In some other context
E in which e is taken to be strictly more robust than when it is under counterpart
relation n, I will refer to that counterpart relation as n > (and n >> and n >>>... for
the progression of strictly more robust counterpart relationships).
I think this allows the following analogue of the proportionality constraint, utilising
event-counterpart pairs in place of Yablo’s properties:6
Proportionalitycp
sufficientcp: An event c under counterpart relation n—cn—is sufficientcp
for effect e iff for every c<n, if cn had occurred without c<n, e would still
have occurred.
neededcp: An event c under counterpart relation n—cn— is neededcp for e
iff for every cn>, if cn>, had occurred without cn, e would not have occurred.
This way, the event of placing ball, taken as essentially red, is sufficientcp for Sophie’s
pecking since had it been crimson, and therefore not scarlet (c<n) but still red (cn), the
ball would still have made her peck. The redness of the ball is also neededcp for the
pecking since if the ball had been coloured cn>, but not red cn, the pecking would not
have occurred.
The same event, taken as essentially scarlet (i.e. with counterpart relation we will
call m, noted as cm), is also sufficientcp for the pecking since had the ball been a lighter
or darker shade of scarlet (c<m), Sophie still would have pecked. However the essentially
scarlet event (cm) is not neededcp for the pecking since had the ball still been red (cm>),
but a different shade (¬cm) then the pecking would still have occurred.
On this account, the event of placing the ball is the proportional cause of the pecking
when it is the placing of an essentially red ball, but not when it is the placing of an
essentially scarlet ball. So far, so good.
Applied to the supposed counterexamples to transitivity I discussed earlier, the
proportionality constraint appears to support the initial reading of the counterpart
relations. In Purple Flame the flame is sufficientcp and neededcp for the blaze, but
the purple flame is merely sufficientcp. Only by building too much detail into the d
event description did the apparent transitivity problem appear. In Dog Bite the press
5Since the dimensions of fragility and robustness are inverts along the same scale, we can use less
fragile and more robust interchangeably. The same applies to less robust and more fragile.
6I am using Weslake’s 2014 paraphrase, and I alter the notation from Yablo’s X+ for more specific
and X− for less specific to my preferred reference to the robustness or fragility of the event under a
given counterpart relation.
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is sufficientcp and neededcp for the left-handed press, but the the left-handed press is
merely sufficientcp for the detonation. Again, the problem lies in an overly-specific
description of d.
On introducing Yablo’s proportionality constraint I framed it as a constraint on
a ‘properly formed’ causal claim. This was intentionally ambiguous between being a
pragmatic or a semantic requirement. It follows, though, that if the transitivity of
causation is indeed an objective, mind-independent, feature of the world, and if our
causal claims need to be proportional in order that transitivity is maintained, then the
proportionality constraint ought to be a semantic, not just pragmatic, constraint on our
causal claims. In the latter part of this chapter I attempt to resolve that observation
with my account of causation.
7.4 Failure of Transitivity in the Canonical Context
In Chapter 5 I introduced the notion of the canonical context for causal claims. This
context is that idealised context in which we would give every feature of our world it’s
definitive (canonical) description. In such a context, I argued, the canonical description
of an event would list all and only its intrinsic features and in that context no feature
is more or less essential than any other. This means that in such a context events have
a very strict (though not maximally strict—see p.66) counterpart relation that I refer
to as i. So, event c in the canonical context assumes the counterpart relation i and is
represented by ci. I further argued that for any claim of the form ‘c caused e’ to be
true, it must be true on the canonical counterpart relation for each event: ci and ei.
However, transitivity will sometimes fail in the canonical context. To see this,
consider an event c with just three intrinsic features P, Q and R, an event d with just
three intrinsic features S, T and U and an event e with just three intrinsic features V,
W and X. Suppose further that only when P is present in c, will S be present in d and
only when U is present in d, will X be present in e.
Event c is a cause of d on the canonical counterpart relation because a total excision
of ci means that no counterpart with P, Q or R will be present and so no counterpart
to di with S will be present. Thus ci caused di.
Event d is a cause of e on the canonical counterpart relation because a total excision
of di means that no counterpart with S, T or U will be present and so no counterpart
to ei with X will be present. Thus di caused ei.
Conjoining the two: ci causes di and di causes ei so, by transitivity, ci causes ei.
The problem here is that ci causes di to have feature S, it does not cause it to have
feature U but it is feature U, not S, that is the difference maker as to whether ei comes
to occur. In short, c had nothing to do with e. I take this to be a counterexample to
the transitivity thesis. The lessons learned in the examples of Dog Bark and Purple
Flame tell us where to look for the root of the problem: d is not a proportional cause
of e under the canonical counterpart relation and so the essence of d is too rich and
causes too much that c had nothing to do with. This generates the spurious transitive
chain.
Unlike the earlier examples, proportionality cannot be achieved by refining the
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counterpart relations under which the events fall. That is because the context has
explicitly fixed the counterpart relation to be the canonical counterpart relation. Even
for those who would deny the role I have identified for the canonical context, it remains
the case that such a context is possible and so such an explicitly fixed counterpart re-
lation is too. More generally, we can suppose that there is some non-canonical context
in play, and that c, d, and e have many more than the three features I named. Never-
theless, if those features are taken to form the essence of each event, the same failure
of transitivity emerges: c is a cause of d, and d of e, but c has nothing to do with
e. The problem is not with the canonical context, the problem is with inflexible and
out-of-proportion causes.
We could rule such causes out by insisting that a causal claim is false if it is
not proportional. There are those in the literature who take proportionality to be a
constraint on causation itself: Menzies & List [2010], Sartorio [2010] and Yablo [1992].
However, if proportionality were a constraint on genuine causal relations then that
would rule out (almost) all of the canonical causal connections that I have argued
are the fundamental, mind-independent relations that our common causal ascriptions
track. But such a restriction would also rule out much more besides: it would be
false to attribute Sophie’s peck to the placing of the scarlet ball, it would be false
to say ‘the slamming door caused the baby to wake’ or to claim that being shot by
Mark David Chapman was what caused John Lennon to die. These would be false
because there is some more proportional claim: that it was the placing of a red ball,
the making of a loud noise or being shot by anyone that did the causal work. Perhaps
such causal claims are not optimally informative of the causal structure, but that does
not make them false. Imposing proportionality as a requirement on causation seems
like a non-starter.
Interestingly, Weslake [2013b] argues that those who advocate a proportionality
constraint on causation may be confusing causation with causal explanation. Whilst
Weslake reaches this conclusion in the context of absence causation, it still fits with
what I have said here. Proportionality seems to play some role in identifying the
optimal form of a causal claim but that does not mean that sub-optimal causal claims
are literally false. They may just be misleading or unhelpful. In the next section I
suggest a less radical role for proportionality.
7.4.1 The Role of Proportionality
I take the previous section to have demonstrated that transitivity, as currently
formed, is in conflict with the counterfactual account of causation that I have been
defending and so something has to give. I take it also that whilst in-proportion causal
claims avoid the problem cases of transitivity, adding a proportionality constraint to
our analysis of causation itself is a non-starter. I therefore propose that we restrict the
claim of the transitivity thesis to only proportional causes, and not causes simpliciter.
This yields the proportional transitivity thesis:
transitivityp: If c is a proportional cause of d and d is a proportional
cause of e, then c is a cause of e.
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transitivityp gets each of the problem cases right, by the lights I have judged
them. Purple Flame and Dog Bite do not count as cases of transitivityp because
there is no common middle-cause between the pairs of causal claims in each. Explicit
Purple Flame includes an out-of-proportion second causal claim: ‘the purple flame
(essentially purple and essentially a flame) caused the ignition’, and so does not meet
the requirements of transitivityp. Even if we appealed to some pragmatic principle
that could justify reading the counterpart relation of the cause to make the second
claim proportional (i.e. that it is essentially a flame but only accidentally purple),
it would, once again, be the case that there was no common middle-cause between
the pairs of causal claims in that example. In the example which demonstrated a
failure of transitivity in the canonical context, neither causal claim was proportional.
Again, even if we appealed to some pragmatic principle to over-ride the explicit fixing
of the counterpart relation, c would be a cause of d under some counterpart relation
for d (where at least J is essential) but d would only be a cause of e under a different
counterpart relation (where only L is essential).
However, transitivityp must get both the problem cases and the straightforward
cases correct to be viable. Here I consider two I introduced at the beginning:
When Billy breaks the window, his action is proportional to the breaking but Billy
himself is is not needed—Suzy could have done it instead—so the proportional cause of
the window breaking is that someone or even something caused the window to break.
That window break, we can suppose, was not the only way that the alarm could have
been triggered—a different window would have triggered it too—so the proportional
cause of the alarm going off was that some window broke. Tweaking the middle-cause
to match we get: Someone caused some window to break and some window breaking
caused the alarm to go off. By transitivityp someone caused the alarm to go off.
In actuality, we know that the someone was Billy so it makes sense to say that Billy
caused the alarm to go off.
In the early pre-emption case we know that the event of the rock being at that
point in mid-air caused the window to break, and we know that Suzy’s throwing the
rock caused it to be at that point in mid-air. It needn’t have been a rock of course, it
could have been a ball or any other sufficiently heavy thing, so it is the event of their
being a thus-and-so heavy thing in mid air that is the proportional cause of the window
breaking. Similarly, it needn’t have been Suzy, or indeed a person, since any projection
of the heavy object would have been sufficient for it being in mid-air. So, it was the
projection of the heavy object that caused it to be mid-air, and it was its being in
mid-air that caused the window to break, so by transitivityp, the projection of the
heavy object caused the window to break. In actuality, we know that the projection
and object in question was the throwing of the rock by Suzy, so it makes sense to say
that the throwing of the rock by Suzy caused the window to break.
7.4.2 ACCT and Proportion
It is not obvious how to incorporate the revised transitivityp into the ACCT Analy-
sis. Causal claims in the priviliged context, and subject to the ACCT Canonical causal
test, will rarely be proportional since every intrinsic feature of the cause event is taken
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to be essential in that context—many more features than will have been neededcp for
any given effect. Yet, given that every event in the backwards lightcone of the effect
will count as a cause by this standard, transitivity will rarely, if ever, be required to
ensure a causal connection. Similarly the ACCT Actual causal test excises every in-
trinsic feature of the cause and so will rarely, if ever, be proportional in respect of the
change that takes place at the effect. That suggests that only the ACCT Contextual
test is really capable of generating chains of proportional causation.
It seems that any genuine case of causation between c and d will need to pass the
usual ACCT Analysis tests, as will any genuine case of causation between d and e.
However the conclusion that c is a cause of e is not established by these connections
alone. Rather, there must be a further requirement that some chain of proportional
causation holds between c and e. I can see no advantage in further specifying which test
the proportional causal connection must hold in: if c is a cause of d and d a cause of e
then in most cases we will be happy to assert causation. The counterexamples discussed
here are interesting because they are exceptional. By adding in the requirement that
there be at least some proportional causal connection between c and e we rule out the
cases that gave the trouble in the first place. Refining that requirement any further
would be unmotivated.
7.5 Deviant Causal Chains
The apparent transitivity of causation is often obliquely invoked when people talk of
‘causal chains’. Causal theories of action and of perception have suffered counterexam-
ples based on apparent causal chains that lead to counterintuitive conclusions. Often
the problem is taken to stem from the application of causation to the theory, that is
the problem is taken to relate to the theory not the causal status of the chain. The
foregoing discussion of the general issues surrounding transitivity in causation moti-
vate a reassessment of those chains in the first place. I will discuss two representative
examples, one from Peacocke concerning perception and one from Davidson concerning
theories of action. I aim to show that the ‘deviance’ of these causal chains is related
to their lack of proportionality.
The first example is from Peacocke and concerns causal theories of perception which
hold that to perceive a thing is to be causally related to that thing in the right sort of
way. Examples such as the following put pressure on how that right sort of way might
be spelled out:
...consider for instance the case of a man who with his eyes open but under
the influence of a hallucinogen is surrounded by redwood trees that produce
a scent that causes him to have a vivid visual image of redwood trees which
happens precisely to match his surroundings. [Peacocke, 1979, p.123]
The thought here is that the redwood trees cause the subject to have a vivid visual
image of redwood trees, just as would happen in ordinary perception, but in this case
the causal chain runs via a scent and a hallucinogen. No viable theory should call this
a case of veridical perception yet standard causal theories of perception do not have the
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resources to say what makes the chain ‘deviant’ and why this doesn’t count as a case of
perception. Therefore, this case is a counterexample to causal theories of perception.
Most attempts to respond to this counterexample accept the causal status of the
connection between the redwoods and the visual image and move on to refining or
abandoning the theory which takes that connection to constitute perception. However
applying the proposed transitivityp constraint on causal chaining suggests that the
causal connection is where the problem arises.
Holding fixed the presence of the hallucinogen, the scent is what gives rise to the
visual image which precisely matches the surroundings. However that precise arrange-
ments of redwoods is not a proportional cause of the scent—many other arrangements
or even a synthetic scent would do the job—and so, by transitivityp, is not an ap-
propriate link for a causal chain. That precise image was not caused by that precise
arrangement of redwoods but rather was caused by there being some redwood scent
present at all. Peacocke’s counterexample requires that there is a perfect match be-
tween the scene and the visual image and it requires that the first causes the second.
Under my proposal, this latter requirement is not met and so the counterexample fails.
Turning now to an example from Davidson which concerns causal theories of action.
On such theories an event is an instance of agency if it is (at least partly) caused by
a corresponding mental state within an agent. The following example is supposed to
demonstrate that some further constraint is required:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and
want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it
intentionally. [Davidson, 1980, p.79]
Here it seems as though the climber’s mental state—the desire to to be safer and the
knowledge that loosening his grip would achieve this—causes him to loosen his grip,
but it does so via an unintentional step. The mental state caused the action and so it
can be said to demonstrate agency, on a causal theory of action. However the event
was clearly lacking the sort of intent7 required for agency and yet the causal theory of
action does not have the resources to say why this causal chain is ‘deviant’. Therefore,
this case is a counterexample to such a causal theory of action.
Once again, commentators accept the causal connection between the mental state
and the action and get on with refining or abandoning the theory which takes that con-
nection to constitute action.8 However, once again, applying the proposed transitivityp
constraint on causal chaining suggests that the causal connection is where the problem
arises.
We can suppose that the nervousness caused the rope to slip but what caused the
nervousness? In this instance the thoughts of letting the rope slip may be the thoughts
7We can simply stipulate that this is not some regular routine the climber goes through in full
knowledge of the outcome. Such distinct cases do seem to demonstrate agency, as Tannjso [2009]
argues.
8Witness the to-and-fro between Schlosser [2007] and Ta¨nnsjo¨ [2009] in Analysis on this point.
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that caused the nervousness, but they are only the proportional cause if there is no more
robust counterpart relation of that event that would have caused the same state. What
about such beliefs and wants are unnerving, we might wonder? It is surely nothing
to do with ropes or weight or grip per se, which are the given content of the thought,
but rather it is the fact that in this context that content belongs to a broader type of
thought, of intentionally harming someone else, letting them fall and the consequences
of such. It is that determinable type of thought, concerning harm and selfishness, and
not the determinate type of thought, concerning letting a rope slip, that is unnerving.
As such it is these determinable thoughts which serve as the proportional cause of
the nervousness, not the overly specific, determinate, thoughts regarding ropes and
slippage.
Once again the initial cause has been overly specified to create the problem. This
over-specification means that the cause is not an appropriate link in a causal chain un-
der transitivityp so under transitivityp the counterexample fails to demonstrate
the causal link required.
These examples show that the proportionality constraint on the transitivity thesis
has general application and it also shows that these cases of deviance, common across
disparate areas of philosophy, admit off a general parsimonious solution. Perhaps it
was a causal problem all along.
7.6 Conclusion
A counterfactual analysis requires that causation be transitive in order to correctly
analyse cases of early pre-emption. In this chapter I have argued that the certain
extant counterexamples to this transitivity thesis rely on a conflation: the middle-
placed cause in their causal chains shifts essence mid-example. Seeking a principled
reason to rule this out I have invoked Yablo’s proportionality constraint for causal
connectedness, but I stopped short of endorsing this as a constraint on causation in
general. I have argued that the proper place for proportionality is as part of a revised
transitivity thesis which holds that only proportional causation is transitive. I showed
that this proposal has general application beyond the causal literature.
A worry remains however: the ‘good’ cases of transitivity discussed require a some-
what unnatural reading in order that they meet the proportionality constraint. It
would be more elegant, and more convincing, if this reading were more naturally de-
rived or had some deeper theoretical justification. Nonetheless, the proposal I have
given resolves the problem of transitivity in a way consistent with my overall thesis.
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8
Symmetric Redundant Causation
One of the key aims of my argument so far has been to demonstrate that there is a
viable solution to early and late pre-emption cases—collectively cases of asymmetric
redundant causation (ARC)—available to those who hold a counterfactual analysis of
causation. Tracing the implications I have developed a view which I believe handles
these asymmetric cases well, however I have said little about cases of symmetric re-
dundant causation (SRC). In this chapter I will discuss the prospects of counterfactual
analyses of causation in light of such cases.
In §8.1 I will first summarise the treatments of ARC cases and show that, despite
their similarity, a unified solution to both is not in prospect. I will then discuss the
standard cases of overdetermination discussed in the literature, offering a definition of
what it takes to be a genuine case of overdetermination. I will then show that such
cases have a distinctive counterfactual signature which can be used to set them apart
as cases of SRC. In §8.2 I will show that a putative case of ARC (trumping), which
presents a particular form of problem for any counterfactual analysis, should in fact be
seen as a case of SRC and treated accordingly.
8.1 Overdetermination
8.1.1 The Anatomy of Pre-emption Cases
Recall that part of my mission in this thesis is to present an account of causation
that adheres as much as possible, though not slavishly, to common sense causal judge-
ments. Counterfactual analyses of causation do particularly well on this score when
the cases are simple but by introducing unused back-ups in the vicinity of a simple
causal structure such analyses struggle to track those common sense judgements. Sim-
ply put, our causal judgements clearly identify one of two candidates as a cause but
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basic counterfactual analyses do not.
The ‘easy’ cases of pre-emption are those where one of the two putative causes
triggers a causal path to the effect which cuts-off or blocks the path of the other causal
candidate. By stipulating that causation is transitive one need only identify some
midpoint on the causal path, after the cutting-off, upon which the effect depends.
That midpoint then acts as a sort of stepping-stone of causal dependence from the
effect back to just one of the causal candidates, the right one as common sense has it.
I call such midpoints partisan. Here is an familiar example of early pre-emption:
EP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Suzy reaches for the only rock
and throws it at the window. Had she not thrown it Billy would have, and
he is notoriously accurate. The rock strikes the window and the window
breaks.
Intuition is crystal clear here, it is Suzy’s throw that broke the window. Yet, had
she not thrown, Billy would have and the window would still have broken so the
breaking did not counterfactually depend on her throw. So much the worse for a
simple counterfactual dependence account of causation. However, by stipulating that
causation is transitive we can trace the window breaking back step-wise through some
midpoint that the rock occupies in mid-air between Suzy and the window. The window
breaking depended on the rock being at that point and so the rock being at that point
is a cause of the window breaking. The rock being at that point further depended on it
being Suzy who threw it1 and so Suzy is a cause of the rock being at that point. Thus,
by transitivity, Suzy is a cause of the window breaking via the partisan midpoint—the
rock’s position in mid-air. The right result has been secured but at the cost of marrying
counterfactual theories to some sort of transitivity thesis.2
The ‘hard’ cases of pre-emption are those cases where intuition is clear on which
of two putative causes is the actual cause of the effect, and where the presence of
the other cause undermines dependence, but where there is no instance of ‘cutting’ or
‘blocking’ upon which to base a stepping-stone solution. Absent some un-backed-up
partisan midpoint (upon which the effect depends, and which in turn depends uniquely
on one candidate) the transitivity amendment offers no help in these late pre-emption
(also known as no-cutting) cases. Common sense says one thing and theory another.
Here is the example again:
LP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
So, we know that Suzy broke the window but that the window breaking did not
depend on her rock-throw because Billy was there to guarantee it. Had she not thrown
1If this isn’t obvious in the example you are imagining then just add more midpoints, as many as
you like, between the window and Suzy. Eventually you will have some midpoint, perhaps very close
to Suzy’s hand, that simply could not have come from Billy if the past is held fixed.
2I will not rehash the issues with transitivity here—see my discussion in Chapter 7—but suffice to
say this is a commitment that complicates the theory on offer.
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the rock the window would have broken regardless. It would, however, have broken
later and, we can presume, differently had Billy’s rock been the only one thrown. Surely
that outcome is a different event from the actual breaking which happened in a specific
way and at a precise time. If that is the case then the window breaking—as it actually
occurred—did depend on Suzy since had she not thrown her rock that very breaking
would not have occurred. This sort of precision in specifying the effect renders the
event modally fragile. By altering the view of events, and not the analysis of causation
itself, the counterfactual theorist can match intuition in late pre-emption cases. The
foregoing chapters should make it clear how overly-simple this picture of fragility is.
I have argued that fragile events are events taken to have a rich essence, where their
essence, and therefore their fragility, is a context dependent matter. I have also argued
that late pre-emption cases provide just the right context for the level of fragility they
require. What matters here is that fragility resolves late pre-emption problems, as I
argued in Chapter 3.
One might hope for a unified solution to these two cases given their common ‘unused
backup’ structure. The fragility strategy alone, however, will not help in cases of early
pre-emption since they can be constructed in such a way as to ensure the outcome
effect happens at just the same time, and in just the same way, regardless of which
candidate brings it about. To see this simply extend the standard early pre-emption
case with an additional step whereby a periodic scan of the room triggers an alarm if
the window is broken. Scanning every five minutes the system is insensitive to whether
the window broke at one time (Suzy’s throw) or another (Billy’s throw) within that
span. In either case the alarm rings at the same time in the same way. Fragility alone
cannot help here.
If fragility alone cannot help in such cases, and transitivity alone cannot help in
cases of late pre-emption then it seems that both tools are required to unpick the ARC
cases that I have discussed. This suggests some requirements to be met by any genuine
problem case for my view. It must be a case in which both causes bring about the
same effect at the same time in the same way and in which neither causal path is cut
or blocked-off by the other. In other words it must be a case where both causal paths
‘run to completion’.3 We do not have far to look.
8.1.2 The Anatomy of Overdetermination Cases
A putative example of such a problematic case is that of a firing squad. Assume for
simplicity that they are an especially accurate and lethal squad of eight, each firing
perfectly on the heart with a deadly bullet. The death of the prisoner does not depend
on the first squad member, and so, by a counterfactual analysis, he is not a cause. The
3It is not clear how to cash out the notion of ‘running to completion’. One might try to define it
as being physically connected to the effect by an unbroken chain of physical connection. But this just
restricts the cases the theory can handle to those worlds where events must be physically connected
to their effects. Our world is, in all likelihood, such a world but our causal analysis should have wider
ambitions. For a discussion of various rival definitions of ‘runs to completion’ and how they might
impact on pre-emption cases, see Bernstein [2014]. For my part I leave the issue noted but unresolved
and rely on an intuitive reading of ‘run to completion’ in what follows.
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same goes for the second member, and the third and so on. No single member of the
squad is a cause of the death and yet the prisoner surely died from being shot. This
seems to mean that the counterfactual analysis has erred.
Genuine Overdetermination
First, a note of warning about such apparent cases of overdetermination. The death,
as it actually occurred, was a death that involved the prisoner receiving damage from
eight simultaneous bullets. Note that it is eight bullets, not seven or six so, on a
sufficiently fragile conception of the death, it really did depend on every one of the
squad: without any one of them it would have been a seven-, not eight-, bullet death.
This is more than a minor quibble about the minutiae since even if we think of a more
convoluted case where the death is the same no matter how many of the squad fire
(perhaps they shoot at a trigger which electrocutes with even a single shot) there will
still be tell-tale step on the causal path to the effect: there will be eight (not seven,
or six) bullets that hit the trigger (if only one had then that would have been the
cause, and the others not). There will also be significant differences in the aftermath:
there will be eight bullets (not seven, not six) embedded in the trigger, and eight (not
seven, not six) shells on the ground, not to mention noise, gunshot residue, remorse,
payment and any other dimension along which the world diverges based on the number
of shooters. I believe that this point was originally made by Bunzl [1979] who argued
that there are no cases of genuine overdetermination in the actual world, just the
‘illusion’ of overdetermination that came from under-specifying the effect in question.4
A sufficiently precise specification of the state of the world should show that all of the
putative causes were required for the world to be precisely as it was at the time of the
event, or on the path to the event, or in the aftermath.5
This is closely related to the fragility strategy for late pre-emption and it raises a
familiar objection: the putatively overdetermined effect is not the super-fragile event
that an ideal physics would describe but rather the object of a common sense causal
ascription. The event picked out by ‘the death of the prisoner’ is not as precisely
specified, or fragile, as Bunzl’s account requires. In the parlance of essences, he is
imputing a far richer essence (read: far fewer counterparts) for the effect than the
speaker and this amounts to changing the semantic content of the causal claim made.
Bunzl is probably correct to insist that, in our physics at least, the maximally fragile
event did indeed depend on each of the contributions jointly. But if a more robust
event (essentially a death, by shooting, at around noon) did not jointly depend on the
contributions, since it would have occurred following any one of them individually, and
4See also Hall and Paul [2013, p.143-144]
5The idea that the aftermath must carry traces of the causal interaction stems from a particular
aspect of our physics: that total energy must be conserved in an isolated system. If energy need
not be conserved in a system then additional bullets need not create traces in the aftermath—they
could simply vanish from the system entirely—however if energy must be conserved, as in our system,
then additional bullets must leave additional traces in the aftermath. I will shortly consider an
example which refines the problem of overdetermination by removing this contingent assumption and
so removing the assumption that we can work backwards from the aftermath to determine causes. So,
I will hereafter drop reference to the aftermath as it does not add anything new.
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if that more robust event was what the speaker had in mind, then on what basis does
Bunzl insist that the causal claim really meant something else? Bunzl must either give
a different account of the more robust causal claim that common sense would allow, or
he must hold an error theory of common sense causal ascriptions. Perhaps the latter
is not so bad an option if you are happy to restrict your causal analysis to merely
nomologically possible worlds, but is not in keeping with the aims of my thesis. I
believe we can do better than flatly deny folk intuitions.
Bunzl’s approach equates to the first of my three causal criteria, ACCT Canonical:
¬Pci ¬Oei, and I think that he is correct to point out that the standard examples
(such as the firing squad) are not cases of overdetermination by that standard. Unlike
Bunzl I take this merely as a necessary, not sufficient, condition on the truth of a
casual claim. My third criterion, ACCT Contextual, further requires that the following
conditional is true: ¬Pcn ¬Oen (where n is a counterpart relation partly determined
by context). Everyday cases of overdetermination fail this criterion for any given one
of the candidate causes (any given squad member). So my theory, unlike Bunzl’s,
reflects the intuitively problematic nature of overdetermination even in these actual
world cases. My theory also lets us distinguish cases of what I will call genuine and
(merely) apparent overdetermination: each candidate fails to meet the Contextual
criterion in cases of apparent overdetermination but each candidate fails to meet both
the Canonical and Contextual criteria in cases of genuine overdetermination.6
So, genuine cases of overdetermination are preciously rare if the occur at all in the
actual world7 but are they metaphysically possible? If so, they represent a problem for
anyone wishing to use Bunzl’s strategy in an analysis of the causal concept.
I think it is clear that they are metaphysically possible. Suppose two signals are
sent down a two wires which converge. Further, imagine that the converged wire leads
to a receiver which beeps if any signal is received. Both signals set off at precisely the
same time, at precisely the same speed, and that each path to the signal is equally
long. The receiver subsequently beeps. This looks to be a case of overdetermination
but is it genuine? Perhaps not without a modification. Bunzl could point out that in
our world a double-signal must arrive at the receiver, or at least at some point along
the path to the signal, and that this allows us to trace the effect back to some jointly
caused event (a two-signal event) which would make the activation of the receiver the
product of a joint, not overdetermining, cause. However, this requires the assumption
that energy is conserved as it is in our world. We need only imagine that excess signal
can simply vanish, and that the converged wire can only carry the equivalent of one
(possibly merged) signal, to make for a genuine case of overdetermination. In situations
where the conservation of energy is not assumed, the Bunzl strategy cannot rule out
cases of genuine overdetermination.
An adequate theory of causation must account for this sort of case.
6Actually, since failing the ACCT Canonical test entails failing the ACCT Actual test, this means
that each candidate fails all three in cases of genuine overdetermination.
7For simplicity I am ignoring issues of compositional overdetermination (see Paul [2007]) or cases
of mental-physical overdetermination. These may or may not exist regardless of whether ordinary
macro-level overdetermination does and so they cross-cut this discussion.
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Overdetermination Defined
In the next section I will propose a means of identifying overdetermination cases using
only counterfactual apparatus. Before I do so, however, I wish to propose four joint
indicators of a case of genuine overdetermination.
First of all, there must be at least two distinct events, each alone sufficient to bring
about the effect. This is the basic unifying thought behind all redundant causation
and I will refer to it as the over-sufficiency requirement.
Second, the effect must counterfactually depend upon there being at least one of
the candidate events present. Without this requirement, there would be no reason to
assume that the candidate events are causally related to the effect at all. Call this the
dependency requirement.
Third, note that for it to be the same effect, there can be no difference in the
timing or manner of the event dependent on whether one, other or both of the causes
are present. If there were a difference whether one or other were present, then a fragility
strategy will simply show the case to be one of asymmetric redundant causation instead
of symmetric. If having both causes present made a difference over having just one,
then the actual case would be one of joint causation, not overdetermination. Thus,
there must be perfect symmetry in the effect no matter whether one, other or both of
the causal candidates are present. Call this the perfect symmetry requirement.
Fourth, both causes must ‘run to completion’. If one cause does not run to com-
pletion then there will be at least some point on on the path of the completed chain
which is not backed-up or guaranteed by a point on the other chain. The effect would
then depend upon the completed chain, and not the incomplete one and it would be a
case of pre-emption and not overdetermination. Call this the no-cutting requirement.
If the over-suffiency, dependency, perfect symmetry and no-cutting requirements
are met in a given case, then that is a case of genuine overdetermination.
Overdetermination Profiled
The problem with redundancy cases in general is that theory says a given event is not
a cause whereas common sense says that it is. In asymmetric cases this is plain and
obvious—Suzy causes the window to break in each construal of the story (one-rock
and two-rock versions). In overdetermination cases it is not entirely clear what verdict
intuition delivers: we would probably not say that either one is the cause and that
the other is not, but if we say that both are the cause then that does not capture the
notion that the effect was overdetermined rather than merely jointly-caused. Intuition
is not giving theory a clear guide to the right answer here. Lewis felt this made
overdetermination a special case, to be decided by the best theory (all else considered).
He said:
When common sense delivers a clear and uncontroversial answer about a
not-too-far-fetched case, theory had better agree... But when common sense
falls into indecision and controversy, or when it is reasonable to suspect that
far-fetched cases are being judged by false analogy with commonplace ones,
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then theory may safely say what it likes. Such cases can be left as spoils to
the victor, in D. M. Armstrong’s phrase. [1986, 194]
Whilst there is some truth in what Lewis says here, he overlooks that whilst intuition
does not give a clear positive verdict on such cases, it does at least give a negative
verdict: it would be wrong to say that neither candidate caused the effect. And yet
that is precisely what his counterfactual analysis (and my modification of it) say in such
cases. The effect did not depend on either of the candidate causes so, taken individually,
neither is a cause. This means that, if a counterfactual theory is the best theory, then
we ought to deny that either of the candidates were causes. I think we can do better
than this. If overdetermination cases have an identifiable structure, expressible in
purely counterfactual terms, then a counterfactual analysis will be well-equipped to
give overdetermination cases the status that intuition implies: it can separate them as
an exception to the general theory. This is what I aim to show.
Consider the rather different case of joint-causation. Imagine that two 2kg weights
are placed upon a scale which reads only up to 3kg before the screen displays an
error. The displaying of the error depends on each of the weights individually and so
each weight is an individual cause of the error reading. That seems wrong—it fails to
capture the requirement that they both contribute—but this is not normally considered
too much of a problem. The aim of an analysis of this sort is to capture what it is
to be one of the great many causes that contributed and there is no suggestion that
to be a ‘cause’ in this liberal sense is to individually suffice for the outcome. Thus,
joint-cause cases are often taken to demonstrate the improvement that counterfactual
theories make over sufficiency theories.8 If we want to capture what is distinctive in
joint-cause cases, all we need to do is to point out that an event is a cause of an effect
if it meets the counterfactual test, and it is furthermore a joint-cause of the effect with
any other synchronous event which passes the test too. In short, there is a pattern of
counterfactual dependence which can be used to identify joint-causes and the existence
of that pattern suggests that counterfactual dependence picks out the salient features
of joint-cause phenomena.
I think a similar pattern of counterfactual dependence serves to pick out all and
only overdetermining causes. Imagine again that two weights are placed on the limited
scale, but this time each weighs 5kg instead of 2kg. Now the error message does not
depend on either of the weights individually, but it does depend upon their conjunction.
Unlike cases of joint-causation, here the individual causal candidates fail the initial
test, but pass a subsequent conjoined test. If either event had passed the first test
alone—i.e. if the effect had depended on it individually—then the other would not
have been sufficient for the effect. This would violate the over-sufficiency requirement
I introduced in the last section and not be a case of overdetermination at all. So,
overdetermination cases must fail the first test for each individual causal candidate.
Overdetermination cases must also pass the conjoined test, lest they fail the depen-
dency requirement (that the effect depend on their being at least one candidate cause
present). However, there is a potentially problematic example for this view: perhaps
8This apparent improvement is discussed, and later challenged, by Hall and Paul [2013, p.148].
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a 10kg weight is being held in abeyance by the presence of the two smaller weights.
The smaller weights in this situation are pre-empting the 10kg weight, the presence of
which guarantees the error reading. So in the absence of the smaller weights the error
still appears and the smaller weights fail to jointly cause the error. However, this is
just the embedding an instance of overdetermination within a pre-emption case and the
earlier treatments (transitivity if there is cutting, fragility if there is not) apply. Once
we consider the error event in a sufficiently fragile way we see it does in fact depend
on the conjunction of the smaller weights. It seems that overdetermination cases really
must pass the joint test too.
Here is the formal statement of test using a simple counterfactual analysis. For any
events c, d and e, c and d overdetermine e iff: ¬c ¬e is false, ¬d ¬e is false, but
where (¬c ∧ ¬d) ¬e is true. Such a simple counterfactual analysis is insufficient,
however, in cases of pre-emption.
On my preferred counterfactual analysis there are additional steps for each causal
test. However, this can be simplified here, given the perfect symmetry and over-
sufficiency requirements. In genuine cases of overdetermination each cause must be
individually sufficient to bring about the effect (over-sufficiency) even on the most
fragile reading of the events (perfect symmetry), so each causal candidate must fail my
canonical test individually. Also, by the perfect symmetry requirement, there must be
no difference in the effect, even on a fragile reading, whether one, other or both of the
causes are present. So, the second conjoined test (meeting the dependence requirement)
for a distinctive case of overdetermination must also be run on the most fragile view
of the events in question. This renders the following formal test: For any events c, d
and e, c and d overdetermine e iff: ¬Pci ¬Oei is false, ¬Pdi ¬Oei is false, and
(¬Pci ∧ ¬Pdi) ¬Oei is true.9
If this is correct then the ACCT theorist has the wherewithal to identify overde-
termination as a special case. Where intuition hesitates, theory provides a distinctive
pattern by which such cases can be isolated and set aside. Now, common sense can
say what it likes about overdetermination cases and theory need only apply what it
says to all and only those cases that display the requisite pattern. Overdetermination
will therefore be an exception to the general causal account, but right from the start
our common sense suggested they would be. I take this as a success for counterfactual
theories.
9I note here that for any genuine case of overdetermination with two candidate causes, a third
spurious cause will also pass this test. Take the weights example where the first weight is c, the
second d and the error reading is e. Now, add a third event f which we can take to be the beating
of some butterfly wings on the other side of the world from the scale. By the test just offered f will
seem to be one of three overdetermining causes of e. That is wrong. It suggests that my formal test
requires some minimal constraint in the joint test. I do not know how to offer such a test, but this is
only a problem for working out which of the set that pass the test are genuine overdetermining causes,
it does not affect the diagnosis of e as being overdetermined simpliciter.
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8.2 Trumping
8.2.1 Pre-emption or Overdetermination?
The perfect symmetry of overdetermination cases is what makes them distinct from pre-
emption cases and what makes them a distinctive type of problem for counterfactual
analyses of causation. In pre-emption there must be some asymmetry in the claims of
each causal candidate such that common sense agrees that one is the cause and the
other is not and I have argued that when this is the case a counterfactual analyses can
track common sense, given the right pragmatics and a viable account of transitivity.
Any case of redundant causation in which neither candidate cause on its own would
bring about the event differently, and where neither cause cuts-off the other, will meet
the requirements for overdetermination that I introduced in 8.1.2. What I have said so
far entails that such a case should be one of SRC however in this section I will discuss
a putative counterexample to this claim from Jonathan Schaffer [2000].
Redacted Magic
In order to prime what I take to be the correct intuition in the cases, and to highlight
where disagreement arises, I first offer a redacted version of Schaffer’s example. I will
shortly give the full version and explain the redaction.
Suppose that at noon Merlin casts a spell (the first that day) to turn the
prince into a frog, that at 6:00 pm Morgana casts a spell (the only other
that day) to turn the prince into a frog, and that at midnight the prince
becomes a frog. [2000, p165]
What was the cause of the prince turning into a frog? The case as it stands is under-
described. We can presume that each spell is sufficient to turn the prince into a frog,
but do they both do so in the same way and at the same time? If so then a difference
in timing or manner of the effect may allow us to distinguish between two sufficient
candidates, just as we do in cases of late pre-emption. We also do not know whether
and how the spells interact. If one cuts the other off, then there may be a chain of
dependence to trace as in early pre-emption cases. Schaffer fills out the details as
follows:
[T]here is neither a failure of intermediary events along the Morgana process
(we may dramatize this by stipulating that spells work directly, without any
intermediaries), nor any would-be difference in time or manner of the effect
absent Merlin’s spell[.] [2000, p165]
This means that there is an over-sufficiency for the effect, a perfectly symmetrical
outcome regardless of whether one, other or both spells are cast, a dependence of the
effect upon at least one of the candidate causes being present, and there is no cut-off
of one spell by the other. This is a textbook case of overdetermination by my criteria
in 8.1.2. Further, my counterfactual test agrees: even on a fragile reading the effect
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did not depend on Merlin individually or Morgana individually but it did depend upon
their conjunction.
All signs point to a case of overdetermination. At least in this redacted version.
Complete Magic
In the last section I cut off the first line of Schaffer’s example and omitted the line
which followed it. Here it is in full:
Imagine that it is a law of magic that the first spell cast on a given day
match the enchantment that midnight. Suppose that at noon Merlin casts
a spell (the first that day) to turn the prince into a frog, that at 6:00 pm
Morgana casts a spell (the only other that day) to turn the prince into a
frog, and that at midnight the prince becomes a frog. Clearly, Merlin’s spell
(the first that day) is a cause of the prince’s becoming a frog and Morgana’s
is not, because the laws say that the first spells are the consequential ones.
[2000, p165, my emphasis to highlight the redactions.]
If we follow Schaffer’s causal conclusion, this is a case of ARC, not SRC, after all. If
that is right then my counterfactual test for overdetermination cases fails (it identifies
a case which is not overdetermined) and the counterfactual analysis is once again faced
with a case where its results and common sense diverge.
It should be apparent from comparing the redacted and completed versions of this
example that Schaffer’s causal conclusion is driven by the fact that it is a law of magic
that the first spell cast on a given day match the enchantment that midnight. In the
following section I will argue that this law is either question-begging or it is benign.
In either case the law does not alter the causal structure. Trumping cases are cases of
overdetermination and not cases of pre-emption.
8.2.2 Laws and Causes
In challenging the role of the magical law in the given trumping example I will give
two different arguments. The first will aim to show that the stipulation of the law is
question begging and the second will aim to show that a law should make no difference
to our causal ascriptions if it does not make a difference to the mechanics of the case.10
Question Begging Laws
Suppose we had an uncontroversial case of redundant causation such as the case of late
pre-emption with Billy and Suzy. Suppose further that the counterfactual dependencies
are just as they are in the original set-up—had Suzy not thrown as and how she did,
the window would have broken a little later, and a little differently. Suppose, however,
I add to the set-up that it is a law in the world where the example takes place that
the second rock thrown causes the window to break and I conclude from this that the
counterfactual analysis of causation must be wrong.
10Similar objections to these can be found in McDermott 2002.
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It is reasonable to ask: in virtue of what is it a law that the second rock thrown
causes the window to break? And the answer given will need to account for the
presence of ‘causes’ in the statement of the law. Whatever account is given, it will not
be a counterfactual analysis of causation since the counterfactual dependencies render
Suzy the cause on such an analysis. Whatever account is given of the introduction
of the word ‘causes’ in the law is an account that pre-supposes the falsehood of the
counterfactual analysis. As such, stipulating that law amounts to begging the question
against the counterfactual theorist in the treatment of the example. Such laws cannot
be admissible in a test case.
Schaffer does not use the word ‘causes’ in the formation of the law offered, but moves
very quickly to taking Merlin, and not Morgana, to be the cause of the frogification
“because the laws say that the first spells are the consequential ones” (ibid). If the
laws did say that then the laws would be question begging, since ‘consequential’ is a
close synonym to ‘causal’ in this usage. Yet the laws do not say that at all but instead
say that the first spells ‘match the enchantment’ at midnight. This is intentionally
weaker than the question-begging alternative and Schaffer goes on to argue that the
law offered is not question begging.
We are asked to imagine that there are decisive competitions between the spell-
casters elsewhere in the world in question such that when the spells disagree about the
enchantment which is to come to pass at midnight, it is always the first spell which
matches the enchantment. Assuming a supervenient account of laws along the lines
of Mill-Ramsey-Lewis11 (MRL) we take the laws of a world to be theorems of the
best axiomatisation of the facts of that world. Here ‘best’ indicates the ideal balance
between simplicity and strength, where simpler systems have fewer axioms and stronger
systems convey more information about the world. Within the MRL framework we can
compare two candidate laws for the situation described (assuming for simplicity that
all other laws for the system are distinct from the spell-casting law):
1. The first spell cast on a given day matches the enchantment at midnight
2. When nonequivalent spells are cast the first spell matches the enchantment at
midnight, but when only equivalent spells are cast, all spells match the enchant-
ment at midnight.
According to Schaffer, the second is less simple and no more strong than the first and
so, according to the MRL account, the first is a law of that world and the second is not.
However, as McDermott (2002, p90) points out, Schaffer is comparing the simplicity
of two theorems of a system, but the simplicity required by MRL is the simplicity of
the axioms. Any world where 1 is true is also a world where 2 is true, and so any best
system which has 1 as a theorem also has 2 as a theorem.
This means that we have two putative laws, each theorems of the best system, where
one drives the intuition that Merlin was the cause and the other drives the intuition
11Such an account takes laws to supervene on facts such that facts are more fundamental than laws.
This means that the laws do not dictate the facts but the other way around, which is crucial to a
Humean programme that Lewis defended and that I am adopting. I understand the idea to originate
from Mill [1882] and having been taken up and refined by Ramsay [1978] and [Lewis, 2001, p.72-77].
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that both were a cause of the enchantment at midnight. We could even derive a third
law which supported the conclusion that Morgana was the cause:
3. When nonequivalent spells are cast the first spell matches the enchantment at
midnight, but when only equivalent spells are cast the last matches the enchant-
ment at midnight.
The lesson here, I take it, is that the laws can be made to support a range of different
causal conclusions. This means that selecting one candidate law above the others is to
beg the question of which causal conclusion is the right one. The law Schaffer advocates
begs the question in just this way and in doing so misleads intuition.
Laws and Intuition
In this section I offer two cases which I take it show that once the mechanism has been
described, and once the counterfactual dependencies are made clear, the introduction
of a law consistent with those counterfactual dependencies does not add relevant in-
formation to our causal judgements.
First, recall the earlier example of two signals sent down converging wires to a
receiver (the version that suspended the conservation of energy assumption). This was
designed to be a textbook case of genuine overdetermination. Now, suppose that the
wires are coloured red and blue before they converge and purple thereafter and that on
every other occasion in this world it just so happens that a stronger signal had been
sent down the red wire with the result that the red-wire signal matches the purple-wire
signal at the point it reaches the receiver. What does this tell us about the case when
both signals have the same strength? I say: nothing. It tells us only what would have
happened had the signals been different. The following may well be a theorem of the
best system: ‘the signal in the red wire always match the signal in the purple wire at
the point it meets the receiver’, but this does not make the same-signal scenario any
less of a case of overdetermination.
Second, recall the case of the scale which gave an error reading for any load greater
than 2kg. Adapt the scale to measure two sides against each other (as in the balancing
scales of justice) and make it so that the scale reads an error if one side weighs at least
2kg more than the other (and, to avoid Bunzl-type concerns, that all excess differential
pressure applied to the scale simply vanishes). Suppose there are two weights in this
world, a 5kg and a 3kg one, and that they are both placed on the same side, with
nothing placed on the other and that the error reading is displayed. It should be plain
that this is a case of genuine overdetermination. Even though it will always be the
case that whatever side the 5kg weight is on will be the side that triggers the error,
it is nonetheless the case that it is no more a cause of the error reading than the 3kg
weight is when they are both on the same side. This is overdetermination regardless
of the law.
I think that the lesson in these cases is that the relevant counterfactual dependen-
cies are not affected by the stipulated law. The law might inform us of competing
cases, such as when Merlin and Morgana cast different spells, when the red signal is
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stronger or when the 5kg and 3kg are on different sides of the scale, but it does not
alter the dependence pattern of the effect on either of the candidates individually or
combined. If we have an adequate treatment of cases which display such a dependence
pattern—and I argued above that we do—then trumping-style cases are subject to
that treatment. Similarly, if my approach to overdetermination cases is faulty, then so
is my treatment of trumping-style cases. The main point here is that trumping cases
are not an additional problem for counterfactual analyses of causation over and above
problems of overdetermination in general.
8.2.3 Super Pre-emption
There is a further case of pre-emption that is found in the literature that I have not
discussed. The problem is mentioned in passing by Hall [2004b, p.237], crediting Yablo
and concerns a standard late pre-emption example with a twist. Here is the case:
SP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
Billy’s rock was a smart rock however and it was rigged with a super-
advanced guidance system. If Suzy’s rock deviated from its path at any
point, the guidance system would have propelled the rock to smash the
window at the exact same time and in the exact same manner as Suzy’s
rock in fact did.
As Hall points out, the case is far fetched but he thinks that it represents the nail in
the coffin of fragility-style approaches to pre-emption cases. Of course, the stipulation
is such that the timing or manner of the effect event is held fixed and so a fragility
strategy is supposed to be ruled out by fiat. As with other such examples, though, the
devil is in the detail. I do not think this example is as problematic as Hall suggests.
Take the latest point in Suzy’s rock’s trajectory towards the window, the very last
point on the rock’s journey to break the window. Given that our world is relativistic,
if this is a real-world example, or even a nomologically possible one, then if Suzy’s
rock is cleanly excised at that exact point then there is literally no time in which the
smart-rock, however sophisticated, has to travel across the intervening space to bring
about the same window breaking. If you think that there is enough time, you just
haven’t imagined the very last point on the trajectory yet. Think of a later one and
try again until there is simply no time at all in which the smart-rock can travel the
gap. The window breaking depended upon that latest point on Suzy’s rock’s trajectory
and, by transitivity, on Suzy.12
Of course I have had to adopt an extremely fragile standard of event individuation
to make this response, but Hall’s case is supposed to be immune to fragility approaches
and yet it isn’t.
12Here I am assuming that there is a last point, but that just makes the exposition clearer and
it isn’t a strict requirement. In a continuum we do not need the last point, but rather some point
at which the smart rock is no longer in the backwards lightcone of the window breaking, but where
Suzy’s is.
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Maybe the case should not be restricted to the nomologically possible. Imagine a
case where the smart-rock does not need any time to influence matters across the inter-
vening space: it is capable of action at a distance. In that case we have a dependence
of the effect upon not one candidate cause (Suzy’s rock) but a conjunction of them
(Suzy’s rock and smart rock), but we have a strong preference for treating Suzy’s rock
as a cause of window breaking, not merely a joint-cause with some distant back-up.
This is a genuine worry, but it is a worry for any situation that allows for action at a
distance. Presumably there are possible worlds in which such action at a distance is
commonplace, and in which such action requires no exchange of energy between the
putative cause and effect. If we construct a pre-emption case in such a world, none
of the strategies employed so far will be able to detect which of the various candidate
causes brought about the effect.
And yet, if this is the Achilles heel of counterfactual theories, one has to wonder
what the alternatives are for accommodating action-at-a-distance causation. If there
is counterfactual dependence of one event upon another then a counterfactual analysis
will attribute a causal relation even if those events are non-local. Without a counter-
factual analysis how are we to identify cases of action-at-a-distance? Mere regularity
cannot tell correlation from causation, conserved quantity theories cannot track non-
local transmissions of energy and whilst contrastive approaches have their merits, they
remain counterfactual in nature and susceptible to even the most ordinary pre-emption
examples. Imperfect it may be, but the ACCT Analysis I have advocated here handles
these problem cases better than all the rest.
9
ACCT, Contrastivism and Causal
Modelling
9.1 Introduction
I have argued for my ACCT Analysis by starting with Lewis’s original 1973 analysis
of causation and proceeding to make as few amendments as possible. I began by
distinguishing three challenges that any realist causal theory faces: (I) account for our
everyday causal assertions; (II) give an account of the mind-independent, objective
standard for causal connectedness between events; and (III) explain the relation of (I)
and (II).
If the sole aim of this thesis was (I) then it would have been odd to begin with
Lewis’s original analysis—it has many known problems, it has many, newer, rivals and
it has very few, if any, defenders left. Even within the diocese of counterfactual ap-
proaches to causation it is thought to have been superseded by the recent contrastivist
accounts (of which certain modelling accounts are a sub-species). In this final chapter
I aim to compare the ACCT Analysis that I have been defending with these current
rivals in respect of the challenges (I) - (III) that I set out at the beginning.
9.2 Contrastivism
Contrastivism is a broader church than I will represent here. Contrastivism in general
may be summarised as follows:
A contrastivist view of a concept holds that all or some claims using that
concept are best understood with an extra logical place for the contrast
class. [Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012, p.134]
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So, contrastivism about causation holds that all or some claims using the causal
concept are best understood with an extra logical place for the contrast class. In
the case of causation there remains a question of whether a single contrast class is
required for the cause or the effect, or whether two contrast classes are required: one
for each. I think Schaffer [2005, 2012a] has argued convincingly that contrastivists
about causation ought to apply a contrast class to both the cause and the effect in
causal claims. Therefore, I will only consider quaternary contrastivist accounts of
causation as relevant here. According to such an account ‘c is a cause of e’ is true iff c
rather than C∗ causes e rather than E∗, where what counts as a member of C∗ or E∗ is
a function of context.1
Such accounts can be found in Maslen [2004a], Schaffer [2005, 2012a], Northcott
[2007] and List & Menzies [2010] and whilst I will apply the most charitable rendering
of contrastivism I can to each of the problems discussed below, the fullest case, and the
richest account of the benefits of contrastive causation, comes from Schaffer’s [2005]. I
will therefore default to Schaffer’s contrastivism unless I state otherwise.
9.2.1 Everyday Causal Talk
I will begin by considering the advantages that contrastivists claim to offer over the
original Lewis theory in respect of our everyday causal talk and then consider how the
ACCT Analysis compares.
Contextualism: Our causal attributions vary with context so that the same causal
sentence in different contexts can have different truth conditions. The original Lewis
analysis has no context-variant element in the semantics which would explain this
variation but contrastivism has: context shifts the relevant contrast class for each of
the events in question. Given the right contrastivist reading, the causal claim thereby
shifts truth conditions across contexts.2
Absences: We are perfectly happy to say that an absence of rain caused the
crop to fail or that the absence of precaution caused the fire and whilst a standard
Lewisian counterfactual account of causation gives corresponding truth conditions for
these assertions, it requires an ontology of omissions—events that are defined negatively
as the absence of something else. This is metaphysically abhorrent [Schaffer, 2005,
p.330]. The Lewisian might say that the absence of precaution is just identical with
the watching of T.V. that occurred instead, but there are two problems with this idea:
it takes the watching of T.V. to have caused the fire, which seems wrong, and it locates
the cause at a spatiotemporal distance from the effect without there being any oomph
that travels the intervening space. The contrastivist can instead take the negative
nominal depicting the event—i.e. ‘the absence of precaution’—to pick out the watching
of T.V. in the actual world but as also picking out the taking of precautions in some
other world. This avoids the implication that watching the T.V. rather than reading
1Some notation: following Northcott [2007] I will denote actual events as c and e and associated
contrast classes (non-empty sets of contrast events, possibly singleton sets) using C∗ and E∗ respectively.
Note that this differs from Schaffer’s specific contrast cases, c∗ and e∗. Here I am aiming for a more
wide-reaching discussion and so I use the more widely used version involving contrast sets.
2I omit discussion of the ‘Selection’ here for brevity. See Chapter 2 §2.4.1.
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a newspaper caused the fire. In that other world the precautions are spatiotemporally
local to the region that caught fire in the actual world.
Transitivity: The original Lewis theory does not seem to have the resources to
diagnose what goes wrong in cases where transitivity appears to fail (see Chapter 7).
If throwing potassium salts into a fire causes it to burn purple, and if the purple flame
causes the curtains to catch fire, then it seems as though throwing potassium salts into
the fire caused the curtains to catch fire. The conclusion seems false and a contrastivist
can say why: the middle place of the transitive chain conflates two distinct claims: in
the first conjunct the salts causes there to be a purple flame rather than an orange
flame, but in the second conjunct it is the fact that there is a purple flame rather than
no flame that causes the curtains to catch. The rather-than clauses expose the illicit
shift that has taken place. Lacking those clauses, Lewis’s original account does not
have the resources to reject these counterexamples.
Regarding Contextualism, my ACCT Analysis offers a rival account whereby counter-
part variation, i.e. shifts in the modality we attribute to the events involved, accounts
for the shifts in truth value. In Chapter 2 I argue that this sort of contextualist view is
at least as good as contrastivism at handling the examples and that it does so without
multiplying argument places beyond necessity.
Absences are metaphysically abhorrent, “bogus entities” as Lewis [2004a, p.100]
put it. Endorsing absence causation as genuine raises problems of profligacy, non-
locality and location and my discussion of contrastivist responses in Chapter 6 should
make it clear that extant contrastivist approaches may improve on the original Lewis
account, but they do not improve enough. My ACCT Analysis, which takes absence
causal claims to be literally false, instead glosses our acceptable causal assertions as
assertions about would-be, not actual, causal relations. As such, they serve a useful
explanatory role without being literally true claims about our world. I think this
account is an improvement on the contrastivist story.
The contrastivist does have a neat story to tell about transitivity, however. The
illicit shifts in the middle place do seem like the source of the problem in the standard
putative counterexamples. My ACCT Analysis alights on the same point but I rely on a
proportionality constraint to rule out certain problem cases (see Explicit Purple Flame,
Chapter 7). The problem with this reliance is that it pushes me to choose between
considering proportionality as a constraint on the literal truth of causal claims or as a
constraint on the assertability or well-formed status of certain causal claims. Whilst
the first option rescues the plausible idea that causation itself is transitive, it comes
at the cost of ruling out a load of our ordinary causal claims which are not strictly
proportional (such as that Mark David Chapman firing a gun caused John Lennon
to die). The second option gives up on transitivity of causation itself, but saves the
idea that some causation—namely the proportional sort—is transitive. This is not as
neat as the contrastivist picture as it stands but this is due to the ACCT Analysis
commitment to there being an objective causal relation. This discussion is supposed to
leave that issue aside for the purposes of comparing the relative success of contrastivism
and ACCT approaches vis-a´-vis ordinary causal talk. The ACCT Analysis introduces
a proportionality constraint as a constraint on causal talk involving chains and the
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contrastivist introduces a matching-contrast constraint to apply to causal talk involving
chains. The contrastivist and ACCT theorist alike can eschew such constraints for
causal statements concerning direct causal influence, so it seems that both make a
special case of talk involving indirect chains.
One area where there appears to be no progress offered by the contrastivist is
in dealing with the problems of late pre-emption and overdetermination. Schaffer
explicitly accepts this [2005, p.358, note 35] but whilst few others even mention it, no-
one seems to think that contrastivity offers an improvement over Lewis’s 73 analysis in
dealing with this central problem. Of course I have argued at length that adopting a
fragile view of events and a sensible pragmatics of causal discourse, helps resolve this
issue. Leaving aside the maximally fragile events that I endorse for the purposes of
identifying an objective causal relation (more on this shortly), the contrastivist could
simply help themselves to the pragmatic maxims that I have offered modulo a little
terminology. I offered three maxims:
1. Take the effect to be as fragile as is required to render the claim true.
2. Take the effect to be no more fragile than is required to render the claim true.
3. Take the effect to be only as fragile as the speaker could discern or infer at the
time.3
Fragility may not have a direct correlate in certain contrastivist theories. Schaffer,
for example, explicitly rejects fragile events on the basis that he can simply specify the
target event in the actual world and a sufficiently close alteration in the contrast class
where required. Others, such as List & Menzies would perhaps be able to retain the
fragile terminology. In any case, the contrastivist has the resources to render the desired
‘Suzy’s throwing the rock caused the window to break’ as true even when Billy throws
too (albeit slightly later): Suzy’s throwing the rock rather than dropping it, caused the
window to break as it did, rather than break slightly later. My argument in Chapter
3 was supposed to justify this sort of reading on the basis that it was charitable and
proportional to the information available in the situation. Although no contrastivist
has yet argued this line, I see no reason why they could not avail themselves of such a
pragmatic approach.
So, concerning the first aim—to account for our every day causal assertions—I take
the honours to be roughly even. Whilst I think it is a mistake for contrastivists to
endorse absence causation as genuine causation, and whilst no contrastivist has yet
argued that they can resolve late pre-emption problems, these are merely contingent
failings and there remains logical space for a contrastivist theory which does not have
these shortcomings. Perhaps such a contrastivist position would have the slight edge
given their neater treatment of counterexamples to transitivity.
3Recall that this last maxim trumps the first in cases where they conflict. See Chapter 3, §3.2.3.
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9.2.2 Objectivity
My second requirement for a theory of causation was that it give an account of the
mind-independent, objective causal relation between distinct events in the world. Here
the ACCT Analysis gives a clear answer: c is a cause of e simpliciter iff ¬Pci 
¬Oei. Causal contrastivism takes causal claims to be four-place relations where two of
those places (the contrast classes) are typically determined by the context. Contextual
theories thus seem at first glance to be ill-suited to giving an account of such an
objective relation, especially a causal relation that seems to relate two events, rather
than four.
However, causal contrastivists, facing the problem of objectivity, may wish to en-
dorse something like my two-tiered system of analysing the genuine causal relation in
the world on the one hand and analysing the content of our causal talk on the other. If
they so wished, I think they should say something like the following: Causal assertions
take place in ordinary contexts and so the contrast places (C∗ and E∗) are populated by
the salient alternatives which the context implies. Claims about the mind-independent,
objective matters of fact regarding causation should be taken to occur in a privileged
context in which the contrast places (C∗ and E∗) are populated by the maximum number
of alternatives to the actual c and e—i.e. every possible alteration of c and e.
Some details matter here. First, the maximal set of alternatives must be the max-
imal set of alternatives that differ intrinsically from the actual c and e. Otherwise,
there will be contrast cases that are identical to the actual world in all respects local to
the causal interaction under consideration—there would be no difference and so there
could be no difference makers to be discovered by the contrastive test. In effect, to be
an alteration of c or e requires being at least not intrinsically identical to them.
Second, and more importantly, somewhere in the totality of other worlds there will
be worlds where some member of C∗ occurs and some member of E∗ does not (or vice
versa). This will be true for any C∗ and E∗ simply because every contingent possibility
is manifested in the total set of possible worlds. If the contrastivist was committed to
every member of the contrast set of C∗ being paired-off with some member of the set of
E∗ then every causal claim would be false because there are distant worlds where some
C∗ manifests but some E∗ does not (or vice versa).4 So instead such a contrastivist
should commit only to there being a pairing of the closest C∗ and E∗ alternatives in the
privileged context.
With these two stipulations in place, there remains a telling difference between
my ACCT Analysis and that of the contrastivist and this difference stems from the
asymmetric standard of non-occurrence that I argued for in Chapter 4. In the privileged
context, and with the above stipulations in place, the contrastivist could offer the
following objective standard of causation:
c is a cause of e simpliciter iff: c occurs in the actual world, e occurs in the
actual world and, in all of the closest possible worlds in which no intrinsic
4Schaffer seems to entertain something like this idea in his [2005, p.348] but is careful to distance
himself from a commitment to it.
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duplicate of c occurs (C∗-worlds), no intrinsic duplicate of e occurs (E∗-
worlds).
Whereas I would instead endorse:
c is a cause of e simpliciter iff: c occurs in the actual world, e occurs in
the actual world and, in all of the closest possible worlds where c is cleanly
excised (¬Pci-worlds), no intrinsic duplicate of e occurs (¬Oei-worlds).
Notice that on this notion of contrastivism, the set of the closest C∗-worlds include
worlds where some very close alternative to c occurs, maybe an alternative that alters
some aspect of c (say, the shade) in a way that makes no difference to e. If such an
alteration of c is possible, then the contrastivist in the privileged context would have
to consider that c is not a cause of e simpliciter, even for paradigmatic causal cases
such as that of a spark causing a fire. By my ACCT Analysis, on the other hand, the
closest ¬Pci-worlds do not include such close variants of c. This means that my view
will not suffer from such false negatives.
Can such asymmetry be built into the contrastivist system? I think it can. It
requires that only clean excisions are considered genuine alterations of the cause event.
The same will not apply to the effect contrast set as I argued in Chapter 4 and so
the contrastivist system can be rendered asymmetric by applying a different standard
to the contrast sets on either side of the causal equation. With this final alteration
in place the contrastivist can match the ACCT results in the privileged context and
endorse an extentionally equivalent test for genuine causal relatedness between distinct
events in the world.
Note, though that if the contrastivist endorses this asymmetry, as I say they must,
they give up their neat account of transitivity. The same cases with the same problems
will apply when the objective causal test is applied: suppose that the clean excision
of c alters one aspect of d but only the alteration of a different aspect of d can affect
e. So, c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e, but nothing about c impacts anything
about e. This is a structural, not intuition-based, counterexample to the transitivity of
causation itself and it applies as much to the contrastivist as it does to me. Whatever
advantage of neatness the contrastivist could claim in relation to my (I) objective is
now wiped out.
It is worth noting that adopting a fine-grained notion of events may reduce the
number of instances of this type of counterexample, though I do not think it would
rule them out altogether. The problems stem from events having multiple ‘aspects’
such that the middle event in a transitive chain can have one aspect caused by c and
go on to cause e in virtue of another, separate, aspect. Thus, adopting a fine-grained
notion of events would appear to avoid such problems so long as it counted different
events for each aspect.
I think this would cure some cases, but not all. A fine-grained view of events could
of course count more events, and discriminate more finely, than a course-grained view
in the privileged context. However if there are any complex events—events constituted
by more than one property or aspect—then such an event can be used to create the
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same type of transitivity issues that I introduced. Given that complex events will be
vital if a theory is to accommodate our ordinary causal notions of ‘Suzy’s throwing a
rock’ or ‘Derek’s placing the red ball’, I find it difficult to imagine a theory of events
that avoids this structure altogether.5
What is more, the positive cases for adopting a course-grained view of events (with
counterparts) is strong. Taking events to be regions with context-variable counterpart
relations has helped account for the contextual variance of our causal claims. It has
also given us a language in which to highlight and discuss the implicit shifts in modality
of the causes and effects in pre-emption cases and thereby enabled us to express the
entailment principles behind the pragmatic maxims that help to clarify these centrally
problematic cases. Perhaps this work can all be translated into a fine-grained events
ontology but I do not know how to do so and I would not know how to demonstrate
the crucial relation between our everyday talk and the objective standards for causal
connectedness in such an ontology.
Which leads me neatly onto my (III) aim for the thesis: show how our everyday
causal talk relates to the proposed objective standard for causal connectedness.
9.2.3 Connection
Suppose that the contrastivist has taken on my suggested privileged context approach
to the objective standard of causal connectedness. How does such a pliable con-
trastivist’s account of everyday causal claims and their account of the objective stan-
dard relate to one another? Is the everyday talk left floating free of the objective
truth?
I do not see that there is any reliable connection between the two. Any causal claim
that is true in an ordinary context will utilise the same actual-world target events (c and
e) as are under consideration when the same ‘c caused e’ claim is considered within the
privileged context. What alters with the context is the contrasts. The ordinary claim
will imply a comparatively specific alternative (Suzy dropping the rock, for example)
whereas the same ‘c caused e’ claim being considered in the privileged context implies
a far wider contrast class. Given the closeness requirement (see above), only the closest
such contrasts will be relevant to the objective status of c and e. I think this creates a
problem which can be teased out in the following example. Suppose that Billy throws
his rock after the window is broken. Billy is not a cause of the window breaking
since in all the closest alterations where Billy’s throw is cleanly excised, the window
nevertheless breaks. However, if the contrast case is a situation where Billy had thrown
a minute earlier (ahead of Suzy) then the following contrastive claim would come out
true: Billy’s throwing the rock when he did rather than a minute earlier caused the
window to break when it did rather than break earlier.
This shows that it is possible for there to be a true contrastive claim in an ordinary
context which does not match the truth in the privileged context. This is possible
because in the ordinary context there is no requirement that the alternative under
5It is worth noting that the classic transitivity cases in the literature are introduced against a
background expectation that the counterfactual theorists for whom they cause a problem are, like
Lewis, fine-grainers. Fine-graining seems unlikely to help in these cases.
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consideration in C∗ be one of the closest alternatives. Thus, the contrastive standards
come apart.
In summary, whilst the contrastive approach does well in handling our causal talk,
and whilst an objective causal standard can likely be expressed using the contrastive
resources, under a contrastive theory there does not seem to be the same close con-
nection between the truth of what people say and an objective standard of causal
connectedness between events. By comparison, the ACCT Analysis meets all of the
desiderata.
9.3 Causal Modelling
Rivalling this sort of four-place contrastivism are a range of interventionist causal mod-
elling approaches. Whilst I have not discussed these theories so far in the thesis, they
are influential and current and I think that they deserve consideration. A full critique
of causal modelling is a topic for another thesis, but here I will aim to sketch some of
the similarities and differences between a sophisticated causal modelling approach and
my preferred ACCT Analysis.
Versions of causal modelling can be found in Sprites, Glymour and Scheines [2000],
Hitchcock [2001a] and Halpern and Pearl [2005] (following Pearle [2000]) but I be-
lieve the most comprehensive and philosophically sophisticated account was given by
Woodward’s seminal book Making Things Happen [2003]. Given its status and the
great interest that it has generated, I will focus almost exclusively on Woodward’s
account but the broader issues will be common (in one form or another) across all
extant views of causal modelling. I will begin with some preliminary explanation of
the modelling project and then compare Woodward’s account with the ACCT Analysis
on offer just as I did with contrastivism.
9.3.1 Causal Modelling Introduced
Modelling accounts have in common the idea of forming structural equations between
variables and defining causal connections between the variables in terms of those equa-
tions. The pairing of the Variables (V) and the Equations (E) forms the modelM, so
M=[V,E]. Whether or not one variable is a cause of another is determined by whether
a certain kind of intervention performed upon the first variable alters the state of the
second variable. Thus, it is a form of counterfactual dependence theory, where the
dependencies are encoded in the structural equations in particular and therefore in the
model in general. Theories differ on what the appropriate variables might be, what
makes for an appropriate model, which variables should be included and what exactly
counts as an intervention. There is also disagreement about what the ambition of such
a programme is—to define causation or causal explanation.
Setting those issues aside for the moment, consider this simple example. Suppose
that Suzy is alone and throws a rock at a window. The rock hits the window and
the window smashes. In this scenario we have three variables ST (Suzy throws), SH
(Suzy’s rock hits the window) and S (the window smashes). Variables can take a
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(possibly continuous) range of values but in this case let us stipulate that Suzy can
throw hard (ST=2), Normal (ST=1) or not at all (ST=0). That the rock either hits
the window (SH=1) or it does not (SH=0) and that the window either breaks (S=1)
or it doesn’t (S=0). Let me also state that no matter how hard it is hit, the window
will break if struck at all and that in the actual situation Suzy threw the rock hard
(ST=2), it struck the window (SH=1) and the window broke (S=1).
Now we can form the structural equation for this scenario. Those variables which
are given a specified value are named exogenous and those whose value derives from
the others in the model is endogenous. For each endogenous variable in the model
there is an equation that takes that variable on the left hand side and some equation
for working out its state on the right. For the simple example given, here are the
equations for the case described:
ST = 2 (exogenous)
SH = 0 if (ST=0), 1 otherwise (endogenous)
S = SH (endogenous)
This model therefore specifies every possible state that every variable will take once
ST is known. This means that we can determine what value S would take if an inter-
vention was performed to alter ST from ST=2 to ST=1. Under such an intervention
the resultant value would remain S=1 so no matter whether Suzy throws hard or nor-
mally the window still breaks. If a causal modelling theory required that for ST to
be a cause of S every alteration of ST would have brought about some alteration of S,
then since this intervention on ST made no difference to S, Suzy’s throw would not be
a cause of the window breaking. This is clearly false.
Why this is false is perhaps familiar from my discussion in Chapter 4. We do not
care that there is some feature of the cause that has no impact on the effect, we care
that there is some other feature of the cause which does. Causal modelling theories
recognise this and typically take a variable X to be a cause of variable Y just in case
there is some alteration of X in the model that changes the value of Y. So, since
intervening on ST such that ST=0 alters S from S=1 to S=0, ST is a cause of S, even
if no other alteration of ST made any difference to S. Suzy is a cause of the window
breaking after all.
Two other concepts will be required for the forthcoming discussion. Woodward’s
theory (which I take to be representative and to which I will default to on detail),
employs the notion of a direct cause (DC) and the notion of a path. Intuitively a direct
cause is an unmediated cause but here is Woodward’s more precise definition:
DC: A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y
with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention
on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution for Y) when all
other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at some value by
interventions. [2003, p.55]
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The reason for the clause about fixing all the other variables is that you may
intervene on ST in our model (ST=0) and that will change the value of S (S=0) but
ST is not an unmediated cause of S because the rock must first hit the window or not
as represented by variable SH). On Woodward’s careful definition ST is not a direct
cause since holding SH at its value in the actual case (SH=1), no intervention on ST
makes a difference. (It is worth noting for later the oddity of Suzy’s rock hitting
the window but her not throwing it—that is the sort of situation under consideration
and the oddity of some permissible combinations of variables will be relevant when
discussing pre-emption below). Interventions on SH on the other hand do vary S even
when every other variable is held fixed, so SH is a direct cause of S (and ST is a direct
cause of SH too).6
Intuitively a directed path is the route or chain by which a cause impacts on the
effect. More precisely a path is a series of direct causes that runs from X to Y. The
notion of a path is used to define what it is to be a contributing cause: X is a con-
tributing cause of Y so long as there is some manipulation of X that alters Y when all
off-path variables in the model are held fixed at their actual values.7
Much more detail is required to do justice to the depth and complexity of causal
modelling approaches in general and Woodward’s in particular. Here, though, I will
stick to the points that I need and bring out detail where it matters. Before I begin
to look at how this account fares on the issues of contextualism, transitivity, absences
and redundancy, I first want to point out some features of this approach that relate to
the questions that were raised in this thesis.
The first issue to note is that the causal relata need not be events. Whatever can
take a value of a variable in the model is ripe to be considered a cause. The variables
in the model might be ‘Suzy’s throw’ or ‘the velocity of the rock’ or ‘the mass of the
rock’ or there might be a single variable which captures all of this information at each
given value: if Suzy throws a 4kg rock at 15m/s the value of the ST variable is ST=3,
if she throws a 2kg rock at 15m/s the value of the ST variable is ST=27, and so on.
Alternatively the ST variable could have just two values: throws (ST=1) and does not
throw (ST=0) ignoring the different ways each state might manifest.
The point here is that causal modelling is strictly compatible with a further re-
quirement that only events can occupy the variable slots, though it would seem to be
unmotivated from the point of view of tracking counterfactual dependencies. Equally,
it could be the case that the only causal claims we are interested in concern coarse-
grained events which would be represented as sets of variables set at a value. Thus the
event c is not represented simply the value of one variable (X) but rather by a range
of values of variables [V1 = v1,V2 = v2,V3 = v3 . . .Vi = vi]. So, causal modelling is
compatible with the assumption that coarse-grained events are the causal relata, but
causal modellers do not restrict themselves to that notion.
6Weslake [forthcoming, p.6] seems to think that as long as X appears on the RHS on the equation
for Y, X is a direct cause of Y. This might prove neater but the case for such a variation on the DC
definition is not made.
7This appears to be weakness in Woodward’s programme. Weslake [forthcoming] argues that by
holding all the off-path variables fixed at their actual values, simple pre-emption cases get the wrong
result. A full and detailed discussion of this issue is found in his [forthcoming].
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Notice, though, that there is a choice to be made when setting up the model as
to how to represent the occurrences in the world. As I showed with ST above, it can
take a wide range of values which capture a lot of information about the world under
a single variable (ST) or the model could simply capture a binary value (1,0) for that
variable (ST). Each element in the world could, in theory, have its own variable or it
could be categorised into a smaller list of variables (Throw, Velocity, Mass), each of
which take one of a larger range of values. The point here is that the model could
have fewer variables, each with many values, or it could have more variables with fewer
values and the choice here is not dictated by the way the world is but rather by how we
choose to represent it in the model. Woodward is clear on this issue: “. . . conclusions
about causal relationships are sensitive to one’s choice of representation.” [2003, p.80]
So, different contexts may well require different assignments of values and variables.
Bearing this in mind, reflect on the definition of a direct cause. A direct cause is one
unmediated by other variables in a given model. And a contributing cause is further
defined in terms of paths of direct causes. Thus whether something is a contributing
cause or a direct cause is a model-relative matter. I will say more on this in the next
section but it is a striking feature of causal modelling approaches in general.
Finally, consider the notion of an intervention in Woodward’s theory. An inter-
vention is an idealised manipulation of the actual values where at least one variable
is set to a non-actual value regardless of whether that variable was endogenous or ex-
ogenous in the set-up of the model. This makes a great deal of sense when we look
at the directed graphs that are typical in modelling texts. These graphs link vertices
(representing variables) and use arrows to depict direct causal connections between
the variables. An intervention that alters the value of a variable effectively ‘severs’
the inward arrows on the graph to indicate that the intervention ensures that variable
is no longer a function of any other. This importantly relates to Lewis’s ‘miracles’.
For Lewis, when we consider what would have occurred under some modification or
other of the actual occurrences we should consider those closest worlds in which the
modification has been made. Here closest is playing a substantial role as it requires us
to rank worlds with alterations by their similarity to the actual world. Lewis [1979]
gives some guidelines about how we should do this but Woodward [2003, p.134–137]
criticises Lewis’s criteria as under-motivated and ambiguous. According to Woodward
we should think of interventions as a special kind of idealised causal contribution that
alters the value of some variable and holds fixed certain others. One might well agree
with Woodward’s complaints about Lewis’s system but it is important to note that by
characterising an intervention in causal terms, as Woodward does, the resultant theory
of causation is explicitly non-reductionist. Direct causes and contributing causes are
defined in part by the notion of an intervention, and an intervention is in turn defined
in causal terms. We have a circular definition of causation. Woodward is adamant
that the circularity is not vicious and that it remains illuminating but we need not
disagree with him on either of these points to conclude that something desirable has
been compromised by this approach: namely a reductive account of causation.
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9.3.2 Everyday Causal Talk
Having set the prelimenaries, I will now compare the prospects of a Woodward-style
causal modelling approach to the ACCT Analysis I have advocated in light of my
desiderata (I)–(III). First, to the requirement that a viable theory ought to account for
our ordinary causal claims. Again, I will take each variety of problem discussed in the
thesis and consider how causal modelling theories and the ACCT Analysis compare in
handling these cases.
Contextualism: Causal modelling theories define variables as causes relative to
a model where the model in question is influenced by the contextually salient factors.
If context indicates that the salient difference is between serving awkwardly and serv-
ing gracefully (see Chapter 2), stealing rather than not stealing or drinking hemlock
rather than not, then the model will reflect that by including these variables and the
appropriate values of those variables. The truth of a causal claim can thereby shift
with context, as the examples discussed in Chapter 2 would suggest.8
Absences: Modelling theories are concerned only with variables and values of
variables and so no ontological commitment to the nature of absences is required. If
the plants being watered is a variable that can take values 1 or 0, then that variable
set to 0 appears to indicate an absence or an omission. If shifting the value of that
variable from 0 to 1 alters the value of some other variable (plants dying) in the model
(holding off-path variables fixed) then the first variable is a cause of the second. So,
causal modelling can endorse absence causation as long as the model is appropriately
set up without having any trouble with the issue of locating the absence somewhere in
the world.
Causal modelling approaches can also reject the notion that the Queen’s failure
to water the plants caused them to die, since the context will not licence including
the Queen (or Obama or a velociraptor) as a variable in the model. This avoids the
problem of proliferation.
The problem of non-locality remains, however. If preventing Bomber at point A
entails some alteration to the subsequent state at point B, then the causal modeller will
endorse full-blooded causation between the two occurrences (in an appropriate model)
and so the Bomber has an impact at a spatiotemporal distance and disconnect. This
remains problematic.
Transitivity: Woodward’s approach does not require that causation be transitive
and is not committed to the counter-intuitive consequences of the counter-example
cases [p.57-58]. Nevertheless, some causes influence their effects in a mediated way
such that if the cause (X) had been varied, but some mediating variable (Z) along the
path to the effect (Y) had been held fixed, then X would not be considered a cause of
Y. Thus Woodward instead endorses the notion of a contributing cause whereby only
the off-path variables are held fixed [p. 59]. For an extended discussion of this issue
see Weslake [forthcoming]. On the whole, causal modelling approaches seem to have
the resources to give the right results in the problem cases so long as the model is
8I do not think that causal modelling approaches need be committed to a contextualist semantics to
account for this variation—a relativist semantics seems viable too—but it will streamline the discussion
to assume a contextualist reading.
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appropriately set up.
Redundant causation: cases of pre-emption and overdetermination are prob-
lematic for Woodward’s initial formulation of actual causation in just the same way as
they are problematic for Lewis: the effect is insensitive to each cause individually. This
motivates a further modification of Woodward’s account of what the off-path variables
should be set to when we are considering the causal status of mediated variables (i.e.
variables that influence the effect via another). A reminder of the late pre-emption
case:
LP: Billy and Suzy are out to vandalise. Each throws their own rock
accurately at a window but Suzy throws faster and her rock reaches the
window first. The window breaks and Billy’s rock sails through the void.
The causal modelling treatment of this case is to model Suzy’s throw (ST), Billy’s (BT),
Suzy’s rock hitting the window (SH) and Billy’s (BH), and the state of the window
(W). What this approach is able to demonstrate is that if you hold fixed the fact that
the backup (Billy’s rock) did not strike the window (BH=0), then the smashing of
the window (W) is sensitive to interventions on Suzy’s throwing of the rock (ST) and
hence Suzy is a cause of the window’s breaking. Exactly how you specify which off-
path variables are held fixed remains unclear in these cases, however. What is it about
Billy’s rock striking the window that picks that variable out to be held at its actual
value?9
Further, Hall [2006] argues that there is no state of the model that actually gets the
cases of late pre-emption correct. The apparent success of causal modelling in these
cases hinges on the idea that BH is held fixed at value 0. Leaving aside the important
issue of when to fix off-path variables, and at what values, BH=0 is ambiguous across
two different states of the world: one in which Billy’s rock vanishes, and another
where it passes through the space the window occupied (a moment after the window
smashed). This seems innocuous enough at first, after all causal modelling approaches
do not distinguish many ways in which a variable might take a value. However, Hall
argues that there is no stable disambiguation of BH=0 which yields the desired result
in the late pre-emption example. Suppose that BH=0 represents the rock not being
in the vicinity of the window, either because Billy didn’t throw it or because it has
vanished courtesy of an intervention. Suppose further that BH=1 represents Billy’s
rock striking the window and BH=2 represents Billy’s rock being in the same place as
BH=1 but where the window is not present. This successfully disambiguates the state
of Billy’s rock. Now, in the actual pre-emption case BH=2 by this schema since Billy’s
rock is in the right place to smash the window just Suzy got there first. Now, if Suzy
smashes the window first, then W=1, but if she doesn’t smash the window first, and
if BH is held fixed at BH=2, then how can the window not be smashed and yet Billy’s
rock pass through the space it occupies? Plainly it cannot. From this line of reasoning,
9I again direct the interested reader to Weslake [forthcoming] who discusses a range of options and
problem cases for Woodward’s, Hitchcock’s, and Halpern and Pearl’s existing attempts to resolve this
problem.
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Hall concludes that late pre-emption cases have not yet been resolved by the adoption
of a casual modelling approach to causation.
Even if we suppose that Hall is right about the existing approach, I think the causal
modeller can instead apply a model which contains enough fine discrimination between
variable so as to ensure that asymmetric cases of redundancy (pre-emption) no longer
give the wrong value. What I have in mind here is just the fragility strategy by a
different name: if X and Z are candidate causes for the window breaking and if X pre-
empts Z, then there will be a model such that window breaks at time t1 is one variable
and window breaks at time t2 is another. X is a cause of the first such variable and
deserves the title of cause, just like Suzy in the classic example.
Genuine overdetermination remains untouched by any fine-graining of the model
(otherwise Bunzl-style objections re-emerge as discussed in Chapter 7 §8.1.2).
I think the contextualism of the model and of my counterpart relations are in
fact related. The counterpart relation that applies to an event in a context tells us
under what conditions that event will be taken to occur and which it will not. This
is functionally equivalent to fixing the values that can be assigned to the variable that
represents that event in any causal model—it fixes the way the world must be for the
value 1 to apply to the ‘event occurred’ variable. I think this suggests that the causal
modeller and ACCT theorist are tracking the same contextual features.
Regarding absences, however, the causal modeller accords positive and negative
causes equal weight. In fact the causal modeller accords actual causes and would-
be causes equal weight in general, which I take to be problematic. A person claims
something rather different when they say that X did cause the accident than they do
when they say that X could have. In the first case we consider what did happen and
entertain counterfactuals about it (the ACCT Analysis and causal modelling theories
are alike in this regard). However, in the second case we consider what would have
occurred if I had acted in such and such a way and consider counterfactuals about that
would-be situation. I think this is an important distinction, and not just at the level
of normativity where responsibility is apportioned, but also at the level of causation
simpliciter. I had nothing to do with the accident in the second case but a causal model
which takes the variable Neil Intervenes (and values 0 for no, 1 for an ordinary sort of
intervention and 2 for an extremely unlikely intervention) will still consider me a cause
of the accident, even if the only way I could have intervened was by some very unlikely
and difficult process.10 The problem here is that would-be actions are considered on
a par with manifest actions in a causal model but not in our common sense reasoning
about causation. I take this is a weakness of causal modelling views.
The ACCT Analysis and Woodward’s version of interventionism share the denial of
the (straightforward) transitivity of causation.11 However the ACCT Analysis, unlike
Woodward’s, seeks to explain why we thought that it was. Here I think the score is
not yet settled, however, as there are rival accounts of how to define which off-path
10The modeller can, as always, insist that their model would exclude the more improbable option
that makes the claim so implausible, but I think this is just to highlight how dependent our causal
attributions are upon a seemingly fickle process of model creation.
11Recall that in Chapter 7 I denied that causation itself was transitive but argued that proportional
causation was.
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variables are to be held fixed when considering mediated causes. I remain optimistic
on behalf of the causal modeller, however, as they have the expressive resources to
say anything that the ACCT Analysis can about when chaining occurs and when it
doesn’t, and they can always add a transitivity clause to the theory if that is what
turns out to be best.
Pre-emption cases generate similar issues for the causal modeller regarding chaining,
but as I pointed out above, the appropriate model (i.e. one with the right variables and
the right values) can yield the right result. Some account of how to read the context in
the right way to justify such a model would need to be forthcoming, however. I offer
the beginnings of such a pragmatics in Chapter 3 but as far as I can tell, no comparable
account exists for the causal modeller.
Overdetermination cases cannot be resolved by interpolating variables, however. In
cases of genuine overdetermination, the end variable takes a specific value no matter
whether one, other or both of the putative causes and set to their actual values and no
amount of fine-graining the effect variable or value will tell the alternative combina-
tions apart. Notice though, that the distinctive pattern of counterfactual dependence
that I appealed to in Chapter 8 can be expressed just as easily in a causal modelling
framework. Where neither counts as a cause on its own, but where their conjunction
does, two variables can be defined as overdetermining the effect. This does not fall on
one side or the other of considering such overdetermining variables causes or not but,
as I argued previously, this is perhaps an advantage given that intuition is unclear as
to what the right answer is in these cases. I think the following from Woodward can
be read as supporting this approach:
My guess is that Lewis is wrong about common sense [regarding overde-
termination], but it also seems to me that in an important respect it does
not matter much whether we count c1 and c2 as causes of e in this case
as long as we can agree about what the relevant patterns of counterfactual
dependence are. [Woodward, 2003, p.85]
As with the comparison with the contrastivist, I take the honours to be roughly
even in this comparison. Held to the standard of everyday talk the ACCT Analysis
and causal modelling approaches can track contextual shifts in the semantic value of
a causal claim, account for absence causal attributions, avoid the counterexamples
regarding transitivity and offer a way of understanding redundant causation. I think it
is a straightforward weakness that the causal modelling approaches cannot distinguish
actual from would-be causation and, by extension positive from negative causal claims,
but I think that the expressive resources of a causal modelling theory which tracks
context (variables, values, paths and interventions) are extremely powerful and that
we should be hopeful on future progress on the outstanding issues when the target
concept is contextual.
9.3.3 Objectivity
The second requirement for my ACCT Analysis was that it give an account of the
mind-independent objective relation between events that was the causal relation. Here
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the ACCT Analysis gives a clear answer: c is a cause of e simpliciter iff ¬Pci ¬Oei.
Causal modelling, like contrastivism, is inherently context-embedded and also seems
at first glance to be ill-suited to giving an account of such an objective relation.
Woodward’s version has no pretensions of reduction but, once a model is estab-
lished, the truth conditions for causal claims are a matter of objective fact. To this
extent the theory does give us an objective-ish standard of causal relatedness between
variables. For the purposes of explanation and the functioning of science, Woodward
argues, this is objective enough [p.56-57].
Perhaps this sense of objective is enough for a causal explanation, but it is not
enough for the committed causal realist who seeks an account of the mind-independent
relation of causation. Considered as a theory of causal explanation, I have little to
complain about on this score—to my mind it is just as context and interest-dependent
as explanations ought to be—but as a standard of causation I think this fails the
objectivity requirement in its current form.
It remains open to the causal modeller, just as it did to the contrastivist, to endorse
a two-tier system of analysing causation along the lines of the ACCT Analysis: one
account for our talk and its explanatory role, and a second account of the genuine
relation of causation in the world that is independent of interest. The account given
by Woodward clearly fits the mould for the first sort of analysis but in order to meet
the requirements of the second sort of analysis there would need to be some singular
model that captured our world. Schaffer seems to agree:
But given that different models yield different causal verdicts, and given
that there is no unique notion of a canonical model for a given situation (at
least none yet developed), it might seem that the only remaining option is
to relativise causal relations to models. [Schaffer, 2014]
Could there be a canonical model? I think my argument from Chapter 5 in favour of
positing a privileged context suggests that there could. Models are relative to contexts
and so for there to be a canonical model there would need to be an appropriate context
in which every causal fact was captured. Such a context would be idealised one, and
one that stands out from all other contexts—it is a privileged context. In the privileged
context, I argued, every intrinsic feature of every region is relevant and so would need
to be represented in the model. A model which captures every detail and dependency
in the world would indeed deserve the title ‘canonical’.
There are two questions to ask of the canonical model: does it capture all of the
causal facts? Does it capture only the causal facts? I will focus on the second question
here without intending to prejudice the first.
By Lewisian standards, we assess a counterfactual conditional ¬c ¬e by checking
whether all of the closest possible worlds in which the antecedent is true are also
worlds where the consequent is true. Without the restriction to only the closest of all
possible worlds every contingent counterfactual conditional would be false since there
will always be some world where the antecedent is true and the consequent false. No
matter how odd that world might be, it remains within the scope of all worlds and
so to get meaningful truth conditions for our counterfactual conditionals, we need to
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restrict the worlds we consider. How to do this is indeed problematic, but Lewis gives
us an account to start with.
In trying to give a truly objective standard of causation, Woodward has a parallel
problem. If there is some non-actual value of X which would generate a non-actual value
of Y, then according to Woodward’s theory X causes Y (details aside for the moment).
Given that this theory allows X to be a cause of Y if any state of X would alter Y, then
if the model contains every possible value for X and not just some restricted interest-
relative set of values, then there will be some extremely improbable or remote possible
values that X could take. Suppose X represents the mass of some earthly object that
does not affect Y at all (it just outside the backwards light cone, say). An idealised
intervention on X to set the mass to that of Jupiter will indeed alter the value of Y. This
issue can be re-created indefinitely for a great many obvious non-causes. When the
model is relative to an ordinary context, such outlandish possibilities are prohibited by
the intuitive irrelevance of the possibility. However in the canonical model we require
a mind-independent standard by which we can restrict the values to only the realistic
or relevant ones. Lewis’s similarity criterion plays the role in his schema and that
approach has been roundly criticised by Woodward, but no equivalent is offered for the
causal modelling theory.
This is not exactly a criticism of Woodward’s theory of course since the avowed aim
of that theory is to give an account of causal explanation and causation-in-context.
Nevertheless, I think that it is a highly significant benefit of the ACCT Analysis
over causal modelling approaches that it can give a plausible account of the mind-
independent, objective relation of causation in our world.
9.3.4 Connection
Suppose for the sake of argument that there were some canonical model and that the
theory incorporating it somehow ruled out the far fetched and problematic cases. How
would that account of the mind-independent, objective causal relation connect with
the account of our ordinary talk?
I think the first thing to notice is that the canonical model would obviously endorse
many more causal relations in the world than a restricted, context-relevant, model.
Take a model which represents the firing of a gun (FG) and the death of a senator
(DS) and assume that if FG=1 then DS=1 too, but DS=0 otherwise. In the canonical
model there will be many more variables such as the pulling of the trigger (PT), the
motion of the hammer (H), the expulsion of gasses (EG) and so on that constitute the
act of firing the gun. We can also interpolate as many additional variables between FG
and DS as there are points in space between them. If FS is a cause of DS via a directed
path of such variables, then every variable on the path is a contributory cause, too.
Adding more variables adds more causation so the canonical model will posit more
causal relationships than a restricted and contextualised model will.
Perhaps the connections that count as causal on the contextualised model are a
strict subset of those that are causal on the canonical model. If so we should ex-
pect that when two variables are causally connected in a contextualised model, those
same variables will be causally connected in the canonical model. The following from
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Woodward would seem to support that thought:
[A]s long as there is a single causal rouite from X to Y, if X is a contributing
cause of Y, X will remain a cause of Y (although not a direct cause of Y) if
additional variables Z are interpolated between X and Y along this route.
Thus, in the example above, if A’s pulling the trigger is a contributing cause
of B’s death with respect to a variable set that does not include the release
of the spring, the hammer striking the cartridge, and so on, it remains
a contributing cause when the variable set is expanded to include these
variables. [Woodward, 2003, p.56]
The reverse is obviously false: you cannot infer from X being a cause of Y in
a model with many variables that X will still be considered a cause of Y on a less
detailed model. The model may not even include X or Y as variables! So this truth
preserving interpolation is asymmetric and it favours adding more detail and finer
discriminations rather than the opposite. I believe this idea is closely related to the
asymmetry of precision I discussed in Chapter 3. In that case I argued that tending
to a fragile interpretation meant that you tended to truth. Woodward seems to be
endorsing something rather similar.
A problem awaits, however. If the causal facts of a contextualised model are to
be a strict subset of the causal facts of the canonical model, then there had better
not be any causal connection that is taken to exist in the contextualised model but
not in the canonical model. However there is nothing to stop the variables in the
contextualised model being variables that do not appear in the canonical model at
all. Perhaps the variables representing firing a gun and the death of the senator are
macro-level variables that simply do not appear in the set of micro-level variables that
constitute the canonical model. If so there is a causal connection in one model that
does not appear in the other. Of course, if these macro-level variables reduce to micro-
level variables then there will still be a close connection between the two, but there
is no guarantee that every model will reduce in the appropriate way. There may be
variables that represent wildly disjunctive or gerrymandered properties in which only
one of those properties is considered a cause in the canonical model. How could we
reduce such a variable to its components without being taken to posit false causal
connections?
Once again this is a problem which has a parallel in the Lewisian approach. Lewis
has to stipulate that excessively extrinsic or disjunctive events cannot stand in a causal
relation. In doing so he is imposing a restriction on what the causal relata could be.
The causal modeller traditionally avoids specifying what the variables need to be in
their theory. Typically seen as a strength, perhaps this secular approach hinders the
causal modeller’s ability to draw a tight logical connection between the canonical and
contextualised models.
I have taken the Woodward theory quite far off the reservation in the hope that it
could be rendered metaphysically satisfactory by the lights I set in my introduction.
I cannot say that the trip was successful but it seems that there is scope to express
some of the same notions, and be open to some of the same problems and objections,
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as the ACCT Analysis. Perhaps some future version of a causal modelling theory will
be able to meet all of my desiderata, but for the time being the best candidate remains
the ACCT Analysis I have introduced and defended in this thesis.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have been arguing on the assumption that a viable theory of causation
should account not only for our causal talk, but also for the causal relation in the world.
Sceptics who deny that there is such a relation the world [Menzies, 2009, Menzies &
Price, 1993] will of course reject some of the reasoning that I have deployed in my case
for the ACCT Analysis of causation, but the viability of such a realist theory stands
as reason to think that those sceptics have given up on the naturalist project too soon.
They may continue to question the motivation for the theory I have offered, but the
viability of that theory undermines the motivation to be sceptical in the first place.
I too gave up swiftly on the idea that there was a single account to be given that
would match both desiderata but I did not give up on the hope that our causal talk and
the causal facts of the matter were related in some intimate way. The ACCT Analysis
that I have offered assigns the same basic counterfactual structure to the conditions for
true causal talk and for determining the brute causal facts concerning distinct events
c and e. Event c is a cause of e relative to counterpart relation x iff c and e are linked
by a chain of causal dependence, where e causally depends on c iff ¬Pcx ¬Oex is
true. In this rendition x is a free variable representing the counterpart relation under
which events c and e fall. In ordinary contexts where our everyday causal talk takes
place, the variable x is set to a context-sensitive value n representing the counterpart
relation that applies in that context. This relativises the truth of the conditional, and
so the truth of ordinary causal assertions, to contexts and interests in a way that is
at odds with a realist causal project. I argued in Chapter 5 that the genuine causal
relation should be taken to be determined in a privileged context and that in such a
context a canonical counterpart relation applies. This is signified by replacing x with i
in the counterfactual conditional above. Thus, a two-tier approach was proposed: one
tier for ordinary causal talk (where x is replaced by n) and another tier for the genuine
causal relation where (x is replaced by i).
So, we were left with two tests with a common structure, but how do they relate?
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I first tried to show that our causal assertions about c and e could only be true if c and
e were causally connected in the privileged context, that is: for all n (¬Pcn ¬Oen)
only if (¬Pci  ¬Oei). However, this attempt failed for an instructive reason: in
cases of prevention or would-be causation, the first can be true and the second false. I
deem prevention and would-be causation to be non-actual causation—a controversial
but precedented stance—and so this prompted me to introduce a further condition on
our causal talk to establish the actual causal connection between c and e in a way that
¬Pcn ¬Oen did not. This second condition on our causal talk required that the
following conditional (or chains thereof) be true: ¬Pci ¬Oen. Given that this final
condition can only be true if ¬Pci ¬Oei is true (see Chapter 9, §5.4), this extra
condition ensures that, by my theory, our causal talk asymmetrically depends upon
the causal facts. This is as it should be.
There are a cluster of objections that are commonly levelled against simple coun-
terfactual analyses of causation and I have discussed what I take to be the most prob-
lematic of these: contextual variation, late pre-emption, absence causation, failures
of transitivity, trumping pre-emption and overdetermination. In addressing contextual
variation in Chapter 2, I only required the resources of a counterpart theory of events to
rescue a simple Lewisian theory of causation (I called the combination CCT) and this
same counterpart theory allowed me in Chapter 3 to show a problem in Lewis’s reason-
ing around late pre-emption cases and his influential rejection of fragile events. Using
basic pragmatic maxims, I argued that a flexible standard of fragility was justified by
the context and could resolve the late pre-emption issues. This pragmatic approach
highlighted a hitherto unnoticed asymmetry in our standards of non-occurrence for
cause and effect and in Chapter 4 I argued that this asymmetry be built into our
causal analysis. Having argued that we needed a two-tier account using this asymmet-
ric standard (which I call ACCT) in Chapter 5, I then addressed the issues of absence
causation, transitivity and trumping/overdetermination with these new resources. In
Chapter 6 I argued that absence causation was not genuine and should be considered
would-be causation, i.e. causation centred on another world, in Chapter 7 that cau-
sation was not transitive but that proportional causation likely was, and in Chapter 8
that trumping cases were just overdetermination cases in disguise. Overdetermination
itself acquires a distinctive counterfactual profile on my ACCT Analysis and so what-
ever verdict intuition confers on such cases can be matched by fiat if required. Such
cases, and those of the more problematic action-at-a-distance cases are very-far fetched
given our physics, however.
I have not established that the ACCT Analysis is true, of course. That was never
the aim. The aim was to ‘measure the price’ as Lewis put it and I considered the
relative price of contextualist and causal modelling alternatives in Chapter 9. In that
discussion I showed that the ACCT Analysis could match many of the benefits of
the other theories at the level of our causal talk but that it was in a unique position
with respect to my realist assumptions. Of the views under consideration only my
ACCT Analysis could meet the desiderata that we (I) account for our everyday causal
assertions; (II) give an account of the mind-independent, objective standard for causal
connectedness between events; and (III) explain the relation of (I) and (II).
Lewis alluded to such a two-tier project in his Postscripts to Causation in [1986e,
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p.199] when he said ‘To say how the double standard works may not be a hopeless
project, but for the present it is not so much unfinished as unbegun.’ Having taken
great inspiration from his own work on the philosophy of causation, and having found
my own path within his neo-Humean framework, I hope I have shown that it is a far
from hopeless project and that it is, at last, begun.
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